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Editorial 
In 2010 the Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development of Bielefeld University started 
a new conference series on “Environmental Degradation, Conflict and Forced Migration” in 
cooperation with the European Science Foundation and the University’s Center for Interdis-
ciplinary Research. The new series gave opportunity to conference participants to share their 
research with a broader audience. The engagement of the editors in the COST Action IS 
1101 on Climate Change and Migration created additional opportunities to facilitate scientific 
exchange and cooperation on matters environmentally induced migration from various per-
spectives. Amongst others this included approaching it from a human rights angle, from an 
adaptation to climate change perspective, or to look at it as a state-led response including 
planned relocation. 
The scientific exchange culminated in various activities and projects including joint publica-
tions with other experts in the field such as the conference proceedings of the ESF-Bielefeld 
University conference series, innovative consultation processes on planned relocation in the 
context of climate change and climate policies, and new research projects such as “Migra-
tion, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy” (MECLEP, www.uni-
bielefeld.de/(en)/tdrc/ag_comcad/research/MECLEP.html) and ClimAccount on the human 
rights accountability of the EU for climate policies in third countries (www.uni-
bielefeld.de/(en)/tdrc/ag_comcad/research/ClimAccount.html). The editors take the oppor-
tunity to present some of the research outcomes within the COMCAD working paper series 
on environmental degradation and migration. 
  
Bielefeld, September 2016       Jeanette Schade and Thomas Faist 
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Abstract 
The case study report presents the results of the Barro Blanco case study by combining and 
elaborating on information and data collected during a pre-study report and data and insights 
gathered during field research. It analyzes the case study according to international human 
rights standards and applicable institutional safeguards. It also investigates to which extent 
public owners/shareholders of development banks can be heal responsible for the implemen-
tation of climate projects. 
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1. Introduction  
The case study report presents the results of the Barro Blanco case study by combining and 
elaborating on information and data collected during a pre-study report and data and insights 
gathered during field research. Contrary to the pre-study report, which outlined the legal and 
institutional as well as the policy context first and subsequently located the Barro Blanco pro-
ject within this context, the case study reports followed a more focused and inductive ap-
proach by first presenting the facts of the case and afterwards wider political and legal con-
text which are relevant for the case study. Thereby findings and data gathered throughout 
previous research is comprehensively presented (empirical analysis) before turning to a nar-
rowed down application of the relevant institutional and legal framework. 
In doing so, the report aims at providing important information for answering the following key 
research questions: 
1) How do the EU and its members, in particular Austria, influence and take part 
in the international governance structure in relation to climate policies (mitigation and 
adaptation) in the selected case study?  
a. In this connection, a special focus will be laid on how the EU and Aus-
tria address adverse effects of climate policies in general and human rights in-
fringements in the context of resettlement, relocation and displacement as a 
result of climate policies in particular. 
2) Which human rights obligations of the EU and its member states, in particular 
Austria, towards individuals and communities in third states can be identified concern-
ing the selected climate policies, especially with regard to those having an effect on 
migratory movements? 
3) What consequences do the selected climate policies have on migratory 
movements from a human rights perspective? 
4) Which gaps in the international legal and institutional framework to adequately 
protect people adversely affected by climate policies (with a focus on people dis-
placed, resettled or located) can be found? 
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5) Finally, a preliminary assessment should be made on which improvements 
should be made for the EU and Austria to better incorporate human rights principles 
in their climate policies. 
The report is divided into three chapters (excluding bibliography). The first aims at introduc-
ing the chosen project by not only providing an overview over the factual context, but also by 
highlighting the project’s setting in international/regional/local policies and by giving a concise 
overview of the stakeholder’s positions.  
Chapter 2 applies earlier research and analyzes it in the given context. Please note that for 
easier handling, parts of Chapter 1 are repeated in this section. In particular, the Chapter 
aims at answering the core research questions listed above and deals in detail with the al-
leged human rights violations.  
Chapter 3 focusses on discerning gaps in the institutional and legal framework and discuss-
ing open issues. It also offers preliminary conclusions, and functions as a first step in identify-
ing common/different aspects and forming recommendations.  
1.1 Background of the chosen project – The ‘Barro Blanco’ case 
1.1.1 Factual background 
Since the 1970s, there have been different plans for generating electricity on the river 
Tabasará, a river running through parts of Western Panama. A first project (Tabasará I, 200 
MW) was proposed as early as 1973, and eventually, after being met with decade-long sig-
nificant resistance, was cancelled. In 1997, a new consortium was created to develop 
Tabasará I and II which, however, again were never constructed after the Supreme Court 
suspended the project in 2000 (Panama Supreme Court, 2000) in light of the project having 
failed to engage in consultations and obtain the assent of the affected indigenous communi-
ties (as required by Law 41 of 1998). (ACD, 2009; Purdy, 2013) 
Following amendments in the law – repealing certain requirements relating to the participa-
tion and acquiescence1 which is to be obtained from indigenous communities (International 
Rivers, 2013; Velásquez Runk, 2012, p. 28) –, a new concession in 2007 was awarded to 
1   See also Section 2.2.1.2.1 in more detail. 
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Generadora del Istmo, S.A. (GENISA) after a public tender process to develop these pro-
jects. (GENISA, 2011, p. 8)  
The envisioned hydroelectric power plant, Barro Blanco, is being constructed and will be 
operated by GENISA, a company created under Panamanian law in 2006 especially for the 
purpose of developing, building and operating the Barro Blanco power plant (GENISA, 2011, 
p. 9). Honduran-owned2 GENISA is part of a Central American economic group owning more 
than 450 MW of installed power generation capacities in the region. 
As the earlier plans for Tabasará I and II, the Barro Blanco dam is located on the river 
Tabasará, in the immediate proximity to an Annex area to the Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé (as 
created by Law 10 of 1997). The project works are located in the province of Chiriquí (district 
of Tolé). Once finished3, it is intended to have an installed capacity of 28.84 MW (Barro 
Blanco PDD, 2010), which is much less than the originally suggested Tabasará I and II pro-
jects.  
The estimated project costs of Barro Blanco amounting to 78,316,800 USD are financed by 
the Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft GmbH (DEG), the Netherlands De-
velopment Finance Company (FMO), and the Central American Bank for Economic Integra-
tion (CABEI) (each approximately 25 million USD). (FMO/DEG Barro Blanco Complaint, 
2014) The latter replaced funding originally sought through the EIB, this loan application 
however withdrawn by GENISA in 2010 after learning that the EIB planned to visit the affect-
ed area after a complaint registered with the EIB CM (Complaint Mechanism). (EIB Barton, 
2013; EIB CM, n.d.)  
GENISA is supplied inter alia by ANDRITZ HYDRO Spain which provides electro-mechanical 
equipment (Andritz, 2013, p. 30). 
In June 2011, Barro Blanco was approved as a CDM project by the CDM Executive Board 
under the Kyoto Protocol (CDM EB, 2011). The Designated Operational Entity (DOE) for the 
validation report was AENOR, the Spanish Association for Standardisation and Certification. 
It constitutes a category 1 project (‘renewable source energy industries’). In total, it is esti-
mated that a total reduction of emissions of 1,405,622 t CO2 will be achieved. (Barro Blanco 
PDD, 2010, p. 8) For more details on this, see also below Section 1.2.3. 
2   The chairman of company is Luis Kafie, a Hondurian investor.  
3   As of June 2016, the dam is finished and is currently being test-flooded. 
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The main controversial points of the projects are  
• the fact that although the project is built outside of the indigenous territory it affects an 
annexed territory of the Comarca and will flood indigenous land;  
• the procedure and quality of the EIA; 
• the process of involving indigenous communities; 
• the social and ecological impacts of the project; 
• the human rights impact of the project; 
• and the fact that several indigenous communities will be evicted as the area where 
their houses are located will be flooded. 
The following table provides an overview of the chronology of events until June 2016.  
Date Event Sources 
2006 
ASEP cancels the contracts to the development of 
previous hydro-plant projects at the Tabasará river 
and issues a new tender calling for new companies to 
develop hydro-power project at this river. GENISA 
participates in the tender und wins the concession to 
develop the Barro Blanco Hydro-Plant. 
(GENISA, 2011, p. 8) 
 
14 Jan 
2008 
GENISA submits EIA to ANAM.  
 
The EIA is made for a 19.99 MW dam – only later did 
GENISA change this to the current 28.84 MW. This 
modification was accepted by ANAM in 2010 and 
ASEP in 2011 without any supplemental EIA. 
(GENISA, 2011, p. 10) 
 
(Barro Blanco PDD, 2010) 
(FMO/DEG Barro Blanco 
Complaint, 2014, p. 13) 
8 Feb 
2008 
The only public forum for the project is held at the 
School in Veladero, a village in the district Tolé, which 
is the province of Chiriquí. Tolé is not located in the 
Comarca and is difficult to reach from the affected 
communities. According to CIAM there were about 41 
participants. The forum was held in Spanish. ‘This 
forum was held under the moderation of Chiriqui Re-
gional Administration of ANAM, and at no point of the 
process involved the Regional ANAM Administration 
of the Ngobe-Bugle Comarca.’ (CIAM n.d.) 
The people directly affected allege that they were nei-
ther adequately informed about the forum nor were 
they granted free access to the forum. Information 
was circulated in advance per Spanish flyers. 
GENISA reports that the public forum was also adver-
tised in the radio and in the newspaper as well as per 
posters. 
No direct contact with the affected communities was 
sought. 
(Counter Balance, 2011, p. 
23) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Intercontinental Cry, 2011) 
 
 
(GENISA, 2011, p. 18) 
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9 May 
2008 
ANAM approves the EIA by issuing resolution 
DIEORA IA-332-2008. Concerning the EIA, Barro 
Blanco is classified as a Category III project (Estudio 
de Impacto Ambiental Categoría III).  
 
13 Dec 
2008  
GENISA signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) on leasing terms of Ngäbe land, with the Ca-
cique.  
However, the Cacique was not backed by the Ngäbe 
General Congress, which makes the agreement inva-
lid. 
(GENISA, n.d.) 
 
(Banktrack, n.d.) 
15 Feb 
2011 
Request for immediate intervention sent to UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
James Anaya. 
‘Supuesta movilización de protesta por parte de 
pueblos indígenas. Según la información recibida, el 
10 de febrero de 2011, la Asamblea Nacional aprobó 
la controvertida reforma al Código de Recursos 
Minerales, facilitando la inversión extranjera en la 
explotación minera. Panamá cuenta con el segundo 
mayor yacimiento de cobre del planeta, ubicado en el 
Cerro Colorado, el cual se encuentra dentro de la 
Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé. Los pueblos indígenas 
Ngäbe-Buglé alegan no haber sido consultados sobre 
la reforma de la ley, y los dos pueblos no comparten 
una posición común con respecto a la reforma. Se 
han sucedido violentos enfrentamientos entre los 
mismos indígenas a la puerta de la Asamblea. Las 
movilizaciones y confrontaciones se habrían 
generalizado en todo el país.’ 
 
UN Doc. A/HRC/18/35/Add.1 
16 Feb 
2011 
Construction of the dam begins. It was estimated that 
the construction would take approximately 28 months. 
(GENISA, n.d.)  
27 Feb 
2011 
Signing of the San Félix agreement to end protests 
(blocking various sections of the Panamericana) after 
the beginning of the construction of the dam. Partici-
pants and signatories of the agreement were the gov-
ernment (MoG Demetrio OAOADIMITRUI), the coor-
dinating body for the defence of the natural resources 
and rights of the Ngäbe-Buglé and campesinos (Co-
ordinadora por la Defensa de los Recursos Naturales 
y del Derecho de los Pueblos Ngäbe, bugle y Cam-
pesino) (Chief Rogelio Montezuma).  
The government promised to initiate the creation of a 
law prohibiting the exploration and exploitation of min-
ing and mineral exploration within the Comarca 
Ngäbe-Buglé (this in response to the controversial 
Law 8). 
(Special Rapporteur on Indi-
genous Peoples, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 
2014, para. 43)  
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March-
May 
2011 
M10 (April 10 Movement for the Defense of the 
Tabasará) occupies the entrance to the Barro Blanco 
project, hindering the continuation of the building of 
the dam for about two months.  
 
(International Rivers, 2013)  
(CMW, 2011)  
 
April 
2011 
A Tripartite Dialogue Table – 1 part goverment, 1 part 
GENISA, 1 part M10 – is formed. 
After a meeting on 3 May 2011, however, dialogue 
broke down. At that point, M10 refused to continue 
negotiations whilst the mayor of Tolé threatened to 
evict them from the encampment. 
(GENISA, 2011, p. 39)  
 
(Schertow & Arghiris, 2011)  
4 May 
2011 GENISA applies for carbon credits.  
(Schertow & Arghiris, 2011) 
5/6 
May 
2011  
M10 organises a roadblock of the Panamerican high-
way at the bridge over the Rio Tabasará.  
(International Rivers, 2013) 
31 May 
2011 
CIAM files a claim/lawsuit against resolution DIEORA 
IA-332-2008 approving Barro Blanco Hydroelectric 
Project before the Supreme Court of Panama.  
 
Demanda Contencioso 
Administrativa de Nulidad, 
con Solicitud Especial de 
Suspensión Provisional, 
Contra la Resolución 
DIEORA IA-332-2008 de 9 
de Mayo de 2008, Proferida 
por la Administradora 
General de la Autoridad 
Nacional del Ambiente 
(ANAM) 
June 
2011 
Barro Blanco is approved as a CDM project under the 
Kyoto Protocol (Project 3237). 
(CDM EB, 2011)  
28 July 
2011 
GENISA publishes an Environmental and Social 
Summary Report on the Barro Blanco Hydroelectric 
Project. The report introduces the main facts of the 
project, elaborates on the regulatory and policy con-
text and introduces GENISA’s environmental and so-
cial management system. It further reports on key 
social and environmental issues including social im-
pacts and issues and impacts on the Ngäbe Buglé 
indigenous community. 
The report (p. 12) refers to the project being devel-
oped to comply with the following international stand-
ards: 
- Social and Environmental Performance Stand-
ards (PS) of the International Finance Corpo-
ration (IFC) 
- WB Environmental Health and Safety Guide-
lines 
(GENISA, 2011)  
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- Environmental standards of the World Com-
mission on Dams (WCD) 
The report also states that ‘no-one will be relocated 
because of the project’ (p. 18) and that despite a small 
part (6.7 ha) of land being flooded which belongs to 
the indigenous Ngäbe Buglé people, compensation 
having being agreed on in May 2011 with the ‘new 
recognized leaders’ (pp. 30-31). As argued by 
GENISA, the land/areas which will be lost to the pro-
ject (submerged by the reservoir) are areas which are 
not under cultivation or used for any productive use 
because of the topography (p. 36) 
The following mitigation measures (pp. 37-38) were 
envisioned by GENISA at this stage: 
- provision of alternative land if requested 
(would be negotiated with the Comarca au-
thorities) 
- technical assistance to increase agricultur-
al productivity and assistance in improving 
housing 
- annual income to the community for devel-
opment projects through rental payments 
- MoU with the General Cacique (p. 39) 
25 Aug 
2011 
A compensation and benefits agreement was signed 
between GENISA and the Board of Directors of Re-
gional Congress of Kädriri (Indigenous Traditional 
Authority).  
But this agreement is contested as the whole con-
gress was not present at that meeting. Moreover, 
consent by the General Congress has never been 
publicly obtained. 
Financing by DEG and FMO is approved (secured 
project finance loan). 
 
(GENISA, n.d.) 
 
(Banktrack, n.d.)  
 
(FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, para. 
25)  
Aug/Se
pt 2011 
M10 and Both ENDS as well as Urgewald hold a tele-
phone conference with FMO and DEG, who confirm 
that they have followed their internal rules. 
That FMO has complied with its internal due diligence 
rules prior to approving the loan has also been con-
firmed at later stages by the Dutch government. 
(International Rivers, 2013) 
 
 
(Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, 2014)  
5 Feb 
2012 
To protest against the project, the Ngäbe indigenous 
communities block the Panamerican highway. 
This also because in the promised law which led to 
the San Félix Agreement (see above), at its first read-
ing, the article providing for the cancellation of com-
mercial mining concessions already in operation with-
in the comarca had been removed from the text. 
Two members of the Ngäbe community died during 
(Special Rapporteur on Indi-
genous Peoples, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 
2014, para. 43)  
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these demonstrations. 
7 Feb 
2012 
Representatives of the Panamanian government and 
the Cacique Silvia Carrera signed the San Lorenzo 
Agreement which laid down the conditions for ending 
a series of indigenous protests. The agreement re-
portedly contains the following obligations of the gov-
ernment (Kearns 2012): 
• Terminate all judicial prosecution of Ngäbe-
Buglé representatives and other protesters 
• Release those who had been arrested during 
the protests 
• Compensate and attend to the needs of the 
family of an indigenous protester who had 
been killed during the demonstrations 
• Restore cell-phone signals in the affected are-
as 
• Withdraw police from the indigenous territories 
and the protest site 
• Re-address laws concerning mining on Ngäbe-
Buglé lands 
• Continue mediation by catholic church 
• Publication of agreement 
• Demobilisation of the protesters from the sites 
• Medical attention of those indigenous protes-
tors who got wounded during demonstrations. 
A further part of the agreement was the decision that 
the UNDP would function as an observer, would ena-
ble a Technical Roundtable on Barro Blanco and carry 
out two missions to areas near the project.  
‘As a result of the round table on the Barro Blanco 
dam, the parties agreed to send a joint verification 
mission comprised of representatives of the Govern-
ment of Panama, the United Nations and the Ngobe-
Bugle comarca to the area to carry out a preliminary 
study on the impact of the project’ (para. 44) 
 
(Kearns, 2012)  
 
(Special Rapporteur on Indi-
genous Peoples, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 
2014, para. 44)  
 
15 Mar 
2012 
The Coordination for the Defense of Natural Re-
sources and the Rights of the Ngäbe Buglé Communi-
ty, the National Assembly, the Government and the 
Traditional Authority of the Comarca Ngäbe Buglé 
sign an agreement which stipulates that there will be a 
revision of the EIA report and a Mission of field verifi-
cation ‘to verify in situ aspects that were not satisfac-
tory’ (International Rivers, 2013). 
‘The purpose of the missions was to verify the impacts 
that had not been addressed satisfactorily in the envi-
ronmental impact assessment. The Technical 
(International Rivers, 2013)  
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Roundtable was seeking only to make findings of fact, 
and not an assessment of compliance against national 
or international standards.’ (FMO/DEG Barro Blanco 
Complaint, 2014, p. 7) 
A modified version of the mining law (Law 11, 26 
March 2012) is passed. 
18 May 
2012 
Occupation of project site due to disagreements be-
tween different groups (Ngäbe traditional authorities 
(not recognized by the government) such as the Tradi-
tional Ngäbe Congress President Celio Guerra and 
the Vice Cacique Mijita Andrade and local campesin-
os (peasants)).  
While those in support of the Cacique Silvia Carrera 
maintained that the Verification should ‘document’ the 
degree of impact, the other fraction maintained that 
the project must be stopped at all costs.  
This results in delays of the verification mission, while 
the construction continues. 
(International Rivers, 2013) 
23-28 
Sept 
2012 
A joint verification mission was carried out visiting the 
construction site of the dam and the communities of 
Quebrada Caña, Kiad and Nuevo Palomar.  
The group consisted of three representatives of the 
Ngäbe-Buglé community, three of the Traditional Au-
thority, three representatives of the company, three 
representatives of the government, three representa-
tives of the UN and a representative of the catholic 
church.  
They recommended that an international team of ex-
perts should carry out an independent study. 
Their report is published in December 2012. 
(Misión de Verificación, 
2012)  
 
 
Jan-
Mar 
2013 
Protests and confrontations continue. 
(International Rivers, 2013) 
June 
2013 
Visit by Lilianne Ploumen, the Dutch Minister for For-
eign Trade and Development, to Panama. 
(Ministerie van Buitenlandse 
Zaken, 2014)  
14 
June 
2013 
Request to James Anaya to meet about the Barro 
Blanco project during July 2013 visit to Panama was 
sent by CIAM, M10, AIDA, CIEL, International Rivers, 
Marin Interfaith Task Force, Collective Voices for 
Peace, ASAMCHI, Carbon Market Watch, Earthjus-
tice, Both ENDS, Salva la Selva 
 
(CIAM et al., 2013a)  
19-26 
July 
2013 
Visit of James Anaya. 
(Special Rapporteur on Indi-
genous Peoples, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 
2014)  
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29 Aug 
2013 
AIDA, CIEL and EARTHJUSTICE submit an amicus 
brief to the Panamanian Supreme Court of Justice 
supporting the lawsuit filed by Félix Wing Solis (CIAM) 
in the name of and representing Adelaida Miranda, 
Ítalo Jiménez, Eugenio Carpintero and Manolo Miran-
da challenging the Resolución DEORA IA-332-2008 of 
9 May 2008 of ANAM. 
CIEL argues that the government of Panama violated 
international law by approving the Barro Blanco pro-
ject without sufficiently consulting the affected Ngäbe-
Buglè indigenous community and violating the obliga-
tion of obtaining free, prior and informed consent and 
without sufficiently investigating the impacts on their 
lands. 
(AIDA, CIEL, Earthjustice 
Amicus Curiae, 2013) 
 
(CIEL Press release, 2013) 
 
9 Sept 
2013 
After the December 2012 report by the verification 
mission (Misión de Verificación, 2012), the UN con-
ducts a second mission under its leadership in June 
2013 (Peritaje Independiente – Independent Expert 
Assessment). 
Following this, the UNDP releases the following three 
reports and an executive summary:  
• The Results of the Diagnóstico Rural Participa-
tivo (Castro de la Mata, 2013a), one of the 
three components of the international expert 
assessment of the hydro-electric project Barro 
Blanco. The objective of this report was to find 
out the attitude, perception and the knowledge 
of the population in the areas directly influ-
enced by the Barro Blanco project. 
• An Analysis of Ecological and Economic As-
pects (Castro de la Mata, 2013b). The aim of 
this report is to independently determine the 
ecological impacts of the Barro Blanco project 
and to facilitate a better understanding of eco-
nomic impacts on the local Ngäbe communi-
ties concerning natural resources.  
• Peritaje independiente de la presa de Barro 
Blanco, Panamá: informe final de la 
component de ingeniería hidráulica (López 
García, 2013): The final report on the hydraulic 
engineering component. The objective of this 
report is to carry out a study on the concrete 
impact of potential flooding caused by the res-
ervoir of the Barro Blanco the dam through 
simulations of water flow and to determine the 
safety limit to ensure the welfare of ancestral 
lands in which the dam is built. 
The studies concluded that the project’s impacts on 
the environment and the Ngäbe communities in ques-
tion could be mitigated but that appropriate consulta-
(Castro de la Mata, 2013a) 
(Castro de la Mata, 2013b)  
(López García, 2013)  
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tions with the indigenous peoples in question had not 
been carried out and that the direct and indirect im-
pacts had not been clearly explained or understood. It 
went on to say that the direct impacts could certainly 
affect the community as a whole and should be miti-
gated properly. 
20 
Sept 
2013 
ASEP informs the first of the affected Ngäbe families 
of eviction from their land. The notification, Edicto de 
Notificación AOL 262-13 from 20 September 2013, 
was issued to Manolo Miranda. His family of approxi-
mately 50 members would face eviction. The notice 
determined a compensation of $ 4,000 Balboas 
($4,000 USD) for taking this land. (Urgent Appeal, 
2014, p. 5) 
(Urgent Appeal, 2014) 
 
26 Dec 
2013 
On Manolo Miranda’s behalf, CIAM filed a lawsuit to 
challenge the authorization to take family Miranda’s 
land for the construction of the Barro Blanco project 
(Urgent Appeal, 2014, p. 5) 
(Urgent Appeal, 2014) 
7 Feb 
2014  
ASEP informs Mr. Manolo Miranda that the company 
GENISA is authorized to enter his land at 10 am on 17 
February 2014. On 18 February 2014, ASEP an-
nounced that it had annulled this decision (Urgent 
Appeal, 2014, p. 6) 
(Urgent Appeal, 2014) 
 
18 Feb 
2014 
On behalf of the Ngäbe Community, M10, Earthjus-
tice, AIDA and CIEL submit an urgent appeal to the 
United Nations Special Rapporteurs on adequate 
housing, indigenous peoples, the right to food, the 
human to safe drinking water and sanitation, poverty 
and human rights, the right to education calling upon 
‘the State of Panama to suspend the eviction process 
and dam construction until it has complied with its 
obligations under international law’ and on ‘the States 
of Germany and the Netherlands, as well as the 
member States of the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration (CABEI), to suspend the financ-
ing of the project until each country has taken appro-
priate measures to prevent their respective develop-
ment banks from violating the Ngäbe’s human rights.’ 
(Urgent Appeal, 2014, pp. 1–2) 
(Urgent Appeal, 2014) 
(CIEL Press release, 2014)  
28 April 
2014 
The traditional authority of the Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé, 
Silvia Carrera Concepción, and the General President 
of M10, Goejeth Miranda, file a complaint with the 
independent complaints mechanism of the FMO and 
DEG. Amongst others, they claim that they have not 
been adequately informed and their consent has not 
been sufficiently obtained in the course of the EIA 
commissioned by GENISA and approved by ANAM.  
The essence of the complaint relates to the fact that 
the failure to ensure the project’s compliance with 
(Letter to FMO complaints 
office, 2014)  
(FMO/DEG Barro Blanco 
Complaint, 2014)  
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international human rights standards violated the fi-
nancing institutions standards, i.e. IFC’s performance 
standards, FMO’s human rights policy and the OECD 
Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. 
With the support of two NGOs from the Netherlands, 
Both ENDS and SOMO, the contribution of which was 
released as Annex 1: Analysis of Policies and Proce-
dures to the complaint letter on 5 May 2014.  
The Annex contains a project description, a presenta-
tion of the environmental and human rights impact as 
well as of the domestic legal proceedings. It also con-
tains a section on admissibility criteria and a discus-
sion of how FMO’s policies are violated by the project.  
The Independent Expert Panel of the banks (DEG and 
FMO) have declared the complaint as admissible and 
decided on conducting a compliance review.  
3 July 
2014 
Release of the report by Special Rapporteur James 
Anaya on the situation of the rights of indigenous 
peoples in Panama. The report contains a section on 
investigation projects in Panama including the Barro 
Blanco hydro-electric dam.  
In the conclusions, the report recommends that in the 
light of the experiences of inadequate consultations of 
indigenous communities in the course of the devel-
opment of recent hydro-electric projects (Barro Blan-
co, Chan 75) a framework in order to regulate consul-
tation processes in cases of hydro-electric projects 
and mining which have an effect on indigenous com-
munities should be established in coordination with 
indigenous representatives.  
Regarding Barro Blanco the report further says that 
the lands of the Ngäbe people should not be flooded 
nor otherwise affected without prior agreement with 
the representative authorities of this community on the 
conditions of such an inundation or on other effects. 
Without the agreement or consent of Ngäbe people, 
the state could only allow to restrict the land rights of 
the people under a general public interest within the 
framework of human rights, and only to the extent that 
the restriction is necessary and proportionate to the 
public interest. 
(Special Rapporteur on Indi-
genous Peoples, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 
2014) 
 
Octo-
ber 
2014 
Fact-finding mission to Panama by the FMO/DEG 
complaint mechanism. 
The independent expert panel consists of Maartje van 
Putten, Michael Windfuhr, and Steve Gibbons. 
 
 
(DEG, n.d.) 
9 Feb 
2015 
Project temporarily suspended by ANAM due to fail-
ures of the EIA.  
Round table negotiations initiated once again. 
(ANAM, 2015)  
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4 May 
2015 
The international financing institutions send a letter to 
Isabel de Saint Malo, vice-president of Panama, to 
urge Panama to continue the project. 
The government announces that the construction will 
be resumed, however, presumably not with GENISA. 
New project developers might be sought.  
The government announces at the round table dia-
logue that it would seek loans from international banks 
to change developers.  
As a consequence to this announcement, the repre-
sentatives of the Comarca Ngäbe Buglé once again 
leave the newly-initiated round table negotiations. 
(Arghiris & Kennedy, 2015) 
 
 
(Both ENDS, 2015)  
(Bocharel, 2015)  
18 May 
2015 
FMO confirms on its website that completing the pro-
ject is commendable.  
(FMO, 2015b)  
29 May 
2015 
The Independent Expert Panel (IEP) issues their re-
port on Barro Blanco. 
FMO and DEG publish a Management Response to 
the report at the same time. 
(FMO/DEG IEP, 2015)  
4 June 
2015 
M10 presents a letter of concern to the Dutch and 
German embassies in Panama and blocks the entry to 
the construction site for several weeks. 
(M10 et al., 2015) 
24 
June 
2015 
Response of DEG to ARD ‘Report Mainz’ of 23 June 
2015 
(DEG response, 2015)  
19 July 
2015 
After blocking the construction site for more than a 
month, indigenous protesters are forcibly removed 
from their protest camped, by parts of it being flooded 
through the police. 
https://intercontinentalcry.org
/police-subdue-indigenous-
protest-camp-seize-barro-
blanco-hydro-plant/  
28 July 
2015 
The Supreme Court overruled the temporary suspen-
sion, allowing the project to continue. 
http://www.hydroworld.com/a
rticles/2015/07/supreme-
court-ruling-allows-work-to-
resume-on-panama-s-29-
mw-barro-blanco-
hydropower-project.html  
http://www.telesurtv.net/engli
sh/news/Panamas-Supreme-
Court-Rules-in-Favor-of-
Hydroelectric-Dams-
20150729-0019.html  
10 Au-
gust 
2015 
Government signs agreement with the leaders of the 
comarca (represented by Silvia Carrera) to create a 
new technical commission responsible for the Barro 
Blanco project. 
http://www.prensa.com/in_en
glish/Barro-
Blanco_21_4274782487.html  
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“The agreement focused on the creation of a team to 
study stabilizing the project to prevent it from impact-
ing nearby communities. It would also continue the 
dialogue on the viability and feasibility of the project. 
The indigenous authorities and the government 
agreed to accept the results and conclusions of the 
task force, and to use them as a basis for decisions 
on the future of the project. The government commit-
ted to not flooding the reservoir or to initiate opera-
tions of the project until a final agreement has been 
reached between the parties.” 
24 May 
2016 
Test flooding commences, accompanied with the 
forceful removal of parts of the affected communities 
from their lands. 
Others remain in protest camps 
http://www.ciel.org/news/barr
o-blanco-flooding-begins-un-
approved-hydro-dam-
indigenous-defenders-
forcefully-evicted/ 
 
1.1.2 Mapping of involved actors, institutions, policies and legislative framework 
Following a brief introduction into the political context of the Barro Blanco project, the sec-
tions will provide an introduction into the involved actors of the Barro Blanco process, as well 
as their respective involvements throughout the project’s approval and arising conflict situa-
tion. The Chapter will begin with studying the involved actors first at the national level, then 
turning to the international level. As the involved civil society is composed of both national 
and international partners, these will be addressed as a third part. Finally, the project opera-
tor, GENISA, will be shortly introduced. 
1.1.2.1  National level – Political context  
Panama’s territory is divided into nine provinces: Bocas del Toro, Chiriquí, Coclé, Colón, 
Darién, Herrera, Los Santos, Panamá, and Veraguas. Each province is headed by a gover-
nor (local authority). In addition, there are five comarcas, a system of demarcated indige-
nous regions introduced already in 1928. Since then, the comarcas have evolved into bodies 
of autonomous administration. See in more detail also below Section 1.1.3.4.  
Since the early 1990s, after decades of military governments (1968-1989) Panama has been 
on a path towards political and institutional change aimed at stabilising democracy. (Europe-
an Commission, E/2007/482, 2007)  
The wide inequality gap among Panama’s population constitutes a dominating factor. Ac-
cording to the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013), Panama suffers 
serious structural problems, in particular in its rural areas. In particular, there is a lack of inte-
 20 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
gration of the local population, often made up by indigenous communities, into the political 
and economic policies of the state (European Commission, E/2007/482, 2007). 
From 2009 to 2014, President Ricardo Martinelli was the head of state and head of govern-
ment. He was criticized inter alia for undermining the independence of the judiciary (by ap-
pointment of political allies to the Supreme Court). (Sullivan, 2012) As incumbent presidents 
may not stand for a second consecutive term, President Martinelli did not stand for re-
election. Instead, his Vice President, Juan Carlos Varela, was elected on 4 May 2014 as the 
new president. 
A large focus of the past government’s policy programme has been the increase in energy 
production to boost their industrial development. The sheer number of newly granted con-
cessions to construct and operate hydroelectric plants has been met with resistance by the 
affected (mainly rural) population and communities. This constitutes an important factor in 
the assessment of the political background of the project. 
1.1.2.2  National level – human rights framework 
In light of the human rights focus of the current assessment, a brief overview of the generally 
applicable human rights framework shall be presented at this stage. Further focus on Pana-
ma’s legislative framework in particular regarding the environment and indigenous peoples 
will be made in the respective sections. 
Panama is party to the following international human rights treaties (dates are only listed for 
those conventions of particular relevance to this case study): Convention against Torture 
(and its Optional Protocol), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (rati-
fication on 8 March 1977, its Optional Protocol (individual complaints procedure) was also 
accepted on 8 March 1977), the Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (ICED), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) (ratification on 16 August 1967), International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR, ratification on 8 March 1977, the Optional Protocol (individual 
complaints procedure) has so far not been ratified), International Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (CMW), Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties (CRPD). (OHCHR, 2015). 
Panama is also party to the Organization of American States (OAS) and to the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ratification 22 June 1978). It recognized the jurisdiction of the 
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Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 9 May 1990. Panama’s constitution4 guarantees 
fundamental human rights, which are generally respected. (European Commission, 
E/2007/482, 2007)  
Panama has so far only ratified ILO Convention No. 107, however, its laws governing indige-
nous affairs are among the most advanced (see also Section 1.1.3.4). However, as the 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination pointed out, there has 
been some concern in the past with regard to the gathering of statistical data (e.g. via means 
of a national census5) regarding indigenous peoples and Afro-Panamanians, as well as of 
their ability to full exercise human rights on equal terms. (CERD, UN Doc. 
CERD/C/PAN/CO/15-20, 2010, para. 10; HRC, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3, 2008, para. 
19)  
1.1.2.3  National level – Institutions and legislative framework 
1.1.2.3.1 La Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM) / Ministry of Environment (since 
2015) 
The National Environmental Authority (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente – ANAM) is the rele-
vant key actor at the national level. ANAM was created by Law 41 of 1 July 1998 (Ley Gen-
eral de Ambiente (General Law on the Environment)) which lays down the principal norms for 
the protection, conservation and recuperation of the environment and the promotion of the 
sustainable use of natural resources. It further regulates environmental managment and the 
integration of social and economic objectives in order to achieve a sustainable development 
of the country (Law 41, Art. 1). ANAM is the key regulatory authority responsible for ensuring 
compliance with and enforcing the laws, regulations and national environmental policy. As 
such, ANAM is also entitled to issue fines and sanctions. Until 2015, it was not a ministry but 
only an environmental authority. However, Law 41 was modified in February 2015, creating 
ANAM as a Ministry of Environment (Act No. 25, amending Law 41 of 1998).  
As ANAM’s role during the period between 2008-2015 is central, its previous structure will be 
analyzed in greater detail. According to Art. 5 of Law 41 (in the previous version), ANAM was 
established as an autonomous unit of the State dealing with the area of natural resources 
and environment in order to ensure compliance with and implementation of environmental 
4   For an unofficial English translation see https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Panama_2004.pdf.  
5   See in this regard also Section 2.2. 
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laws, regulations and national policies on environment. Among its tasks are not only to for-
mulate national environmental policies and policies with regard to natural resources accord-
ing to national development plans but also to guide, supervise and implement the execution 
of environmental policies, strategies and programs. ANAM delivers resolutions and technical 
and administrative norms in order to implement national environmental policies and policies 
concerning renewable energy and monitors their execution in order to prevent environmental 
degradation. The unit is responsible for promoting and facilitating the execution of environ-
mental projects, if required, through responsible authorities and private organisations. It is 
further in charge of specifying the scope, guidelines and terms of reference for the elabora-
tion and presentation of declarations, evaluations and environmental impact studies and of 
evaluating the latter and issue resolution in this regard. ANAM is also entrusted with the task 
to enhance the participation of the population and to create and maintain accessible and up-
to-date data with regard to the environment and the sustainable use of natural resources by 
means of studies and provide information and analysis for technical consultation and support 
the National Environment Council (Consejo Nacional del Ambiente) as well as the environ-
mental councils of the provinces, the comarcas and the districts. (Art. 5, Law 41)  
In addition, ANAM has established a Climate Change and Desertification Unit which is 
tasked to oversee Panama’s commitments under the climate change regime. ANAM is there-
fore also Panama’s Designated National Authority (DNA). (UNFCCC, 2015)  
ANAM also evaluates the (mandatory) Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). Con-
cerning Barro Blanco, ANAM was responsible for approving the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) via resolution DIEORA IA-332-2008 in 2008.  
The key piece of legislation regulating EIAs (estudios de impacto ambiental) is Executive 
Decree No. 123 of 14 August 2009, modified by Executive Decree No. 155 of 2011. Ac-
cording to its provisions, any new project, work or activity relating to the sectors of agricul-
ture, hunting and forestry; fishing; food and drink processing; mining; textiles and leather 
manufacturing; wood and paper manufacturing; recycling; energy; construction; services; 
tourism; and waste disposal require the submission of and EIA and approval by ANAM. 
There are three categories requiring EIAs – Category I (no significant impacts, listed in Arti-
cle 16); Category II (listed in Article 16, negative partial environmental impacts can be 
caused); Category III (listed in Article 16, can result in significant adverse environmental im-
pacts, deeper analysis is called for). 
Concerning the EIA, Barro Blanco was classified as a Category III project (Estudio de Impac-
to Ambiental Categoría III). The EIA was later contested by CIAM and the affected communi-
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ties at the Supreme Court, due to lack of proper consultation process and other procedural 
requirements.  
Generally, only one EIA is required per project. Certain activities, however, might require 
additional permits in addition to the EIA, e.g. concerning activities relating to the use or dis-
charge of water. For large-scale activities, e.g. energy, mining…, a concession, issued 
through the relevant regulatory authority (e.g. ASEP), is necessary. 
The scope of the EIA includes impacts on human health, flora, fauna, renewable and non-
renewable natural resources, protected areas, landscapes, society, and anthropological, ar-
chaeological, historic, or cultural heritage. 
Since 2012 there is a special legal framework (Law 11, 26 March 2012) regarding projects 
which affect indigenous territories (see in more detail Section 2.2.1.2.1). 
In the course of the EIA, consultations with the affected public/communities must be con-
ducted (Art. 29(2) Executive Decree No. 123). 
ANAM also signed the Letter of Approval for the Barro Blanco project’s registration as 
a CDM project on 16 November 2009. 
Over the years, ANAM was also part to roundtable processes.  
On 9 February 2015, ANAM suspended the project temporarily due to breaches in the EIA, 
inter alia with regard to the agreement reached with the communities and those affected, the 
development of the negotiation process, the absence of an archaeological management plan 
approved by the National Institute of Culture (INAC) to protect the petroglyphs and other ar-
chaeological findings. (ANAM, 2015)  
It then organized a dialogue table with the affected communities – with the help of the UN 
(Carmen Rosa Villa, High Commissioner for Human Rights of the UN, Martin Santiago, Resi-
dent Coordinator) – to reach an agreement with the parties. These negotiations are currently 
still ongoing. 
1.1.2.3.2 Autoridad Nacional de los Servicios Públicos (National Public Services Authority – 
ASEP)  
ASEP was founded by Law 26 of 29 January 1996. ASEP has the competencies to regulate 
and control the provision of public services in the field of potable water, sewerage, telecom-
munication and electricity. According to Art. 19(2) of Law 26 ASEP is responsible for granting 
concessions, licenses and authorizations for the provision of public services in their area of 
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competences on behalf of the State and Art. 19(17) says that ASEP is entitled to recommend 
expropriations and authorize the establishment of restrictions concerning property and 
easements necessary for the provision of public services. 
Concerning Barro Blanco, ASEP granted the concession to develop the power plant at 
the Tabasará river after ANAM had granted the EIA. ASEP was part of the UN dialogue 
which took place, which resulted in the peritaje verification mission. 
1.1.2.4 National level - Actors from the indigenous communities and Comarca institutions 
 
 
As mentioned above, Panama’s territory is divided into nine provinces: Bocas del Toro, 
Chiriquí, Coclé, Colón, Darién, Herrera, Los Santos, Panamá, and Veraguas. Each province 
is headed by a governor (local authority). In addition, there are five comarcas, a system of 
demarcated indigenous regions introduced already in 1928. Detailing the Constitution, these 
have been established equipped with varying degrees of self-government: Emberá-
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Wounaan6, Kuna Yala7 (the first comarca, established in 1938), Ngäbe-Buglé8, Kuna de 
Madungandí9 and Kuna de Wargandí10. (Rodríguerz-Pinero Royo, 2010, pp. 331–332) The 
Naso and the Bribri do not have a comarca. Three of these comarcas (Emberá-Wounaan, 
Kuna Yala and Ngäbe-Buglé) are provincial-level territories (in addition to the nine provinces 
listed under Section 2.1), whereas the other two (Kuna de Madungandí and Kuna de War-
gandí) are subordinated to provinces (equivalent to a municipalities). 
The Emberá-Wounaan, Ngäbe-Buglé11 and Kuna de Madungandí have their own Charters 
(Cartas Orgánica Administrativa) which were adopted by executive decree. These also form 
the basis for the relations of the traditional authorities with the central government and public 
authorities. 
Since then, the comarcas have evolved into bodies of autonomous administration. Though 
Panama has not yet ratified ILO Convention No. 169 (but only the strongly assimilatory and 
therefore criticized ILO Convention No. 10712), its laws governing indigenous affairs are 
among the most advanced. (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 2014, para. 12) The Constitution as well as the respective legal acts 
on the comarcas contain far-reaching safeguards, in particular with regard to land rights. The 
Constitution protects their language (Article 88), ethnic identity and culture (Article 90), edu-
cation (Article 108) and land rights (Articles 124, 126 and 127). In particular, the basis of in-
digenous’ land rights in Panama is provided by Article 127 of the Constitution: ‘The State 
guarantees to indigenous communities the reservation of necessary lands and collective 
ownership thereof, to ensure their economic and social well-being. Procedures to be followed 
for obtaining this purpose, and the definition of boundaries within which private appropriation 
of land is prohibited, shall be regulated by law.’13 
6   Law 22 of 8 November 1983, Gaceta Oficial 19976. 
7   Law 2 of 16 September 1938, Gaceta Oficial 7873; Law 16 of 19 February 1953, Gaceta Oficial 12072; Law 
99 of 23 December 1998, Gaceta Oficial 23701. 
8   Law 10 of 7 March 1997, Gaceta Oficial 23242. 
9   Law 24 of 12 January 1996, Gaceta Oficial 22951. 
10   Law 34 of 25 July 2000, Gaceta Oficial 24106. 
11   Carta Orgánica Administrativa, Executive Decree No. 194, 25 August 1999, modified by Executive Decree No. 
537, 2 June 2010. 
12   Indigenous and Tribunal Peoples Convention (ILO Convention No. 107, 1957), in force for Panama since 4 
June 1971. 
13   El Estado garantizará a las comunidades indígenas la reserva de las tierras necesarias y la propiedad 
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The Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé, where the impacts of the Barro Blanco project are felt, was cre-
ated by Law 10 of 7 March 1997. It is a provincial-level territory. The administrative structure 
of the Comarca consists of three types of authorities, as amended in 2011: 
• Traditional authorities: Cacique General, Cacique regional, Jefe Inmediato and 
Vocero (spokesperson) 
• Authorities of the Comarca: the presidents of the Congreso General (General Con-
gress [this legal institution has the main power and makes decisions, and consists of 
one representative of each part/region of the Comarca]), Congreso regional (Regional 
Congress) and Congreso local (Local Congress) 
• State authorities: Gobernador Comarcal (Governor of the Comarca), Consejo de Co-
ordinación Comarcal (Coordinating Council of the Comarca), Alcalde Comarcal (Ma-
jor of the Comarca) and corregimientos (municipalities) (Castro de la Mata, 2013a, p. 
12) 
Elections to these authorities occur through delegates. Since 2011, the Cacique General de 
la Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé is Silvia Carrera Concepción. Unlike the Congreso General, how-
ever, the Cacique General is not entitled to approve projects, but is more a traditional figure 
to represent the Ngäbe.14 
In addition to these legally recognized institutions/authorities, there is also still a Traditional 
Congress (Congreso Tradicional de Masas), which is not recognized by the government. 
Elections to this Congress still occur according to ‘elections by rows’ (standing behind the 
candidate of choice). While the Cacique tried to mediate between these two Congresses at 
first, through political instrumentalization and disagreements on certain issues (e.g. Law 11), 
there have been substantial internal tensions, separating the sides. 
In total, the comarcas amount to approximately 22% of Panama’s territory (16,634 km2). 
About half of the indigenous population lives within these comarcas. Within these regions, 
the respective indigenous peoples have exclusive (collective) land rights (Turner, 2011, p. 
90) and a ‘certain degree of control over the use of renewable and non-renewable resources’ 
(Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 2014, para. 
5). Thus, the comarca laws do not only regulate ownership of land but also contain provi-
colectiva de las mismas para el logro de su bienestar económico y social. La Ley regulará los procedimientos 
que deban seguirse para lograr esta finalidad y las delimitaciones correspondientes dentro de las cuales se 
prohíbe la apropiación privada de tierras. 
14   As discussed also below, GENISA had the consent from the Cacique General Maximo Saldaña (Silvia Carre-
ra’s predecessor) and a regional congress. However, neither of these entities had the mandate to express that 
consent.  
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sions regarding natural resources, governance, administration of justice, economic activity, 
culture, education and health. (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 2014, para. 13) This means that the indigenous peoples retain a 
certain decision-making power with regard to natural resources located within the comarcas. 
The precise extent of decision-making power varies according to the respective comarcas 
legislative acts. With regard to renewable resources, this often requires the prior authoriza-
tion by the affected indigenous authority. Generally less control can be exercised concerning 
non-renewable resources, with the prominent exception of the Ngäbe-Buglé comarca (and its 
annexes15), where a special act of legislation was implemented in 2012 (Law 11, 26 March 
2012) prohibiting the issuing of mining concessions (Article 3). Moreover, Article 6 leg.cit. 
mandates the prior authorization by the ‘Congreso General, Regional o Local’ with regard to 
hydroelectric plants. In addition, any such authorized project must transfer at least 5% of its 
annual revenue to the Ngäbe-Buglé community. 
Despite the legal establishment of indigenous’ collective land rights, concerns have been 
voiced by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination with regard to expul-
sions and displacements affecting indigenous communities in connection with energy pro-
jects, exploitation of natural resources and tourism. (CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/PAN/CO/15-
20, 2010, para. 13) Moreover, the Committee pointed out that the consultations mandated by 
environmental and indigenous law (inter alia Article 5 of ILO Convention No. 107) concerning 
natural resource projects were often carried out by the private corporations carrying out the-
se projects and not by state, and did not comply with international standards. (CERD, UN 
Doc. CERD/C/PAN/CO/15-20, 2010, para. 14; HRC, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3, 2008, 
para. 21)  
1.1.2.5  International level – CDM Executive Board  
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Executive Board is in charge to supervise the 
CDM. Amongst other tasks the Board is responsible for accrediting Designated Operations 
Entities (DOEs), registering projects (in accordance with specific procedures) and issuing 
Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits earned through CDM projects.  
The CDM Executive Board approved the Barro Blanco project. (CDM EB, 2011) 
15  Article 4, Law 10 of 7 March 1997, Gaceta Oficial 23242: ‘Como áreas anexas, formarán parte de la división 
política especial de la Comarca Ngöbe-Buglé, las comunidades ubicadas en territorio continental e insular de 
las provincias de Bocas del Toro, Chiriquí y Veraguas, que se describen en los límites establecidos para la 
Comarca.’ 
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1.1.2.6  International level – Financing institutions  
1.1.2.6.1 Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft GmbH (DEG) 
DEG is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) banking 
group, a promotional bank of the Federal Republic of Germany. KfW is a government-owned 
public entity, with 4/5th of its capital held by the federal German state and 1/5th by the Bun-
desländer. (eurodad, 2012) DEG was founded in 1962 and its headquarters are located in 
Cologne (Germany). It is managed by the three members of the Management Board, over-
seen by a Supervisory Board (which includes both governmental officials as well as mem-
bers dispatched by private corporations and non-governmental organizations). Its equity cap-
ital amounts to € 1.9 billion. Its objective is ‘to promote business initiative in developing and 
emerging market countries as a contribution to sustainable growth and improved living condi-
tions of the local population’ (DEG, 2015). DEG finances direct (long-term) investments with 
the aim to sustainably contribute to the economic development of partner countries. The 
bank further provides advice to companies concerning risk analysis and product develop-
ment. The field of investments comprises all sectors of the economy and especially aims at 
enhancing access to investment financing for small and medium-sized companies. DEG al-
most exclusively uses own funds (DEG, 2015).  
An important objective of DEG is the promotion of sustainable development. Project assess-
ments by KfW/DEG include environmental and social impact assessments as an integral part 
of the appraisal process. On the one hand, this is based on the regulations/laws of the pro-
ject country, and on the other hand, these provisions must be in line with international envi-
ronmental, social, health, safety and labour standards. (KfW Environmental & Social Impact 
Assessments, 2015) To this end, DEG applies IFC Performance Standards (in the current 
project study, the 2006 versions are pertinent), has adopted a DEG Guideline for environ-
mental and social sustainability (DEG Guideline for sustainability, n.d.), and applies the ILO 
core labour standards. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are also 
considered in its operations. (KfW DEG, 2015)  
Projects are ranked into categories A, B, or C, according to their potential environmental and 
social risk, category A designating projects which are especially environmentally and socially 
sensitive. (KfW Environmental & Social Impact Assessments, 2015) 
Together with the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), DEG established a 
complaint mechanism in 2014 to provide the possibility for individuals, groups, communities 
or other parties to complain if they think they are or may be negatively affected by a project 
financed by DEG. As part of this mechanism, an Independent Expert Panel, consisting of 
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three international experts, was set up that decides on the admissibility of each complaints 
and on the proceedings afterwards (see also more information below).  
DEG finances the Barro Blanco project with a loan of 25 Million USD.  
 
1.1.2.6.2 Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO) 
The Nederlandse Financierings-Maatschappij voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (Netherlands 
Development Finance Company – FMO) is the Dutch development bank, owned by a public-
private partnership (51% of shares held by the state, 49% held by commercial banks, trade 
unions and other private-sector representatives). The bank was founded in 1970 and aims at 
financing entrepreneurs, companies, projects and financial institutions from developing coun-
tries and emerging markets. (FMO, 2015a) FMO invests in the sectors of financial institu-
tions, energy and agribusiness, food and water. 
In 2006, FMO adopted the Equator Principles and since 2000, it has been applying the IFC 
Performance Standards. It also has an Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance 
(ESG) Policy, consisting of three parts: Corporate Governance Policy; Environmental and 
Social Policy; and Human Rights Policy (effective as of 1 January 2013). (FMO Investment 
Policies, 2015)  
In addition, FMO has adopted a non-legally binding, voluntary Position Statement on Hydro-
power, listing the specific considerations that  
- The project needs to demonstrate a significant reduction in greenhouse gas 
emission;  
- The project must comply with the most recent IFC Performance Standards; this 
includes consultation with local population affected by the project;  
- Specific plans needs to be available to compensate for any negative effects;  
- If the adverse environmental and social impacts cannot be sufficiently mitigated, 
FMO will not finance the project;  
- As long as FMO is involved in the project, extensive monitoring will take place by 
FMO and by qualified and reputable external industry experts. This monitoring 
includes frequent consultation with local population. (FMO Position Statement, 
n.d.) 
Together with DEG, FMO has established an independent complaint mechanism in order to 
provide ‘stakeholders a tool, enabling alternative and pre-emptive resolution of disputes be-
tween the latter and FMO as financer of projects involved. At the same time the Mechanism 
assists FMO in implementing and adhering to its own policies and procedures and as such 
the Mechanism is a learning-by-doing process.’ (FMO, 2013) The objective of the complaints 
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mechanism is to ensure that ‘the costs of economic development do not fall disproportionate-
ly on those who are poor or vulnerable’ (FMO, 2013) and to acknowledge the responsibility of 
business to respect human rights.  
FMO finances the Barro Blanco Project with a loan of USD 27.83 million.  
1.1.2.6.3 Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) 
The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) is a multilateral development 
bank and was founded in 1960. According to CABEI’s Constitutive Agreement, the objective 
of the bank is ‘to promote the economic integration and the balanced economic and social 
development of the founding countries’ (CABEI Constitutive Agreement, 1960, Art. 2).  
CABEI finances the Barro Blanco Project with USD 25 million. 
1.1.2.6.4 (EIB (European Investment Bank)) 
The European Investment Bank (EIB), owned by the 28 member states of the European Un-
ion, inter alia provides financing for sustainable investment projects in Europe and beyond. 
Originally, financing was sought from the EIB for the Barro Blanco project. However, in 2009, 
a complaint was received filed by a number of stakeholders (complaint was filed by Mr. Os-
car Sogandares (ASAMCI), Mr. Osvaldo Jordan (ACD) and Ms. Berediana Rodriguez (M10)), 
alleging non-compliance with the additionality principle of the Clean Development Mecha-
nism, a lack of adequate consultation and assent of indigenous communities, negative envi-
ronmental and social impacts of the project, and allegations concerning ANAM. (EIB 
SG/E/2009/11, 2009) After the EIB initiated an investigation into the project, the promoter 
GENISA cancelled the request for a loan before an announced visit of representatives of the 
EIB in order to directly meet the affected communities. (Letter to the CDM Executive Board, 
2011)  
1.1.2.6.5 Austrian Development Bank (Österreichische Entwicklungsbank – OeEB) 
The Austrian Development Bank (OeEB) was founded in 2008 and is a wholly-owned subsid-
iary of Oesterreichische Kontrollbank. OeEB invests in developing countries and emerging 
markets by providing long-term investment loans, taking equity participations in companies 
and banks and financing advisory programmes.  
There is no direct link between OeEB and the Barro Blanco project. However, OeEB finances 
CABEI with a long-term credit line of 30 million Euro contributing to infrastructure projects 
with a focus on renewable energy in Central America. (OeEB projects, n.d.) 
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The OeEB adheres to the ecological and social standards agreed on by the EDFI (European 
Development Finance Institutions). Thus, same as FMO and DEG, the IFC Performance 
Standards, the Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines of the World Bank, and the core 
ILO Conventions. (OeEB Standards, 2015) 
1.1.2.7  International level – Involved in dispute resolution  
1.1.2.7.1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
UNDP is the UN development network operating in 177 countries in order to support coun-
tries and regions to achieve human development and reach the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). UNDP work focuses on four main fields: poverty reduction and achievement 
of the MDGs, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, and environment and 
energy for sustainable development. 
Concerning the Barro Blanco project, UNDP has not only chaired a Technical Roundtable to 
discuss possible solutions but also took part in the verification mission to the affected com-
munities and commissioned investigations as well as subsequently published reports pre-
senting the results of the investigations (Castro de la Mata, 2013a, 2013b; López García, 
2013).  
It also remains involved to a lesser degree in ongoing negotiations. 
1.1.2.7.2 Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples 
The Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples was introduced by the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 2001. Its mandate was renewed by Human Rights Council 
Resolution 15/14 in 2010. Under its tasks fall, inter alia:  
‘(b) To gather, request, receive and exchange information and communications from 
all relevant sources, including Governments, indigenous peoples and their communi-
ties and organizations, on alleged violations of the rights of indigenous peoples; 
(c) To formulate recommendations and proposals on appropriate measures and activ-
ities to prevent and remedy violations of the rights of indigenous peoples;  
(f) To develop a regular cooperative dialogue with all relevant actors, including Gov-
ernments, relevant United Nations bodies, specialized agencies and programmes, as 
well as indigenous peoples, national human rights institutions, non-governmental or-
ganizations and other regional or subregional international institutions, including on 
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possibilities for technical cooperation at the request of Governments;’ (Human Rights 
Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/14, 2010, Art. 1)  
Accordingly, the former Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, S. James 
Anaya, who was in office from 2008 until 2014, visited Panama in 2013 and conducted an 
independent investigation on the rights of indigenous peoples in Panama. He was also re-
quested by national and international NGOs to visit the Barro Blanco site and affected com-
munities. (CIAM et al., 2013a) In the report that was published after his visit, the Special 
Rapporteur not only elaborated on the effects of investment projects such as hydro plants on 
indigenous communities in general but also on the case of Barro Blanco in particular (Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 2014). 
In the conclusions, the report recommended that in the light of the experiences of inadequate 
consultations of indigenous communities in the course of the development of recent hydro-
electric projects (Barro Blanco, Chan 75) a framework in order to regulate consultation pro-
cesses in cases of hydro-electric projects and mining which have an effect on indigenous 
communities should be established in coordination with indigenous representatives.  
Regarding Barro Blanco the report further said that the lands of the Ngäbe people should not 
be flooded nor otherwise affected without prior agreement with the representative authorities 
of this community on the conditions of such an inundation or on other effects. Without the 
agreement or consent of Ngäbe people, the state could only allow to restrict the land rights of 
the people under a general public interest within the framework of human rights, and only to 
the extent that the restriction is necessary and proportionate to the public interest. (Special 
Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 2014) 
1.1.2.8  Civil Society institutions/Non-Governmental Organisations 
Aside from national indigenous mobilization, Barro Blanco has also been in the limelight of 
international civil society campaigns. The case stands exemplary for the effects that the im-
plementation of international development and climate policies can have. In addition, the 
national NGOs involved have understood to raise the awareness of international NGO part-
ners in an attempt to create international pressure on the involved international and Europe-
an institutions. The following focusses on the most important NGOs involved, both at the 
national and international level, detailing how they have been involved in the course of the 
Barro Blanco campaign. 
 33 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
1.1.2.8.1 Alianza para la Conservacion y el Desarrollo (ACD)  
The Alianza para la Conservacion y el Desarrollo (ACD), founded in 1999, is a non-
governmental organisation and works for sustainable development and human rights. The 
organization works with indigenous, Afro-descendant and peasant groups throughout Pana-
ma to assist these groups with community development and environmental justice work, in 
addition to providing support to these groups in brining complaints before international bodies 
(ACD, 2009). 
With regard to Barro Blanco, ACD – through Osvaldo Jordan –, helped with mobilization and 
international awareness-raising. In addition, ACD inter alia filed comments to the CDM Exec-
utive Board and to the EIB complaint mechanism. 
1.1.2.8.2 Centro de Incidencia Ambiental – Panama (Environmental Advocacy Center 
(CIAM)) 
The Environmental Advocacy Center Panama is a NGO with a focus on environmental and 
social rights. It aims at promoting the protection of the environment, enhance the participa-
tion of the citizens, amongst others by disseminating information, developing networks and 
drafting reports in order to influence political decisions (CIAM 2012, 4).  
The NGO is committed to continue and improve the support of communities which are or 
might be affected by hydro energy project. It assists those communities to raise awareness 
among the population in general and the responsible authorities. In relation to Barro Blanco, 
CIAM has 
• Filed a lawsuit against the resolution issued by ANAM which approved the EIA 
• Filed a lawsuit to challenge the authorisation by ASEP to take land from the Ngäbe 
communities 
• Supported the affected indigenous communities to file a complaint against FMO, the 
Dutch development bank, for financing the BB project. (FMO/DEG Barro Blanco 
Complaint, 2014) 
1.1.2.8.3 Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) 
The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) is an association consisting of inter-
national attorneys. Among its tasks are giving legal counsel and advocacy, carrying out poli-
cy research and enhancing capacity building in the fields of biodiversity, chemicals, climate 
change, human rights and the environment, international financial institutions, law and com-
munities and trade and sustainable development. CIEL was founded in 1989 and is based in 
Washington DC and Geneva. 
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With regard to Barro Blanco, CIEL inter alia filed the 2013 amicus curiae brief with AIDA and 
Earthjustice. (AIDA, CIEL, Earthjustice Amicus Curiae, 2013) 
1.1.2.8.4 Earthjustice 
Earthjustice is a non-profit environmental law organisation with headquarters in San Francis-
co and nine regional offices. The organisation was founded in 1971. Earthjustice works pri-
marily with strategic litigation (about 300 cases per year), but is also active in the field of pub-
lic awareness-raising, lobbying to influence policy making and legislation as well as building 
international partnerships. Its main objectives include preserving the wild, fighting for healthy 
communities and advancing clean energy and a healthy climate.  
With regard to Barro Blanco, Earthjustice inter alia filed the 2013 amicus curiae brief with 
AIDA and CIEL. (AIDA, CIEL, Earthjustice Amicus Curiae, 2013) 
1.1.2.8.5 Asociación Interamericana para la Defensa del Ambiente (AIDA) 
AIDA is a non-profit environmental law organisation and was founded in 1998. It ‘works 
across international borders to defend threatened ecosystems and the human communities 
that depend on them.’ (AIDA, 2015) AIDA’s mission is ‘to strengthen people's ability to guar-
antee their individual and collective right to a healthy environment, via the development, im-
plementation, and effective enforcement of national and international law.’ (AIDA, 2015) To 
this end, AIDA works together with local groups, lawyers and scientist. The organisation is 
not only limited to legal work, it also launches education and alliance-building initiatives in 
order to enhance knowledge and raise awareness. It further drafts and distributes reports on 
key environmental issues, aims at influencing policy makers in international institutions and 
tribunals and supports other non-profit organisations working in the field of environmental 
issues. The following basic principles are crucial for AIDA’s work: encouraging transnational 
collaboration, protecting human rights, cultivating the power of international law and encour-
aging citizen enforcement and public participation (AIDA, 2015). 
With regard to Barro Blanco, AIDA inter alia filed the 2013 amicus curiae brief with CIEL and 
Earthjustice. (AIDA, CIEL, Earthjustice Amicus Curiae, 2013) 
1.1.2.8.6 Movimiento 10 de abril para la defensa del Rio Tabasará (M10) 
M10 is a grassroots organisation created as a consequence of protests of the communities 
around the Tabasará River against a proposed hydro-electric project (Tabasará I) preceding 
the Barro Blanco Project. On 10 April 1999 the protests culminated in the arrest of several 
activists of the Ngäbe community. The project to build Tabasará 1 was abandoned. Com-
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memorating these events, the movement was called Movimiento 10 de Abril (Arghiris, 2011). 
Since then, M10 has been active in all the protests against Barro Blanco not only on a local 
level by organising blockades and demonstrations but also on a national and international 
level by filing complaints and – as being composed mainly of representatives of the affected 
indigenous communities and, thus, directly affected by the dam – lawsuits.  
Another organisation (M22 – Movimiento 22 de Septiembre, led by the cacica regional del 
área de Kodrini, Clementina Peréz) has also become involved in the protests and has orga-
nized a number of roadblocks. M22 is also opposed to return to the ongoing negotiations 
(June 2015). (Aizprúa, 2015) 
1.1.2.8.7 Fundación para el Desarrollo Integral, Comunitario y Conservación de los 
Ecosistemas en Panamá (FUNDICCEP) and La Amistad, Conservacion y 
Desarrollo (AMISCONDE) 
FUNDICCEP is a NGO which carries out environmental programs aiming at the conservation 
and protection of protected areas and supports social and community action to promote sus-
tainable development. FUNDICCEP actively and dynamically participates in different sectors 
of civil society, government institutions and partner organisations. Since 2007, they have 
been active on the topic of hydroelectric power plants. 
AMISCONDE is a binational initiative (Costa Rica and Panama) in order to protect natural 
resources and enhance sustainable development. It is generally concerned with the hydro-
project development policy of Panama, in particular in the Chiriquí province.  
Regarding Barro Blanco, they have sent letters to the international financing institutions, and 
framed their concerns inside the national political framework, pointing out that Barro Blanco 
was not an isolated situation. 
1.1.2.8.8 Both ENDS 
Both ENDS is an independent NGO based in the Netherlands with the objective to work for a 
sustainable future. Through the coalition Counter:Balance, they became involved in the in-
ternational campaign against Barro Blanco. 
Both ENDS has visited the Barro Blanco project site (in 2013) and has co-written the Annex 
1: Analysis of Policies and Procedures of the Barro Blanco Project submitted to the FMO 
complaint mechanism on 5 May 2014. (FMO/DEG Barro Blanco Complaint, 2014) 
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1.1.2.8.9 Center for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) 
The Center for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) is an independent non-profit 
organisation focusing on doing research and network activities on social, ecological and eco-
nomic issues. It carries out research on multinational corporations and the consequences of 
their activities for people and the environment worldwide.  
SOMO has co-written the Annex 1: Analysis of Policies and Procedures of the Barro Blanco 
Project submitted to the FMO complaint mechanism on 5 May 2014. 
1.1.2.9 Construction and supplier companies 
1.1.2.9.1 Generadora del Istmo, S.A. (GENISA) 
As mentioned above, GENISA is the construction company created for the implementation 
and operation of the Barro Blanco project. The company was founded in 2006 and ‘is part of 
a Central American economic group that directly owns a total of 485 MW of installed power 
generation capacity in the region through its sister companies: Pan-Am Generating Ltd. and 
Luz y Fuerza de San Lorenzo S.A. de C.V.’ (GENISA, 2011, p. 9) The execution of the pro-
ject is carried out by an Engineering Procurement construction contractor, responsible for 
detailed design of the project and for the construction under the supervision of GENISA 
(GENISA, 2011, p. 7). 
1.1.2.9.2 Andritz 
The ANDRITZ GROUP is an international technology company with headquarter in Graz, 
Austria, and produces and globally supplies plants, equipment and services for hydropower 
stations (Andritz Hydro), Pulp and paper industry (Andritz Pulp & Paper), Metalforming and 
steel industry (Andritz Metals) and solid/liquid separation in municipal and industrial sectors 
(Andritz Separation).  
Its subsidiary ANDRITZ HYDRO Spanien is responsible for providing the technological 
equipment, the engineering, production, transport as well as installation and start-up of two 
Kaplan turbines and generators as well as one Francis turbine, a throttle valve and a genera-
tor to the Barro Blanco project (Andritz, 2013, p. 30).  
1.2 International/regional/local climate change policies  
The Republic of Panama (with a population of 3.5 million people), forming the connecting 
point between Central and South America, is a middle-income state, with a stable economy 
and modern financial sector. Constituting one of the most biologically diverse countries in the 
world, approximately 40% of its territory is forested (FAO, 2015). In addition, more than 10% 
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of the population is indigenous. Its geographic and demographic features show similarities to 
its neighbours, making it a typical example of a middle-income nation that will have to ad-
dress climate change increasingly in the years to come. 
However, Panama’s history, economy and politics are also unique, partly also owed to its 
geographic importance due to the Panama Canal. (Gordon, 2009, pp. 133–134) Though 
possessing one of the highest per capita incomes in Central America, it has a high percent-
age of poverty among its population (27,6% in 2011) (World Bank Data, 2015). 
Panama is ranked 14th among states which are most exposed to multiple hazards based on 
land (floods, storms, droughts,…). The vulnerability of both its human and ecological systems 
is threatened to increase due to the effects of climate change (World Bank, 2011). Climate 
change not only threatens Panama’s agricultural production, biological diversity and industri-
al economy, but through direct (e.g., rising sea levels threatens the San Blas Archipelago, 
forcing the Kuna people to relocate to the mainland (Minority Rights Group International, 
2010)) and indirect effects (e.g., through implementation of national policies on renewable 
energy production (inter alia hydroelectric projects)) will lead to the displacement of particu-
larly vulnerable communities. 
1.2.1 UNFCCC level cooperation 
The UNFCCC entered into force for Panama on 21 August 1995 (Law No. 10 of 12 April 
1995). Panama is a non-Annex I party to the Convention, thus without specific emission re-
duction targets. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005, Panama having 
already ratified it on 5 March 1999. (Law No. 88 of 30 November 1998)  
Panama’s focal point for the UNFCCC is the Ministry of Environment (formerly the National 
Authority on the Environment (ANAM, created through Law 41 of 1 July 1998)). In 2002, 
ANAM established the National Climate Change Program with Resolution No. AG 0583-
2002, consisting of four sub-programs: mitigation, vulnerability and adaptation, fulfil-
ment, awareness. It has so far published two National Communications on Climate Change. 
According to its Second National Communication on Climate Change, one of its main foci 
has been to institutionalize the issue of climate change. This has laid the basis for developing 
national structures and policies. In 2007, the National Policy on Climate Change was 
adopted (Executive Decree No. 35 of 26 February 2007), providing a framework for the pub-
lic and private sector as well as civil society activities. The National Strategy builds upon 
principles common to the climate change system (common but differentiated responsibility, 
present and future generations), recognizing that it must be mainstreamed into its national 
development strategy (Principle 1(4)), under participation of its citizens.  
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The implementation of this policy resulted in the incorporation of the National Climate 
Change Coordination Technical Unit (UTNCCC – Unidad Técnica Nacional de Coordinación 
de los temas relacionados con el Cambio Climático, Resolution No. AG-0280-2004) into 
ANAM. This shall function as an international link with climate change governing bodies, inter 
alia the UNFCCC, the IPCC and the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS – Sistema 
Global de Observación del Clima). In 2009, the National Committee on Climate Change in 
Panama (CONACCP) was established to support ANAM in the implementation and monitor-
ing of the National Climate Change Policy (Executive Decree No. 1 of 9 January 2009, modi-
fied with Executive Decree No. 52 of 2013). It consists of 27 members, including several min-
istries, e.g., the Ministry of Agricultural Development, of members of the private sector, and 
from academia.  
With regard to mitigation activities, the national policy stipulates that the implementation of 
development projects pertaining to a number of sectors, inter alia renewable energy, and 
which fall within the Clean Development Mechanisms shall be promoted. For this purpose, a 
national strategy should be developed. Moreover, there shall be efforts to promote and ob-
tain financial resources through the foreign service of industrialized states which are commit-
ted to reduce omissions for the project establishment. Also, the strategy foresees that regu-
latory procedures are developed for the formulation, development and cycle of the CDM 
project. 
In addition, a Participatory Action Plan (Plan de Acción Participativio) shall be developed 
and implemented, covering the public sector, civil society and academia. In particular, the 
national strategy stipulates that the environmental authority is responsible for ensuring the 
informed participation of the affected local actors (local authorities, communities, NGOs and 
social groups). 
As of July 2015, AMAM’s website lists 20 Project Design Documents (PDDs) and 40 Project 
Idea Notes under their CDM activities (ANAM PDD, 2015). UNFCCC’s website lists 21 pro-
jects (UNFCCC CDM, 2015). Panama’s stable investment climate serves as a beneficial fac-
tor in this context. (Jung, 2005) In addition, due to Panama’s growing economy and moderni-
zation process, there is an increased need of energy.  
There are several steps which need to be fulfilled in order to become a CDM project, inter 
alia the necessity to submit the proposal/project idea to ANAM as the Designated National 
Authority (DNA). Further, a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) needs to be identified, 
which assists in the development of the project. Then, a national letter of approval (LoA) 
must be requested from ANAM for the project registration with the CDM Executive Board 
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(Resolution AG-0155-2011 lists national requirements such as the filling out of a project idea 
document (PIN), including a detailed project description as well as the listing of benefits or 
negative consequences for affected communities). (ANAM PDD, 2015) 
The project then is validated by the DOE. During the implementation of the project, the pro-
ject developer is responsible for monitoring that the project is in compliance with the PDD. 
After the project is completed, the DOE verifies that it reduces emissions as anticipated. This 
validation report is issued together with a request for releasing the Certified Emission Reduc-
tions (CERs) to the CDM Executive Board, who approves the request and issues the CERs. 
The majority of registered CDM projects in Panama relate to the hydroelectric power sector 
(ANAM PDD, 2015, Proyectos MDL por Tipo), the most important renewable energy sector in 
Panama. Panama’s electricity production sector was privatized in the late 1990s. Since then, 
more than 60 hydroelectric projects have been constructed and are planned, respectively, 
expecting to produce approx. 1373 MW electricity. As of 2012, almost 1200 MW were being 
produced, amounting to more than 50% of Panama’s net energy generation (EIA, 2015). 
Electricity production concessions are granted by the National Public Services Authority (Au-
toridad Nacional de los Servicios Publicos, ASEP) (Art. 9, Law No. 6 of February 3rd 1997, 
with amendments16, which establishes the institutional and regulatory framework for the elec-
tric utility sector in the Republic of Panama). 
A third of these projects are in some stage of the CDM process. They are also part of a poli-
cy supported by fiscal incentives for renewable energy developments (in particular hydroe-
lectric generation of energy) (Law No. 45 of 4 August 2004, modified by Law No. 57 of 2009, 
and regulated by Executive Decree No. 45 of 10 June 2009).17 
Only recently has Panama begun implementing further legislation on energy efficiency, e.g., 
Executive Decree No. 36 of 1 March 2007 which implements a national policy on cleaner 
production. 
16   For an unofficial English translation, see http://www.energia.gob.pa/pdf_doc/MarcoLegal/D-Ingles/Law6-1997-
Unified-Text(OG26871-C)ver111215.pdf.  
17   For example, hydroelectric power plants up to 10 MW are not subject to distribution or transmission charges 
when selling directly or occasionally. Projects are exempted from certain taxes, e.g. all imports of equipment, 
machinery, materials,... up to 500kW installed capacity. Moreover, there are further fiscal incentives for larger 
energy projects, equivalent up to 25% of direct investment, based on equivalent tonnes of CO2 emission re-
ductions per year. (Giardinella, Baumeister, & Da Silva, 2011). For an unofficial English translation, see 
http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/12339/Law%2045%20-
%20%20Renewable%20Energy%20Promotion.pdf?sequence=2.  
 40 
                                               
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
1.2.2 Regional level climate change cooperation 
Panama is a member state to regional organizations which focus on combatting climate 
change. In particular, Panama is party to the Central American Integration System (SICA) 
and to the Central American Commission on Environment and Development (CCAD). The 
latter is a Committee which is formed by the environmental ministries of SICA member 
states.  
In 2010, these two bodies jointly issued a Regional Strategy on Climate Change (ERCC). 
The document goes back to the 2008 San Pedro Sula Declaration, which inter alia stated 
that there was a need  
‘to incorporate climate change as a transversal and high-priority topic in national de-
velopment plans and strategic and operational plans at institutions that form part of 
the governments of our countries.’ 
In the Regional Strategy, it is held that studies from 2007 show that the eight SICA states 
(Belize, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and 
Panama) together only emit approximately 0.5% of all GHG emissions, but also make up one 
of the most vulnerable regions to climate change. Hence, ‘the region’s priority is to reduce its 
vulnerability by increasing adaptation and promoting voluntary initiatives to contribute to 
global mitigation efforts.’ (CCAD/SICA, 2010, p. 12)  
The Regional Strategy has six strategic areas: 
1. Vulnerability, adaptation to climate change and variability and risk management 
2. Mitigation 
3. Capacity building 
4. Education, awareness, communication and citizen participation 
5. Technology transfers 
6. Negotiations and international support 
Strategic area 2 (mitigation) contains a number of measures to encourage mitigation 
measures. The operational objective stipulates that the states shall  
‘Use funds for mitigation in the context of the UNFCCC and opportunities in different 
carbon markets to promote programs in renewable energy, energy efficiency and en-
ergy savings; sustainable transportation; forest conservation and extension of forest 
lands; sustainable agriculture; and solid, liquid, industrial and agricultural waste 
treatment to capture methane.’  
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To put this into action, they shall inter alia review and adjust their regulatory frameworks to 
permit greater investments in renewable energy projects. (CCAD/SICA, 2010, pp. 64 ff.)  
Panama is also one of 25 member states of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). 
The ACS has initiated SHOCS (Strengthening Hydro-Meteorological Operations and Ser-
vices in the Caribbean SIDS), which aims at helping member states to better prepare for cli-
mate change. (ACS, 2015)  
Furthermore, Panama takes part in the long-standing political forum of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, i.e. the Forum of Ministers of the Environment of Latin America and the Car-
ibbean, institutionalized since 1982. In March 2014, they issued the Declaration of Los 
Cabos (Forum of Ministers of Latin America and the Caribbean, 2014), reaffirming climate 
change as one of the priority areas and noting ‘with great concern the increasing adverse 
impacts of climate change on our region, given its vulnerability, that requires urgent respons-
es by all countries respecting their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities in an effective international response, including the provision of new, additional, 
adequate and predictable financing by developed countries and other relevant actors, to ad-
dress the responses on the need to adapt to and mitigate climate change.’  
1.2.3 Barro Blanco CDM Project No. 3237 
The Barro Blanco project obtained the letter of approval by ANAM for filing for registration 
under the CDM mechanism on 17 November 2009. (AENOR, 2011, p. 9) The Designated 
Operational Entity (DOE) for the validation report was AENOR, the Spanish Association for 
Standardisation and Certification. It constitutes a category 1 project (‘renewable source en-
ergy industries’). 
According to the validation report, they verified during their visit that the ‘[l]ocal communities 
(Veladero, Cerro Viejo, Palacios and Bellavista) have been consulted and have demonstrat-
ed their support for the development of the Barro Blanco Hydroelectric power plant Project by 
signing the corresponding minutes of the meetings.’ (AENOR, 2011, p. 24) As to comments 
by stakeholders, the report refers to one comment submitted by Mr. Osvaldo Jordan during 
the first period for commenting, on behalf of ACD, which was received during this period. 
AENOR then stated that after speaking to the DNA of Panama and the ‘main communities 
involved in the area’, these had ‘agreed that the project will bring work and development to 
the area, and all of them supported the development of the project. No negative feedback 
was received.’ (AENOR, 2011, p. 24) 
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Due to a change in methodology, there then was another period for comments regarding a 
new version of the PDD, and during that period, no comments were received. (AENOR, 
2011, p. 24) Thus, AENOR concluded that it could recommend the Barro Blanco project for 
registration. A number of NGO reports indicate, however, that comments had been sent also 
during the second period, and their receipt had been confirmed. Yet, no response was given 
on these comments by AENOR and the comments do not appear on the UNFCCC’s website. 
(Jordan, Sogandares, & Arjona, 2011) 
In June 2011, Barro Blanco was approved as a CDM project by the CDM Executive Board 
under the Kyoto Protocol (CDM EB, 2011). Prior to the approval, supplementary information 
on the additionality of the project was sought by the Executive Board (CDM Barro Blanco, 
2010), not however on the stakeholder involvement or on any specific measures were taken 
in response to the information gathered. In total, it is estimated that a total reduction of emis-
sions of 1,405,622 t CO2 will be achieved. (Barro Blanco PDD, 2010, p. 8) 
1.3 Stakeholders’ positions 
This sections presents the positions of local/regional and international stakeholders – in par-
ticular as regards alleged human rights violations (with particular focus on migra-
tion/displacement/resettlement) 
This reflects inter alia information gathered in interviews/focal groups, but also information 
gathered during the pre-study report.  
1.3.1 Participation/consultation/consideration in project 
The majority of complaints focus on whether and how the affected indigenous communities 
were informed and consulted in the course of the project implementation. 
According to the affected communities, they were not properly consulted before the start 
of the project. There are severe allegations that fundamental flaws were attached to the le-
gally mandated public forum to be held prior to the approval of the EIA. Aside from claims 
that the affected indigenous communities were not actually invited to the forum (which was 
held in Tolé on 8 February 2008, a non-indigenous town located outside of the comarca and 
several hours away from where the communities live), the few who did acquire information 
about the public forum through contacts in Tolé were not allowed to enter the room. The po-
lice was called to prevent them from gaining access. Also, the public forum was held in a 
small venue, meaning that even once they were permitted to enter, only five persons were 
allowed to actually enter the room and listen. Moreover, the information dispatched did not 
fulfil minimum standards considering indigenous consultation procedures.  
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Additionally, the affected communities maintain that the consent obtained from the former 
Cacique General Maximo Saldaña by the project operator, GENISA, had not been authorized 
by the General Congress, and their consent had never been obtained. (see, inter alia, 
chiriquinatural, n.d.; FMO/DEG Barro Blanco Complaint, 2014) 
According to the lending institutions as well as their governments, the necessary steps 
to conduct a consultation process were taken. According to the German parliamentary secre-
tary Hans-Joachim Fuchtel (in response to a parliamentary inquiry), this has been in compli-
ance with the applicable standards at the time. As he noted, the pertinent IFC standards 
(2006) at the time required for free, prior and informed consultations (and not free, prior and 
informed consent). As also the Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development stated, 
stakeholders were involved in the consultation process. (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 
2014) As the project concerned a part of the annexed area of the comarcas Ngäbe-Bügle, an 
agreement had been reached with the regional administration, which was however not ac-
cepted by three directly affected villages. (Fuchtel, 2015a) These villages felt that had not 
been involved in the consultation process, despite talks being facilitated by the UNDP and 
the Catholic Church. (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014) 
The DEG and FMO Management Response to the Independent Expert Panel’s Compliance 
Review Report also acknowledged that despite an agreement which had been reached with 
a regional congress and the Cacique, the legitimacy thereof had been questioned by other 
representatives of the indigenous community. (DEG and FMO Management Response, 
2015) 
Regarding the environmental and social effects of the project, it was affirmed that the Envi-
ronmental and Social Summary Report conducted by the project operator, GENISA, had 
been in compliance with the pertinent standards. (GENISA, 2011) Moreover, the German 
parliamentary secretary emphasized that the effects of the envisioned project will be locally 
limited, as was also confirmed by the UN peritaje reports. (Fuchtel, 2015a) 
According to the project operator, the legally mandated public forum was held on 8 Feb-
ruary 2008, after being advertised through newspaper, radio, fliers and posters. Fifty people 
attended. Also in 2008, GENISA signed an agreement with the Cacique General Maximo 
Saldaña for the use of the territory. After disagreements on the legitimacy of his mandate to 
do this, GENISA obtained consent by the Regional Congress of the communities (Kadriri) 
being affected in 2011. This agreement had later been ratified by the Comarca General Con-
gress on 29 December 2011 (Swyter, 2013). Moreover, GENISA asserted that no displace-
ment would occur due to the flooding. (GENISA, 2011) 
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According to independent reports by institutions, there was/is an apparent lack of infor-
mation on the project. The peritaje report by the United Nations stated in this regard that ‘es 
obvio que los pobladores des estas comunidadedes no han sido consultados en forma 
correcta.’ (Castro de la Mata, 2013a, para. 96) Consequently, the members of the affected 
communities did not understand with full clarity the potential impacts of the project, and were 
susceptible to false rumors in this regard, creating anxiety and fear. (Castro de la Mata, 
2013a, paras. 96-100) 
 
The former Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, remarked 
in this regard that there was a ‘lack of an appropriate governing framework for consultations 
with indigenous communities’ in Panama. Thus, ‘consultations were carried out in an impro-
vised manner’, and the processes ‘were unsatisfactory, partly because the enterprises in-
volved undertook to carry out the consultations on their own and failed to work with the peo-
ples concerned through their representatives.’ (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 2014, para. 41) 
The report by the IEP [see also in more detail under Section 1.4.3] stated in this regard that 
there were ‘serious questions as to whether the lenders could be satisfied that the consulta-
tions with the affected communities have been conducted in a format and intensity (good 
faith negotiations) that is required by IFC PS7.’ (FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, para. 14)  
According to civil society, the consultation process was significantly flawed and did not 
correspond to national or international requirements. (CIAM et al., 2013b) This relates not 
only to the EIA procedure conducted by GENISA and ANAM, but also to the validation pro-
cess by AENOR (Letter to the CDM Executive Board, 2011; Sogandares, 2012). In the 
course of the amicus curiae submission to the Supreme Court of Panama on the issue of the 
validity of the conducted EIA, AIDA, CIEL and Earthjustice detail to some extent how the 
procedure failed to apply the pertinent international standards as developed within the UN 
and also reflected in the jurisprudence of the Inter-American system. They point to three es-
sential safeguards: the obligation to make an appropriate and participatory process that en-
sures the right to consultation (the consultation has to be conducted prior, in good faith and 
in order to reach an agreement, has to be adequate and accessible, includes an independent 
and objective study of the environmental and social impacts, and is informed); the obligation 
to carry out an EIA; and to share the benefits with the affected people. (AIDA, CIEL, 
Earthjustice Amicus Curiae, 2013) The amicus curiae submission concludes that Panama 
failed to comply with this, as they did not obtain the free, prior and informed consent of the 
Ngäbe-Buglé before ANAM has issued its resolution approving the EIA; the EIA was not 
complete as it did not assess all the impacts of the project; the approval procedure of the EIA 
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frustrated the enjoyment of the right to information of the affected communities and did not 
guarantee their effective participation; the authorities failed to adequately monitor the devel-
opment of an appropriate EIA. (AIDA, CIEL, Earthjustice Amicus Curiae, 2013) 
1.3.2 Due diligence assessments / monitoring 
A further key issue in the present case is concerned with how the financing institutions exer-
cised their due diligence obligations to assess potential negative environmental and social 
impacts and to which extent they monitored compliance with applicable standards throughout 
the project implementation phase. 
According to the affected communities, the assessments of environmental and social im-
pacts were never complete. The Ngäbe ‘depend on their land and natural resources for their 
physical, socio-economic, and cultural survival’ (FMO/DEG Barro Blanco Complaint, 2014, p. 
3) With regard to the use of the river, it is used both for the provision of food and water, as 
well as for religious purposes (Mama Tata religion). Any agreement claimed to have been 
reached in advance by the project operator was not in accordance with their internal deci-
sion-making structure, thus lacking legitimacy. The challenge of the legitimacy of the consent 
obtained had also been sent to the lenders by the communities. 
According to the lending institutions as well as their governments, the process fulfilled 
any prior due diligence obligations, including human rights commitments. (Ministerie van Bui-
tenlandse Zaken, 2014) Barro Blanco is ranked as a category A project (Fuchtel, 2015a), i.e. 
being especially environmentally and socially sensitive. As is the practice in such circum-
stances, an international consultant18 – which included an indigenous expert as part of the 
monitoring team (Kopp, 2013) – was hired to monitor compliance with the applicable stand-
ards prior to financing and during the financing period. According to the parliamentary secre-
tary, this was confirmed. (Fuchtel, 2015a) Moreover, he elaborated that while there were 
governmental officials on the supervisory board of DEG, due to confidentiality reasons and 
their personal mandate in exercising that function, they could not provide any information on 
what knowledge they had of the problematic issues. The government as such therefore did 
not have any information of violations of social or environmental standards. (Fuchtel, 2015a)  
18   Hatch consultancy (the senior auditor for IFC standards in the Barro Blanco project was Mauricio Inostroza 
Riffo, from May 2010-January 2013). 
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The DEG and FMO Management Response acknowledged that they had not been fully ap-
praised at the time of credit approval but stated that they had engaged technical advisors to 
support the process during due diligence and the construction period. (DEG and FMO Man-
agement Response, 2015) 
According to the project operator, the suspension of the project came surprising as it was 
of the opinion that it had fulfilled all requirements and periodic monitoring was taking place. 
(GENISA, n.d.)  
According to independent reports by institutions, the initial project impact assessments 
were not complete. This concerned in particular the initial statement by the project operator’s 
assessment that there would be no need for any physical displacement. This was accepted 
by the government and lenders as such (See also Section 1.3.4).  
The IEP’s report emphasizes at several passages that the lenders were not fully appraised of 
several issues (environmental and social impacts, indigenous peoples, cultural heritage, bio-
diversity and ecosystem impacts) at the time of approval. However, by the time of the first 
disbursement of funds, this had partially been remedied. With regard to some issues (EIA 
process, or how the government deals internally with issues such as land or cultural herit-
age), the report comes to the conclusion that there was little else the lenders could have 
done at the early stages. 
The IEP’s report also comes to the conclusion – after presenting an overview of the phases 
of due diligence/approval/monitoring – that where the initial appraisal of the factual and legal 
situation is not given to the extent required by the applicable standards, a ‘strong monitoring 
process needs to be put in place to ensure subsequently agreed actions are implemented.’ 
(FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, para. 210) It was only after a new consultant was engaged after the 
initial project approval that work of sufficient quality and detail was presented to the lenders. 
(FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, para. 182)  
As established by the UNDP verification mission, the project would in fact lead to the dis-
placement of six houses (Misión de Verificación, 2012, para. 5; see also below 1.3.3). The 
peritaje report explains that this includes not only the loss of the land, but also the loss of 
crops and other assets present at that location. (Castro de la Mata, 2013b, para. 102)  
Former Special Rapporteur Anaya also points to the fact that the ‘environmental impact study 
approved by the National Environment Agency has […] given cause for concern, since it fails 
to assess the project’s impact on the lands and territories of the Ngobe-Bugle people.’ 
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(Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 2014, para. 
42) 
According to civil society, the EIA process was flawed as the authorities (ANAM) did not 
ensure that the appropriate procedures were undertaken. For example, the public forum was 
not announced properly, the timeframe to receive comments from other governmental institu-
tions such as the National Institute of Culture (INAC) was not respected, and the assess-
ments were not complete as to the impacts Barro Blanco would have.  
In addition, civil society points to the fact that the involvement by the international financing 
institutions was uninformed to begin with. Whereas other projects had official independent 
visits without the project operator, this was not the case with regard to Barro Blanco. There 
was a significant lack of transparency (for example, it was not disclosed at what point 
FMO/DEG decided to finance the project).  
1.3.3 M/D/R specific 
The present case study has little mention of any specific MDR requirements, inter alia due to 
the fact that the necessity that some parts of the affected community would have to be reset-
tled was not accepted until later on. As the Environmental and Social Summary Report by 
the project operator explicitly states, the Barro Blanco project ‘will not displace any people 
from their homes’ (GENISA, 2011, p. 39). There is agreement that 6.7 ha of required land is 
located in annexed areas of the comarca, however disagreement over what this land has 
been used for. According to the project operator, this land was not used for cultivation or any 
other productive use due to its topography. As a mitigation measure, inter alia the provision 
of alternative land was listed. 
According to the affected communities, some of the land affected by the project belongs 
to an Annex of the comarca and is therefore collective property. Their proper consent to 
transfer ownership was never obtained. Compensation was offered to some of them, but the 
affected communities are not interested in negotiating in this regard.  
According to independent reports by institutions, six houses would be inundated, dis-
placing six extended families (Castro de la Mata, 2013a). ASEP – using its authority under 
Law 6 of 1997 – has the power to expropriate the pertinent landowners for public purposes. 
The concerned land is collective land (Law 72 of 2008) and requires the government/project 
operator to engage through the traditional authorities of the Ngäbe-Buglé in order to obtain 
their free, prior and informed consent. As applicable standards, IFC PS5 and PS7 are rele-
vant. With regard to the lenders and the obligation to ensure that all feasible alternatives had 
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been investigated, the Panel came to the conclusion that this had been the case. As ASEP 
had not been able to measure the extent of alternative land necessary, this had not been 
suggested to the communities yet. Nevertheless, as indicated above, the communities were 
not interested in relocating, also due to the cultural importance they attached to the respec-
tive piece of land. 
Additionally, the Panel concluded that the initial assumption of the lenders that no displace-
ments would be necessary was in order. However, at latest after the peritaje reports, the con-
tinuing protests, and the realization that the indigenous communities’ position that they would 
not accept compensation for their collective title based on individual land titles, the lenders 
should have insisted to have this issue solved already earlier. (FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, para. 
119) To date, there is still no resettlement plan or agreement. 
The European lending institutions acknowledge that their realization of the problem oc-
curred too late, but have not suggested any solutions on this. (DEG and FMO Management 
Response, 2015)  
1.3.4 Access to justice/remedies  
A crucial aspect relates to the possibility of the affected communities to obtain justice.  
The project operator acknowledges in its Environmental and Social Summary Report that 
international standards require the setting up of a grievance mechanism. According to the 
report, the system has been installed, and should run through its legal adviser and its Legal 
Representative CEO. 
With the help of civil society, numerous judicial and non-judicial instances have been test-
ed. Thus, civil society has engaged in numerous court proceedings on behalf of the affected 
communities.  
A lawsuit (Contra la Resolución DIEORA IA-332-2008) was filed against the EIA process with 
the Supreme Court by CIAM, which suffered several delays. The request for provisional sus-
pension of construction during this time period was not granted, so by the time the lawsuit 
was completed, GENISA had almost completed construction. The amicus curiae was filed in 
the course of these proceedings, however, the final judgement did not mention its content 
with any word. In autumn 2014, the case was decided in favour of ANAM and the proceed-
ings were closed.  
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A second lawsuit (Contra la Resolución AN. No. 6103-ELEC) was filed against the decision 
by ASEP to authorize the taking of land for the construction on behalf of Mr. Manolo Miranda, 
again by CIAM.  
There were deliberations whether to proceed to the Inter-American system, however, no pro-
ceedings have been initiated so far. 
Additionally, there was a mediation process, supported by the Catholic Church and UNDP, 
which took place in Panama City between the affected indigenous communities (represented 
inter alia by the Cacique, M10, representatives of the regions) and the government and pro-
ject operator. There was no representation by the lenders.  
The newly established FMO/DEG joint complaint system was accessed by the affected 
communities with the help of SOMO and Both ENDS. Yet, even before the final report was 
made public, the involved NGOs commented on the pressure exerted by FMO/DEG in their 
letter to the Vice President of Panama, where they warned that the suspension ‘may weigh 
upon future investment decisions, and harm the flow of long-term investments into Panama.’ 
(Arghiris & Kennedy, 2015) Moreover, even despite the Panel’s report, no specific steps 
have been taken by the banks to come to a solution. (Both ENDS, n.d.) Thus, as a conse-
quence, a letter of concern by the affected communities, their representatives, SOMO, Both 
ENDS, and Urgewald, was handed over to the Dutch and German ambassadors in Panama 
in June 2015 and asked ‘the authority of the respective governments to ensure that the 
Dutch and German development banks respect the rights of those affected by the projects 
they finance’ (letter available at http://grievancemechanisms.org/news/movimiento-10-de-
abril-presents-letter-of-concern-to-dutch-and-german-embassies-in-panama)  
According to the lending institutions as well as their governments, the creation of the 
joint complaint mechanism in cooperation with civil society actors proved their good faith in 
attempting to remedy or resolve the conflict. (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014)  
The suspension of the construction as ordered by ANAM in February 2015 came as a sur-
prise and the financing partners were interested in following the ongoing negotiations to find 
a solution for all parties. (FMO, 2015b, 2015c; Fuchtel, 2015a) 
1.4 Measures put in place to address adverse (e.g. procedural, social and environmental) 
impacts of the project/case study  
This section deals with not only national measures put in place but also international re-
sponses (e.g., the establishment of a grievance mechanism, involvement of UN actors in 
mediation processes etc.) which address these issues. 
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1.4.1 Measures put in place by the project operator 
In response to the identified impacts of the project on the affected indigenous communities, 
the construction company GENISA listed several ‘mitigation measures’ to address the im-
pacts on the land of the indigenous communities: 
• ‘The provision of alternative land if requested. The selection of alternative land will be 
negotiated with the Comarca authorities. GENISA owns land that could be made 
available adjoining the Comarca annexes. This land is not currently occupied. 
• Technical assistance to increase agricultural productivity and assistance in improving 
housing. The company is in the provision to provide help to the owners directly af-
fected by the Project, either with materials or labour to achieve improved quality of 
life. 
• Most access to the riverbank will be maintained. This includes the reservoir area – 
though there will not be access to the machine house area for safety and security 
reasons. 
• Annual income to the community for development projects through rental payments; 
and projects under the social program agreed in the December 2008 (currently being 
updated in 2011 with the Regional Congress of the Ngäbe Bugle Group). 
• Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the General Cacique of the Ngäbe Bugle 
Comarca.’ (GENISA, 2011, pp. 38–40)  
The MoU was agreed on in August 2009. According to GENISA, it lays down that the com-
pany will rent 6.7 ha of land for 50 years paying 1,500 USD per year to the Integrated Devel-
opment Corporation of the Comarca (CODIGO). ‘In addition to the annual rental that is paya-
ble to the Comarca (through its Development Corporation), GENISA has made a commit-
ment to provide equivalent land (by size or value) to the users of the land, and compensation 
for the permanent concession of the land or for any agricultural produce that is growing in the 
flooded area, in a range between $1500 and $3000/ha.’ (GENISA, 2011, p. 38)  
There is little evidence to be found with regard to compensation offered to individuals having 
to move because of the flooding of their land. The Urgent Appeal written by M10, Earthjus-
tice, AIDA and CIEL mentions that 4,000 Balboas/USD was offered to Manolo Miranda in the 
eviction notice issued by ASEP (Urgent Appeal, 2014, p. 5). 
As indicated above, these measures (offering of alternative land, compensation, etc.) were 
never put in place as the negotiations process/contact with the affected communities failed. 
1.4.2 Measures put in place by international bodies 
Following the protests and the blockage of the Pan-American Highway in 2012, a political 
dialogue and mediation process, supported by the Catholic Church and UNDP, was initiated. 
It took place in Panama City between the affected indigenous communities (represented inter 
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alia by the Cacique, M10, representatives of the regions) and the government and project 
operator. There was no representation by the lenders. 
According to Ms Bolduc, UN Resident Coordinator in Panama at the time, ‘[t]he Church had 
the central mediation role, but more in terms of moral authority, while the UN facilitated the 
dialogue process by providing technical and methodological assistance, to both the govern-
ment and the indigenous groups.’ (UNDP, 2013, p. 20)  
Two round tables took place simultaneously at the UN, one focussing on Law 11 of 201219, 
and one on Barro Blanco. After an agreement was reached on Law 11, the second table 
eventually agreed to install a verification mission to visit the construction site of the dam and 
the communities of Quebrada Caña, Kiad and Nuevo Palomar. The group consisted of three 
representatives of the Ngäbe-Buglé community, three of the Traditional Authority, three rep-
resentatives of the company, three representatives of the government, three representatives 
of the UN and a representative of the Catholic Church. They recommended that an interna-
tional team of experts should carry out an independent study. 
After the December 2012 report by the verification mission (Misión de Verificación, 2012), the 
UN conducted a second mission under its leadership in June 2013 (Peritaje Independiente – 
Independent Expert Assessment). 
Following this, the UNDP released the following three reports and an executive summary:  
• The Results of the Diagnóstico Rural Participativo (Castro de la Mata, 2013a), 
one of the three components of the international expert assessment of the hydro-
electric project Barro Blanco. The objective of this report was to find out the attitude, 
perception and the knowledge of the population in the areas directly influenced by the 
Barro Blanco project. 
• An Analysis of Ecological and Economic Aspects (Castro de la Mata, 2013b). The 
aim of this report was to independently determine the ecological impacts of the Barro 
Blanco project and to facilitate a better understanding of economic impacts on the lo-
cal Ngäbe communities concerning natural resources.  
• Peritaje independiente de la presa de Barro Blanco, Panamá: informe final de la 
component de ingeniería hidráulica (López García, 2013): The final report on the 
hydraulic engineering component. The objective of this report was to carry out a study 
on the concrete impact of potential flooding caused by the reservoir of the Barro 
Blanco the dam through simulations of water flow and to determine the safety limit to 
ensure the welfare of ancestral lands in which the dam is built. 
19   See also Section 2.2.1.2.1. 
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The studies concluded that the project’s impacts on the environment and the Ngäbe commu-
nities in question could be mitigated but that appropriate consultations with the indigenous 
peoples in question had not been carried out and that the direct and indirect impacts had not 
been clearly explained or understood. It went on to say that the direct impacts could certainly 
affect the community as a whole and should be mitigated properly. 
1.4.3 Measures put in place by the project financers 
In February 2014, FMO and DEG established a joint complaint mechanism. According to 
their policy document, the ‘mechanism provides stakeholders a tool, enabling alternative and 
pre-emptive resolution of disputes. At the same time the Mechanism assists DEG in imple-
menting and adhering to its own policies and procedures and, as such, is the Mechanism a 
learning-by-doing process.’ (KfW DEG, 2014, 1.1.2) Both institutions use the same panel, 
and when co-financed projects are concerned, they use a joint approach. The three experts 
appointed to the panel are Maartje van Putten, Michael Windfuhr, and Steve Gibbons. (KfW 
DEG, n.d.)  
On 14 April 2014, a complaint was filed by M10 and the Cacique General Silvia Carrera at 
the newly established joint complaint mechanism of FMO and DEG. (Letter to FMO com-
plaints office, 2014) As applicable standards, the complainants alleged violations by 
FMO/DEG of certain international human rights standards, in particular IFC’s performance 
standards, FMO’s Human Rights Policy and the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enter-
prises. The complaint was found admissible on 17 June 2014.  
The process was complicated by the fact, however, that the complaint mechanism was in-
stalled only in 2014, three years after the project had been approved. Hence, in order for the 
compliance review process to be carried out, each step had to be negotiated with GENISA, 
the loan recipient, especially with regard to cooperation, confidentiality obligations, and ac-
cess to documents for the independent expert panel. 
In October, one week prior to the project team conducting research within ClimAccount, the 
experts travelled to Panama and made a one-week on-sight visit. In May 2015, the inde-
pendent expert panel of FMO/DEG published their final report on the Barro Blanco project. 
Therein they emphasized the complex nature of the project, both in terms of the timing of the 
panel’s report, but also in light of the socio-political impacts. 
The scope of review was the manner in which DEG and FMO assessed and monitored the 
project, against those standards to which they had committed themselves at the time of 
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granting the financing in 2011 (para. 3) The complainants explicitly asked that the panel 
would not engage in dispute resolution or mediation.  
Regarding the applicable standards, the panel explained that not only the IFC’s performance 
standards (in their 2006 version) were relevant (by virtue of both FMO and DEG having 
committed themselves to them), but that they would also take regard of the core principles of 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the core ILO Conventions. For this purpose, the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights would be looked at in order to determine 
how to operationalize these principles in the private sector context. (FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, 
paras. 50-55) 
The panel inter alia reached the conclusions that: 
- FMO/DEG took all appropriate steps to put themselves in a position of under-
standing regarding the validity of the EIA; 
- FMO/DEG, however, failed to be fully appraised on the issues of environmental 
and social risks, as well as of indigenous peoples at the time of credit approval as 
at the time of approval their assessment was limited and conditional on further 
steps, such as a future indigenous peoples report. These were made conditional 
for the first disbursement, though, which took place accordingly; 
- In light of the lack of prior adequate assessment at the time of credit approval, a 
strong monitoring process would have needed to be put in place to ensure the 
implementation of subsequently agreed actions, 
- Even if the initial conclusion of the lenders that no resettlement would need to 
take place was acceptable, the UNDP findings (2013) that there could be some 
impact on a limited group of people should have led FMO/DEG to undertake fur-
ther actions to address this; 
- FMO/DEG could have done more to seek clarity on the issue of land acquisition 
and use by seeking an expert legal opinion or more detailed information from the 
operator or government on this; 
- The question whether the consultation process with the affected communities was 
conducted in a proper and good faith manner should have been examined more 
closely by FMO/DEG, especially in light of the resistance and challenges to the al-
leged agreement; 
- Regarding physical or economic displacement, the panel noted the amendments 
to the Environmental and Social Action Plan following the 2013 peritaje report of-
fering compensation to those potentially displaced were enough to put the lenders 
in accordance with their policy commitments on this issue; 
- The question of cultural heritage was not assessed properly before the project 
approval. Once it became clear that this would constitute a difficult issue, the 
lenders hired independent consultants to review the progress, the responsibility of 
which, however, lies primarily with the Government of Panama (through INAC); 
- The appraisal of potential biodiversity and ecosystem impacts at the time of pro-
ject approval was ‘severely limited’. 
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Hence, to which extent the financing institutions carried out an appropriate due diligence as-
sessment of environmental and social impacts in advance was the crucial point analysed by 
the experts. 
Following the report by the IEP, DEG and FMO issued their Management Response, em-
phasizing that they were ‘committed to extract lessons learned from the report with the pur-
pose of improving the quality of our appraisal and monitoring process’ (DEG and FMO Man-
agement Response, 2015, emphasis in original). In addition, they acknowledge that at the 
time of credit approval, they were not fully aware of the project implications. However, they 
point to the fact that at the time of first disbursement they ‘were fully appraised regarding 
material issues.’ (DEG and FMO Management Response, 2015)  
2 Analysis  
 
The following analyses the Barro Blanco project on the basis of the alleged human rights 
violations. Please note that for easier handling, parts of the above framework are repeated in 
this section. 
2.1 Introduction 
The Barro Blanco case is symptomatic for the complex interlinkage between the often-times 
competing fields of resource development, environmental protection, and the rights of indig-
enous peoples.  
Since the 1970s, there have been plans to generate electricity on the river Tabasará, running 
through Chiriqui province in Western Panama. A first project (Tabasará I, 200 MW) was pro-
posed as early as 1973, and eventually, after being met with decade-long significant re-
sistance, was cancelled. In 1997, a new consortium was created to develop Tabasará I and II 
which, however, again were never constructed after the Supreme Court suspended the pro-
ject in 2000 (Panama Supreme Court, 2000) in light of the project having failed to engage in 
consultations and obtain the assent of the affected indigenous communities (as required by 
Law 41 of 1998). (ACD, 2009; Purdy, 2013) 
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Following amendments in the law – repealing certain requirements relating to the participa-
tion and acquiescence20 which was to be obtained from indigenous communities (Velásquez 
Runk, 2012, p. 28), a new concession to construct a hydroelectric power plant on the river 
Tabasará, Barro Blanco (28.84 MW), was awarded to Generadora del Istmo, S.A. 
(GENISA)21 in 2007. The project, once completed, will have impacts on an Annex area to the 
comarca Ngäbe-Buglé22, as the power plant’s reservoir will flood 6.7 ha of the indigenous 
territory, including six houses and historical artefacts. As of July 2015, construction was ap-
proximately 95% finished, once again being met with protests and blockades by the affected 
communities after the temporary suspension announced on 9 February 2015 was lifted. 
Aside from national indigenous mobilization, Barro Blanco has also been in the limelight of 
international campaigns. The case stands exemplary for the effects that the implementation 
of international development and climate policies can have. Financed inter alia by two Euro-
pean development banks (DEG and FMO)23, and registered as a CDM project by the CDM 
Executive Board under the Kyoto Protocol (CDM EB, 2011)24, despite ongoing protests by 
the affected communities, foreign and international bodies have provided international au-
thorization to the ongoing construction. 
20   See also below Section 2.2.1.2.1 in more detail. 
21  GENISA was created under Panamanian law in 2006 especially for the purpose of developing, building and 
operating the Barro Blanco power plant (GENISA, 2011, p. 9). Honduran-owned GENISA is part of a Central 
American economic group owning more than 450 MW of installed power generation capacities in the region. 
22   Created by Law 10 of 1997. Comarcas are indigenous administrative units of the government, where Pana-
ma’s indigenous peoples enjoy varying degrees of self-government. There are five comarcas in Panama (Em-
berá-Wounaan, Kuna Yala (the first comarca, established in 1938), Ngäbe-Buglé, Kuna de Madungandí 
and Kuna de Wargandí. (Rodríguerz-Pinero Royo, 2010, pp. 331–332) The Naso and the Bribri do not have 
a comarca. Three of these comarcas (Emberá-Wounaan, Kuna Yala and Ngäbe-Buglé) are provincial-level 
territories (in addition to the nine provinces listed under Section 2.1), whereas the other two (Kuna de Madun-
gandí and Kuna de Wargandí) are subordinated to provinces (equivalent to a municipalities). The Emberá-
Wounaan, Ngäbe-Buglé22 and Kuna de Madungandí have their own Charters (Cartas Orgánica Adminstrativa) 
which were adopted by executive decree. These also form the basis for the relations of the traditional authori-
ties with the central government and public authorities. 
23   The estimated project costs of Barro Blanco amounting to 78,316,800 USD are financed by the Deutsche 
Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft GmbH (DEG), the Netherlands Development Finance Company 
(FMO), and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) (each approximately 25 million 
USD). (FMO/DEG Barro Blanco Complaint, 2014) The latter replaced funding originally sought through the 
EIB, this loan application however withdrawn by GENISA in 2010 after learning that the EIB planned to visit 
the affected area after a complaint registered with the EIB CM (Complaint Mechanism) (EIB Barton, 2013; EIB 
CM, n.d.). 
24   In June 2011, Barro Blanco was approved as a CDM project. The Designated Operational Entity (DOE) for the 
validation report was AENOR, the Spanish Association for Standardisation and Certification. It constitutes a 
category 1 project (‘renewable source energy industries’). In total, it is estimated that a total reduction of emis-
sions of 1,405,622 t CO2 will be achieved. (Barro Blanco PDD, 2010, p. 8). 
 56 
                                               
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
Conduct by multiple parties falling short of international standards and insufficient safeguards 
have resulted in severe human rights impacts for the local indigenous population. Yet, as will 
be seen, identifying accountable actors is hard to come by. 
2.2 Legal Framework: Natural Resource Development v. Human Rights 
As mentioned in the introduction, the construction of the dam will have a number of direct 
impacts on the local indigenous population living in the Annex areas of the comarca Ngäbe-
Buglé. In particular, four communities, the Cogle (though none of their territory will be flood-
ed), Quebrada Caña, Quiabda (Kiad) and Nuevo Palomar, will be affected. The communities 
– together amounting to more than 500 people25 – are semi self-sustaining, relying mainly on 
subsistence agriculture (such as rice, beans, sugar cane, yams,…). They also own some 
livestock (mainly chicken and pigs).  
The impacts on the communities range from impeded access to and use of resources, 
threats to their cultural survival (in particular in connection with their spiritual practices (‘Ma-
ma Tata’)), to displacement. Due to the lack of consent, forced expropriations of territory un-
der the collective ownership of the Ngäbe-Buglé will also be a consequence.  
The following analysis has grouped these concerns into three main aspects where the pro-
ject’s impacts on human rights has been particularly evident. Firstly, the authorization of the 
project without the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of the affected communities. Sec-
ondly, the due diligence assessments/monitoring throughout the process. And thirdly, the 
imminent forced displacement from indigenous territories. Issues regarding access to jus-
tice/remedies will be dealt with in Section 2.4 on accountability/responsibility. 
Each section will first provide an overview of the international standard before proceeding to 
the applicable domestic legal framework and policies by the financing institutions. On this 
basis, the facts will be assessed, pointing to discrepancies identified. 
25   GENISA, based on the 2010 census, estimated that 538 people were spread out among the four communities. 
However, the 2010 census – as also recognized by Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination with regard to previous statistical data – has been said to be incomplete with regard to Panama’s 
indigenous population. Hence, while it is not possible to arrive at a definite estimate how many will inhabitants 
these four villages include, the peritaje mission came to the conclusion that it seemed like the inhabitants were 
more numerous than reflected in the official census. (Castro de la Mata, 2013a, para. 4)  
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2.2.1 Authorization of the project without the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of the 
affected communities 
2.2.1.1  International standards 
A core concern of the Barro Blanco case has been the failure of the project operator, gov-
ernmental authorities and international partners to obtain the consent of the affected 
communities. The standard against this will be measured in the present case is the principle 
of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), as incorporated into a number of international 
instruments and recognized by international courts. 
Since the early 1990s, the principle of FPIC had been evolving for the protection of the rights 
of indigenous peoples. Introduced into the World Bank’s policies in a soft formulation in 1991, 
it was already stated that its requirements served the purpose of ‘[i]dentifying local prefer-
ences through direct consultation, incorporation of indigenous knowledge into project ap-
proaches, and appropriate early use of experienced specialists are core activities for any 
project that affects indigenous peoples and their rights to natural and economic resources.’ 
(World Bank OD 4.20, 1991, para. 8) Similar developments could also be witnessed within 
the United Nations, and the first draft of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
in 1988 already contained provisions providing for the obligations of states to seek the ‘free 
and informed consent’ of indigenous peoples in relation to activities concerning the owner-
ship and possession of lands as well as development programs regarding the exploitation or 
exploration of natural resources pertaining to their traditionally owned territories. (Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Discrimination 
Against Indigenous Populations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/25, 198826)  
26   12. The right of ownership and possession of the lands which they have traditionally occupied. The lands may 
only be taken away from them with their free and informed consent as witnessed by a treaty or agreement.  
13. The right to recognition of their own land-tenure systems for the protection and promotion of the use, en-
joyment and occupancy of the land.  
14. The right to special measures to ensure their control over surface resources pertaining to the territories 
they have traditionally occupied, including flora and fauna, waters and sea ice. 
16. The right to protection against any action or course of conduct which may result in the destruction, deterio-
ration or pollution of their land, air, water, sea ice, wildlife or other resources without free and informed con-
sent of the indigenous peoples affected. The right to just and fair compensation for any such action or course 
of conduct.  
17. The duty of States to seek and obtain their consent, through appropriate mechanisms, before undertaking 
or permitting any programmes for the exploration of exploitation of mineral and other subsoil resources per-
taining to their traditional territories. Just and fair compensation should be provided for any such activities un-
dertaken.  
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ILO Convention No. 169 (ILO Convention No. 169, 1989), drafted in 1989, employs the term 
‘free and informed consent’ in the context of forced relocation (Article 16), otherwise, howev-
er, merely relying on ‘consultations’. UNDRIP also contains several provisions explicitly refer-
ring to FPIC, ranging from the prohibition of relocation (Article 10), to factual thresholds (Arti-
cle 11), the implementation of legislative and administrative measures that may affect indige-
nous peoples (Article 19), the storage or disposal of hazardous materials in the lands or terri-
tories of indigenous peoples (Article 29), and, in the context of determining their authority 
over their lands most importantly, in connection with ‘the approval of any project affecting 
their lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.’ (Article 32)  
FPIC as a tool to ensure indigenous peoples a de facto authority over certain areas has been 
interpreted into other legal instruments, most prominently emphasized by the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which in its General Recommendation No. 23 stated 
that ‘5. The Committee especially calls upon States parties to recognize and protect the 
rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal lands, territo-
ries and resources and, where they have been deprived of their lands and territories tradi-
tionally owned or otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take 
steps to return those lands and territories. Only when this is for factual reasons not possible, 
the right to restitution should be substituted by the right to just, fair and prompt compensa-
tion. Such compensation should as far as possible take the form of lands and territories.’ 
(CERD UN Doc. A/52/18, Annex V, 1997)  
Also the International Finance Corporation (IFC) (the commercial lending institution of the 
World Bank), in its most recent revision27 of its performance standards, includes a progres-
sive understanding of FPIC: ‘There is no universally accepted definition of FPIC. For the pur-
poses of Performance Standards 1, 7, and 8, ‘FPIC’ has the meaning described in this para-
graph. FPIC builds on and expands the process of ICP described in Performance Standard 1 
and will be established through good faith negotiation between the client and the affected 
Communities of Indigenous Peoples. The client will document: (i) the mutually accepted pro-
cess between the client and affected Communities of Indigenous Peoples, and (ii) evidence 
of agreement between the parties as the outcome of the negotiations. FPIC does not neces-
27   As has been explained above, though, the relevant performance standards in the Barro Blanco case are the 
2006 versions. 
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sarily require unanimity and may be achieved even when individuals or groups within the 
community explicitly disagree.’ (IFC, 2012, para. 12)  
FPIC serves to fill the substantive elements of the participatory process. It creates ‘safe 
spaces’ for where indigenous identity can enjoy authentic indigenous sovereignty. (Wiessner, 
2008, p. 1174) The following exemplary content is assigned to free, prior and informed con-
sent in training manuals and guidelines on its implementation. According to an International 
Workshop on Methodologies regarding Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Indigenous 
Peoples, consent is to be obtained freely, i.e. absent of ‘coercion, intimidation or manipula-
tion.’ (Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, UN Doc. E/C/19/2005/3, 2005, para. 46(i)) 
The element ‘prior’ entails that consent ‘has been sought sufficiently in advance of any au-
thorization or commencement of activities and that respect is shown for time requirements of 
indigenous consultation/consensus processes’. (Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
UN Doc. E/C/19/2005/3, 2005, para. 46(i)) And ‘informed’ relates to a sum of factors to be 
taken into consideration when information is provided to the affected indigenous community, 
inter alia covering following aspects: nature, size, pace, reversibility and scope of pro-
ject/activity; reason for or purpose of the project/activity; duration; affected areas; preliminary 
assessment of likely economic, social, cultural and environmental impacts and potential risks 
(in respect of the precautionary principle); fair and equitable benefit-sharing; involved per-
sonnel; procedures that the project may entail. (Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, UN 
Doc. E/C/19/2005/3, 2005, para. 46(i)) Information delivered shall inter alia be accessible, 
clear, consistent, accurate, transparent, objective, complete, delivered in the appropriate 
language and manner. (UN-REDD Programme, 2013, p. 18)  
One core question, however, concerns the meaning of ‘consent’ and whether this arises to a 
de facto veto power. The drafting process of Article 19 UNDRIP (originally Article 20) reflects 
this fine balance. Originally formulated as ‘States shall obtain the free and informed consent 
of the peoples concerned before adopting and implementing such measures [legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them]’ (Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2006/79, 2006, p. 46; see for state criticism of the broadness of the orginal formula-
tion UNGA, UN Doc. A/61/PV.107, 2007), the final version adopted reads: ‘States shall con-
sult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own 
representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.’ (Art. 
19, UNDRIP, 2007)  
In comparison, with regard to forced relocation, Article 10 UNDRIP expressly states that ‘[n]o 
relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous 
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peoples concerned’. With regard to the formulation adopted in the final version of the Decla-
ration, former Special Rapporteur James Anaya points out that it ‘should not be regarded as 
according indigenous peoples a general ‘veto power’’ but that it requires a negotiation pro-
cess ‘towards mutually acceptable arrangements’. (HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 2009, para. 
46) He contrasts this to mere consultation obligations which often constitute ‘mechanisms for 
providing indigenous peoples with information about decisions already made or in the mak-
ing, without allowing them genuinely to influence the decision-making process.’ (HRC, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/12/34, 2009, para. 46) This corresponds to widespread practice and scholarly 
opinion (Hofbauer, 2015, p. 231ff), even if the adopted text tempts some bodies to go further.  
Case-law by the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights has confirmed the 
importance of FPIC for the protection of indigenous rights. Notably, the Commission found in 
Twelve Saramaka Clans that ‘in light of the way international human rights legislation has 
evolved with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples, that the indigenous people’s 
consent to natural resource exploitation activities on their traditional territories is always 
required by law.’ (Saramaka v. Suriname, 2006, para. 154). This was confirmed by the Court, 
which also embarked on an analysis of the limits of the right to property as contained in 
Article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights (see also below Section 2.2.3 in 
more detail). Inter alia it held that ‘effective participation’ of affected indigenous communities 
was necessary in order for possible limitations to the right to property to be permissible. 
Hence, it found that the duty to actively consult: requires the state to both accept and 
disseminate information; entails constant communication; must be undertaken in good faith, 
through culturally appropriate procedures; must have the objective of reaching an 
agreement; must be undertaken at the early stages of development to provide time for 
internal discussion and proper feedback to the state; the communities must have been made 
aware of possible risks to ensure acceptance which is knowingly and voluntarily. (Saramaka 
v. Suriname (Ct), 2007, para. 133) As later confirmed in Kichwa Indigenous Peoples of 
Sarayaku v. Ecuador, ‘the obligation to consult is the responsibility of the State; therefore the 
planning and executing of the consultation process is not an obligation that can be avoided 
by delegating it to a private company or to third parties […].’ (Sarayaku v. Ecuador, 2012, 
para. 187)  
2.2.1.2  Applicable domestic legal framework and institutional policies 
2.2.1.2.1 Domestic legal framework 
Panama’s Constitution (Articles 124, 126 and 127) as well as the respective legal acts on the 
comarcas contain far-reaching safeguards, in particular with regard to land rights. The basis 
of indigenous’ land rights in Panama is provided by Article 127 of the Constitution: ‘The 
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State guarantees to indigenous communities the reservation of necessary lands and collec-
tive ownership thereof, to ensure their economic and social well-being. Procedures to be 
followed for obtaining this purpose, and the definition of boundaries within which private ap-
propriation of land is prohibited, shall be regulated by law.’28 At the same time, the govern-
ment ‘retains ownership of underground resources along with the right to authorize large-
scale development projects such as hydroelectric dams and mining for the benefit of the 
whole nation’ (Cansari & Gausset, 2013, in reference to Ley 10, 1997)  
With regard to the obligation to obtain FPIC of the affected communities, two domestic acts 
of legislation are of particular relevance. Firstly, Law 10 and its related decrees regarding the 
authorities of the comarca Ngäbe-Buglé, and secondly, Law 41 on the environment, in par-
ticular regarding the authorization process of projects having an impact on indigenous territo-
ries. 
The comarca Ngäbe-Buglé was established by Law 10 of 7 March 1997. Its Carta Orgánica 
Administrativa, forming the basis for the relations of the traditional authorities with the central 
government and public authorities, was regulated in Executive Decree 194 of 1999. Howev-
er, in 2010, Executive Decree 537 (2 June 2010) amended this act, changing the election 
procedures for the authorities and leaders of the comarca. 
Accordingly, the administrational structure of the Comarca consists of three official recog-
nized types of authorities: 
• Traditional authorities: Cacique General, Cacique regional, Jefe Inmediato and 
Vocero (spokesperson) 
• Authorities of the Comarca: the presidents of the Congreso General (General Con-
gress [this legal institution has the main power and makes decisions, and consists of 
one representative of each part/region of the Comarca]), Congreso regional (Regional 
Congress) and Congreso local (Local Congress) 
• State authorities: Gobernador Comarcal (Governor of the Comarca), Consejo de Co-
ordinación Comarcal (Coordinating Council of the Comarca), Alcalde Comarcal (Ma-
jor of the Comarca) and corregimientos (municipalities) (Castro de la Mata, 2013a, p. 
12) 
28   El Estado garantizará a las comunidades indígenas la reserva de las tierras necesarias y la propiedad 
colectiva de las mismas para el logro de su bienestar económico y social. La Ley regulará los procedimientos 
que deban seguirse para lograr esta finalidad y las delimitaciones correspondientes dentro de las cuales se 
prohíbe la apropiación privada de tierras. 
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In addition to these legally recognized institutions/authorities, there is also still a Traditional 
Congress (Congreso Tradicional de Masas, or Congreso General Ngäbe Buglé y Campes-
ino), which is not recognized by the government. Elections to this Congress still occur ac-
cording to ‘elections by rows’ (standing behind the candidate of choice). While the Cacique 
tried to mediate between these two Congresses at first, through political instrumentalization 
and disagreements on certain issues (e.g. Law 11), there have been substantial internal ten-
sions, separating the community internally. 
Elections to the officially recognized authorities occur through delegates. Since 2011, the 
Cacique General de la Comarca Ngäbe-Buglé is Silvia Carrera Concepción (her predecessor 
was Maximo Saldaña). Unlike the Congreso General29, however, the Cacique General is not 
entitled to approve projects, but is more a traditional figure to represent the Ngäbe. 
Thus, any consent to a project must have been obtained by the Congreso General. 
With regard to projects having an effect on indigenous territories, Law 41 of 1998 recognized 
not only the rights of indigenous peoples to use and manage the natural resources located 
on their lands (Article 9830), but also that the seizing of their land is prohibited and that they 
may only be relocated after consenting thereto (Article 10231). However, Law 18 of 31 Janu-
ary 2003 – generally a law dealing with redistricting – repealed Arts. 63, 96, 98, 101 and 102 
of Law 41 of 1 July 1998. (Velásquez Runk, 2012, p. 28)  
Even though not applicable to the Barro Blanco case, Law 11 of 2012 shall be briefly pointed 
out (for a detailed description on how this Bill was at the center of heated discussions see 
Cansari & Gausset, 2013). This legislative act was passed in the course of the round tables 
29   Article 47, as amended, reads: ‘El Congreso General Ngöbe-Buglé es el máximo organismo normativo de 
decisión y expresión étnica y cultural del pueblo Ngöbe-Buglé, integrado por los Delegados. Sesionará 4 
veces al año en la región que el Congreso acuerde previamente, alternando se sede entre las tres regiones. 
Cada 5 años, elige de entre sus miembros su nueva Junta Directiva, la que se reuniá con la frecuencia que lo 
decidan sus miembros, alternando su sede entre las tres regiones.’ 
30   Article 98 read: Se reconoce el derecho de las comarcas y pueblos indigenas ion relación al uso, manejo y 
aprovechamiento tradicional sostenible de los recursos naturales renovables, ubicados dentro de las 
comarcas y reservas indigenas creadas por ley. Estos recurso deberán utilizarse de acuerdo con los fines de 
protección y conservación del ambiente, establecidos en la Constitutión Politica, la presente Ley y las demás 
leyes nacionales. 
31   Article 102 read: Las tierras comprendidas dentro de las comarcas y reservas indigenas son inembargable, 
imprescriptibles e inalienables. Esta limitación no afecta el sistema tradicional de trasmisión de tierras en las 
comunidades indigenas. Las comunidades o pueblos indigenas, en general, sólo podrán ser trasladados de 
sus comarcas y reservas, o de las tierras que poseen, mediante su previo consentimiento. En caso de ocurrir 
el traslado, tendrán derecho a indemnización previa, asi como a la reubicación en tierras comparables a law 
que ocopaban. 
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held at UNDP in 2012. Law 11 prohibits mining within the Ngäbe-Buglé comarcas (annulling 
any previously granted concession32) and requires the authorization of the general, regional 
or local congress and a referendum in the affected district prior to the granting of any hydroe-
lectric project affected the indigenous territory. (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en, 2014, para. 15) 
2.2.1.2.2 Institutional policies  
Both DEG and FMO apply the IFC’s Performance Standards (PS). As the Barro Blanco pro-
ject was approved by both banks in August 2011, the 2006 version of the standards is appli-
cable. Particularly relevant in the context of community participation are PS 1 (Social and 
Environmental Assessment and Management System) and PS 7 (Indigenous Peoples). (IFC, 
2006) 
PS 1 provides the wider framework for the required environmental and social impact as-
sessment, which shall ‘identify and assess social and environmental impacts, both adverse 
and beneficial, […] [and] avoid, or where avoidance is not possible, minimize, mitigate, or 
compensate for adverse impacts on workers, affected communities, and the environment.’ 
(IFC, 2006, p. 1) Moreover, the assessment should ‘ensure that affected communities are 
appropriately engaged on issues that could potentially affect them’ (IFC, 2006, p. 1). This is 
further detailed by stating that this engagement should include a process of consultation and 
‘be free of external manipulation, interference, or coercion, and intimidation, and conducted 
on the basis of timely, relevant, understandable and accessible information.’ (IFC, 2006, p. 4, 
para. 19) Where affected communities are subject to risks or adverse impacts from a project, 
and no alternatives are feasible (IFC, 2006, p. 2, para. 9),  
‘the client will undertake a process of consultation in a manner that provides the af-
fected communities with opportunities to express their views on project risks, impacts, 
and mitigation measures, and allows the client to consider and respond to them. Ef-
fective consultation: (i) should be based on the prior disclosure of relevant and ade-
quate information, including draft documents and plans; (ii) should begin early in the 
Social and Environmental Assessment process; (iii) will focus on the social and envi-
ronmental risks and adverse impacts, and the proposed measures and actions to ad-
dress these; and (iv) will be carried out on an ongoing basis as risks and impacts 
32   This also applied to the hotly disputed Cerro Colorado mine. 
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arise. The consultation process will be undertaken in a manner that is inclusive and 
culturally appropriate. The client will tailor its consultation process to the language 
preferences of the affected communities, their decision-making process, and the 
needs of disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. For projects with significant adverse 
impacts on affected communities, the consultation process will ensure their free, prior 
and informed consultation and facilitate their informed participation. Informed partici-
pation involves organized and iterative consultation, leading to the client’s incorporat-
ing into their decision-making process the views of the affected communities on mat-
ters that affect them directly, such as proposed mitigation measures, the sharing of 
development benefits and opportunities, and implementation issues. The client will 
document the process, in particular the measures taken to avoid or minimize risks to 
and adverse impacts on the affected communities.’ (IFC, 2006, p. 5, paras. 21-22, 
emphasis added) 
PS 7 (Indigenous Peoples) emphasizes that particular attention should be paid to the poten-
tial impacts of a project on indigenous peoples. It recalls that the free, prior and informed 
consultation must be sought from the affected indigenous communities, through involvement 
of their representative bodies. (IFC, 2006, p. 29, para. 9) In addition, it refers to a number of 
special requirements which apply in the context of indigenous peoples, including having a 
qualified and external expert involved to assist in conducting the prior assessment. (IFC, 
2006, p. 30, para. 11) 
2.2.1.3  Analysis 
Once completed, the Barro Blanco hydroelectric dam will impact indigenous territory, pro-
tected by Panama’s Constitution as well as by Law 10 of 1997 establishing the comarca 
Ngäbe-Buglé. Thus, prior to granting GENISA a concession, the government of Panama was 
obligated under international law to enter into good faith negotiations with the affected com-
munities to obtain their free, prior and informed consent.  
The manner in which this consultation process was to take place is regulated by Panama’s 
domestic law. As ANAM had classified the Barro Blanco project as a project which could re-
sult in significant adverse environmental impacts, Executive Decree No. 123 on the contents 
of EIAs required that a public forum must be held in the course of the impact assessment. 
According to the Decree, it should be organized by the promoter during the evaluation and 
analysis of the EIA for the public in general, in order to provide information on the project and 
the opportunity to comment on the study. 
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Thus, on 8 February 2008, GENISA conducted such a public forum with regard to Barro 
Blanco. It was held in a small school in Tolé, located outside of the indigenous territory, was 
difficult to reach for the affected communities (requiring a several hour foot-march), and was 
poorly advertised. The few members of the community, who did gain information of the meet-
ing being held and attempted to attend, were at first not let into the building, and then only 
few were allowed to enter. No further consultations in the course of the EIA proceedings took 
place with the affected communities at this stage. 
The EIA was approved by ANAM three months later (May 2008). This was prior to any 
agreement reached with the communities. Rather, in 2009 – after ANAM had already ap-
proved the EIA without any further investigation, GENISA stated that they had reached an 
agreement with the previous Cacique General (Maximo Saldaña) for the use of the territory. 
After disagreements on the legitimacy of his mandate to do this, GENISA later concluded an 
agreement with the Regional Congress of the communities (Kadriri) being affected in 2011. 
In light of these facts, the participation process of the affected indigenous communities 
shows a number of flaws if assessed against international standards as well as the IFCs per-
formance standards. These relate to the overall procedure of the consultation process, in 
particular to be undertaken in good faith, but also to each individual elements of a standard 
which is essential in guaranteeing respect for indigenous sovereignty. 
The primary objective of FPIC, whether measured under international law or under the IFCs 
2006 Performance Standards, is to ensure mutually acceptable solutions for both sides. In 
the present case, this has not been reached at any stage of the process. Thus, the consulta-
tion process has erred with regard to the following aspects: 
- First, as emphasized above, the requirement to obtain FPIC is a state obligation 
which cannot be delegated to third parties. In the present case, GENISA was 
tasked to conduct the public forum, albeit in coordination with ANAM. Neverthe-
less, especially in light of the long-lasting dispute regarding resource exploita-
tion in comarca areas in Panama, the government missed the opportunity to 
engage in a meaningful consultation process from the start. 
- Second, with regard to the requirement to conduct the consultation process prior 
to any project approval through the indigenous representative bodies, the Car-
ta Orgánica – a publically available legislative act – lists the representative author-
ities who are authorized to conclude agreements. Good faith requires the parties 
interested in economic exploitation of an area which will affect indigenous lands to 
enquire in detail through external experts into the indigenous societal structure 
and ensure that the proper indigenous authorities are party to any agreement. 
From the outset there were parts of the comarca not only rejecting Barro Blanco 
but resource development in the comarca in general. Nevertheless, before ensur-
ing that the agreement obtained with the authorities had the legitimate authority 
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under the laws of the comarca and without entering into any meaningful consulta-
tion with the affected communities, the project continued. This is closely also 
linked to a failure to ensure the informed participation of the communities. 
- Hence, informed participation entails not only that the consultation process 
should be transparent, consistent, complete etc., but, most importantly, it means 
that it should be culturally appropriate. In the present case, neither the public fo-
rum nor the further process have adhered to these standards.  
o The manner in which the public forum was advertised, where it was locat-
ed (outside of indigenous territory) and the information presented contrib-
uted to the negative attitude of the affected communities towards the pro-
ject.  
o The EIA was incomplete as it inter alia did not indicate that any houses 
would be flooded (see also below Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) 
o The peritaje missions carried out in 2013 confirmed that the direct and 
indirect impacts had not been clearly explained to or understood by the af-
fected communities. 
Thus, on this basis, it can be concluded that the project was authorized without the free, prior 
and informed consent of the affected communities, an issue which in light of the historical 
struggle over the exploitation of natural resources in the comarca weighed particularly heavy 
on the possibility of any mutually acceptable outcome. 
2.2.2 Due diligence assessments / monitoring 
2.2.2.1 International standards 
A further identified crucial point relates to the adequacy of the conducted environmental im-
pact assessment (EIA) as well as the monitoring activities by the financing partners. More 
broadly, this can be summarized as an analysis of the extent to which the involved parties 
have complied with their due diligence obligations to prevent or minimize potential dam-
age/harm from occurring.  
In this context, the due diligence obligation of the involved parties stems both from human 
rights law (see, e.g., CESCR, UN Doc. E/1991/23, 1991; HRC, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 2004) and from international environmental law. In particular, it 
requires states to regulate the conduct of private parties in order to protect individuals from 
harmful activities and ensure that appropriate remedies are available. Hence, prior to author-
izing activities which potentially could cause harm to the environment, states are under the 
obligation to ensure that their decision is based on an assessment of the risks involved with 
the project activity. (ILC Articles on Prevention (with Commentaries), 2001, Art. 7) This obli-
gation of states to conduct an EIA to fulfil their due diligence obligation under international 
law has been recognized as customary international law inter alia by the International Court 
of Justice in Pulp Mills. (Pulp Mills (ICJ), 2010, pp. 82–83, para. 204) EIAs have to ‘address 
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the potential effects’ of the proposed activities. (Pulp Mills (ICJ), 2010, pp. 82–83, para. 204), 
thus not excluding issues which would deprive it of its purpose. While the scope and content 
of EIAs remains for each state ‘to determine in its domestic legislation or in the authorization 
process’ (Pulp Mills (ICJ), 2010, p. 83, para. 205), the Court was clear in finding that ‘an envi-
ronmental impact assessment must be conducted prior to the implementation of a project. 
Moreover, once operations have started and, where necessary, throughout the life of the 
project, continuous monitoring of its effects on the environment shall be undertaken.’ 
As to the involvement of the affected communities in EIAs, the issue is closely linked to Sec-
tion 2.2.1 (see also Art. 19, UNDRIP, 2007) and the objective to ensure adequate participa-
tion of indigenous peoples in projects affecting them. Thus, jurisprudence by regional human 
rights bodies has consistently confirmed that the obligation to conduct a prior EIA through 
independent and technically capable entities constitutes an essential safeguard for the pro-
tection of property rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. (Saramaka v. Suriname (Ct), 2007, 
para. 129; Social and Economic Rights Action Centre & the Centre for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria, 2001, para. 53)  
By inference of environmental matters into a number of human rights – reaffirming especially 
procedural obligations such as access to information and the obligation to conduct a prior 
EIA (Sands & Peel, 2012, p. 787ff), some cases have even gone so far to explicitly extend 
the obligation of prior EIAs to environmental and social impact assessments. (Centre for Mi-
nority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
Council) v. Kenya, 2009, paras 266-268; Saramaka v. Suriname (Ct), 2007)  
As a number of instruments have confirmed, EIAs should also extend to an assessment of 
the impacts on cultural heritage. (CBD Guidelines, n.d.; Espoo Convention, 1997) 
Additionally, the due diligence obligation also extends to corporate entities involved in the 
project. Exemplary are the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Report of the 
Special Representative of the SG on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 2011), stipulating in Principle 15 that: 
In order to meet their responsibility to respect human rights, business enterprises 
should have in place policies and processes appropriate to their size and circum-
stances, including: 6 
(a) A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights; 
(b) A human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and ac-
count for how they address their impacts on human rights;  
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(c) Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts 
they cause or to which they contribute. 
 
As emphasized by the interpretative guide to the Guiding Principles, due diligence in this 
context refers to ‘such a measure of prudence, activity, or assiduity, as is properly to be ex-
pected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a reasonable and prudent [person] under the par-
ticular circumstances; not measured by any absolute standard, but depending on the relative 
facts of the special case’.  (OHCHR, 2012, p. 4) This also comprises an ongoing manage-
ment process, according to the circumstances at hand, to meet their responsibility to respect 
human rights. 
2.2.2.2  Applicable domestic legal framework and institutional policies 
2.2.2.2.1 Domestic legal framework 
The main piece of environmental legislation is Law 41 of 1 July 1998 (Ley General de 
Ambiente (General Law on the Environment)). It contains general provisions on environmen-
tal law and establishes ANAM (Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente – National Environmental 
Authority). ANAM is the key regulatory authority responsible for ensuring compliance with 
and enforcing the laws, regulations and national environmental policy. As such, ANAM is 
also entitled to issue fines and sanctions. 
ANAM also evaluates the (mandatory) Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs).33 The 
key piece of legislation regulating EIAs (estudios de impacto ambiental) is Executive Decree 
33  Capítulo II Proceso de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental  
Artículo 23. Las actividades, obras o proyectos, públicos o privados, que por su naturaleza, características, 
efectos, ubicación o recursos pueden generar riesgo ambiental, requerirán de un estudio de impacto 
ambiental previo al inicio de su ejecución, de acuerdo con la reglamentación de la presente Ley. Estas 
actividades, obras o proyectos, deberán someterse a un proceso de evaluación de impacto ambiental, 
inclusive aquellos que se realicen en la cuenca del Canal y comarcas indígenas.  
Artículo 24. El proceso de evaluación del estudio de impacto ambiental comprende las siguientes etapas:  
1. La presentación, ante la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente, de un estudio de impacto ambiental, según se 
trate de actividades, obras o proyectos, contenidos en la lista taxativa de la reglamentación de la presente 
Ley.  
2. La evaluación del estudio de impacto ambiental y la aprobación, en su caso, por la Autoridad Nacional del 
Ambiente, del estudio presentado.  
3. El seguimiento, control, fiscalización y evaluación de la ejecución del Programa de Adecuación y Manejo 
Ambiental (PAMA) y de la resolución de aprobación.  
Artículo 25. El contenido del estudio de impacto ambiental será definido por la Autoridad Nacional del 
Ambiente, en coordinación con las autoridades competentes, y publicado en el manual de procedimiento 
respectivo. 
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No. 123 of 14 August 2009, modified by Executive Decree No. 155 of 2011. According to 
its provisions, any new project, work or activity relating to the sectors of agriculture, hunting 
and forestry; fishing; food and drink processing; mining; textiles and leather manufacturing; 
wood and paper manufacturing; recycling; energy; construction; services; tourism; and waste 
disposal require the submission of a EIA and approval by ANAM. There are three catego-
ries requiring EIAs – Category I (no significant impacts, listed in Article 16); Category II 
(listed in Article 16, negative partial environmental impacts can be caused); Category III 
(listed in Article 16, can result in significant adverse environmental impacts, deeper analysis 
is called for). 
In the course of the EIA, consultations with the affected public/communities must be con-
ducted (Title IV). 
Generally, only one EIA is required per project. Certain activities, however, might require 
additional permits in addition to the EIA, e.g. concerning activities relating to the use or dis-
charge of water. For large-scale activities, e.g. energy, mining…, a concession, issued 
through the relevant regulatory authority (e.g. ASEP), is necessary. 
The scope of the EIA includes impacts on human health, flora, fauna, renewable and nonre-
newable natural resources, protected areas, landscapes, society, and anthropological, ar-
chaeological, historic, or cultural heritage. 
Artículo 26. Los estudios de impacto ambiental serán elaborados por personas idóneas, naturales o jurídicas, 
independientes de la empresa promotora de la actividad, obra o proyecto, debidamente certificadas por la 
Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente.  
Artículo 27. La Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente hará de conocimiento público la presentación de los estudios 
de impacto ambiental, para su consideración, y otorgará un plazo para los comentarios sobre la actividad, 
obra o proyecto propuesto, que será establecido en la reglamentación de acuerdo con la complejidad del 
proyecto, obra o actividad.  
Artículo 28. Para toda actividad, obra o proyecto del Estado que, de acuerdo con esta Ley y sus reglamentos, 
requiera un estudio de impacto ambiental, la institución pública promotora estará obligada a incluir, en su 
presupuesto, los recursos para cumplir con la obligación de elaborarlo y asumir el costo que demande el 
cumplimiento del Programa de Adecuación y Manejo Ambiental.  
Artículo 29. Una vez recibido el estudio de impacto ambiental, la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente procederá 
a su análisis, aprobación o rechazo. El término para cumplir, ampliar y presentar los estudios de impacto 
ambiental, será establecido mediante reglamentación de la presente Ley.  
Artículo 30. Por el incumplimiento en la presentación o ejecución del estudio de impacto ambiental, la 
Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente podrá paralizar las actividades del proyecto e imponer sanciones según 
corresponda.  
Artículo 31. Contra las decisiones del Consejo Nacional del Ambiente o de la Autoridad Nacional del 
Ambiente, en cada caso de su competencia, se podrá interponer el recurso de reconsideración, que agota la 
vía gubernativa. 
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As mentioned above, since 2012 there is a special legal framework (Law 11, 26 March 2012) 
regarding projects which affect indigenous territories.  
2.2.2.2.2 Institutional policies  
Of the applicable bank policies, particularly PS 5 (Land Acquisition and Involuntary Reset-
tlement), PS 7 (Indigenous Peoples) and PS 8 (Cultural Heritage) are relevant. 
As stated in Section 2.2.2.1.2, PS 1 provides the wider framework for the required environ-
mental and social impact assessment, which shall ‘identify and assess social and environ-
mental impacts, both adverse and beneficial, […] [and] avoid, or where avoidance is not pos-
sible, minimize, mitigate, or compensate for adverse impacts on workers, affected communi-
ties, and the environment.’ (IFC, 2006, p. 1)  
‘[A]ll relevant social and environmental risks and impacts of the project [will be considered], 
including the issues identified in Performance Standards 2 through 8, and those who will be 
affected by such risks and impacts.’ (IFC, 2006, p. 1, para. 4) As to the standards of as-
sessment, these are drawn from national legislation as well as from a state’s obligations un-
der international law if implemented into national law. 
The social and environmental management system should by a continuous process through-
out the project’s life cycle, i.e. in the early stages of the project development and on an ongo-
ing basis. This management system shall also be monitored throughout the process:  
‘In addition to recording information to track performance and establishing relevant 
operational controls, the client should use dynamic mechanisms, such as inspections 
and audits, where relevant, to verify compliance and progress toward the desired out-
comes. For projects with significant impacts that are diverse, irreversible, or unprece-
dented, the client will retain qualified and experienced external experts to verify its 
monitoring information. The extent of monitoring should be commensurate with the 
project’s risks and impacts and with the project’s compliance requirements. Monitor-
ing should be adjusted according to performance experience and feedback. The cli-
ent will document monitoring results, and identify and reflect the necessary corrective 
and preventive actions in the amended management program. The client will imple-
ment these corrective and preventive actions, and follow up on these actions to en-
sure their effectiveness.’ (IFC, 2006, p. 5, para. 24) 
Special requirements for the required ESIA in this case can also be deducted from PS 7 (In-
digenous Peoples) and PS 8 (cultural heritage).  
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Firstly, aside from the obligation to ensure the informed participation of affected indigenous 
communities (see above), the assessment should pay special regard to pay attention to the 
impacts of the project on traditional or customary lands under use. This entails entering into 
good faith negotiations (with successful outcome) with the affected communities, in particular 
in cases where relocation will not be able to be avoided (after examining all feasible alterna-
tives). (IFC, 2006, p. 31, paras. 13-14)  
Secondly, PS 8 aims at ‘protecting cultural heritage from the adverse impacts of project activ-
ities’. (IFC, 2006, p. 32) Cultural heritage ‘refers to tangible forms of cultural heritage, such 
as tangible property and sites having archaeological (prehistoric), paleontological, historical, 
cultural, artistic, and religious values, as well as unique natural environmental features that 
embody cultural values, such as sacred groves. However, for the purpose of paragraph 11 
below, intangible forms of culture, such as cultural knowledge, innovations and practices of 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles, are also included. The requirements of this Per-
formance Standard apply to cultural heritage regardless of whether or not it has been legally 
protected or previously disturbed.’ (IFC, 2006, p. 32, para. 3) 
Where a project may affect cultural heritage, not only are consultations with affected com-
munities to be entered into, but the process should also include the relevant national or local 
regulatory agencies that are entrusted with the protection of cultural heritage. 
The removal of cultural heritage should be avoided unless the overall benefits of the project 
outweigh the anticipated cultural heritage loss and there are not other feasible alternatives. 
2.2.2.3  Analysis 
Closely related to the lack of meaningful participation of the affected indigenous communities 
is the question to which extent the involved parties have undertaken appropriate assess-
ments to evaluate, prevent or minimize harm from occurring in line with their due diligence 
obligations. Thus, have the involved parties undertaken all reasonable efforts to inform them-
selves of ‘factual or legal components that relate foreseeably’ (ILC Articles on Prevention 
(with Commentaries), 2001, Art. 3, para. 10) to the implementation of the Barro Blanco pro-
ject in order for them ‘to take appropriate measures in timely fashion, to address them.’ (ILC 
Articles on Prevention (with Commentaries), 2001, Art. 3, para. 10)  
On the one hand, this relates to the initial EIA and the process leading to its approval in 2008 
by ANAM, thus, inter alia, the consultation process with the affected communities, and the 
extent and scope of the EIA. On the other hand, as the requirement to exercise due diligence 
is a continuous obligation, this also is concerned with the subsequent monitoring process. 
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The granting of a concession to construct a hydropower dam on the Tabasará river to 
GENISA in 2006 followed decades of resistance by indigenous communities residing in the 
area and year-long law suits against previous plans to exploit the river.  
As already stated above, the EIA procedure took place early 2008. Barro Blanco was classi-
fied as a category III project under Executive Decree No. 123, i.e. a project which can result 
in significant adverse environmental impacts, calling for a more detailed analysis. After a 
public forum was held in February 2008 by GENISA, ANAM approved the EIA three months 
later (May 2008, Resolution DIEORA IA-332-2008). According to domestic law, the scope of 
any EIA should include impacts on human health, flora, fauna, renewable and non-renewable 
natural resources, protected areas, landscapes, society, and anthropological, archaeological, 
historic, or cultural heritage. 
A major concern in this context relates to the fact that the EIA lacked completeness. It 
failed: 
- to indicate that any members of the affected communities would have to be reset-
tled,  
- to recognize the spiritual importance of the affected river and lands for parts of the 
community, 
- and neglected to adequately consult with the communities on the value of the af-
fected area.  
These flaws were accepted by the authorities and project financers, with both instances ap-
proving the project despite realizing that additional information was required. Thus, in late 
realization, ANAM suspended the project temporarily on 9 February 2015, inter alia with re-
gard to the agreement reached with the communities and those affected, the development of 
the negotiation process, the absence of an archaeological management plan approved by 
the National Institute of Culture (INAC) to protect the petroglyphs and other archaeological 
findings. (ANAM, 2015) 
Furthermore, as the Panel Report of the FMO/DEG complaint mechanism points out, the 
lenders had determined at the time of credit approval that inter alia the indigenous peoples 
report was insufficient, requiring more information (FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, para. 8), as had the 
question of cultural heritage not been fully assessed (FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, para. 19). Even 
though they required a number of additional reports (FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, paras. 75-76), the 
Panel Report pointed out that a conclusive analysis of indigenous peoples’ rights, in the 
Panamanian context, was still missing at the time of first disbursement. (FMO/DEG IEP, 
2015, para. 86) 
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Also, prior to the project’s approval by the lenders, there was already a domestic lawsuit 
pending regarding the legitimacy of the conducted EIA. EIB – from which GENISA originally 
had sought financing – had already received complaints by involved NGOs, leading to its 
decision to wanting to visit the affected communities.34 It was also known to the lenders that 
the legitimacy of the agreement reached with the (former) Cacique had been challenged. As 
the due diligence obligation is fact-dependent, the historical resistance, well known to the 
parties, in connection with the absence of a mutually acceptable agreement with the affected 
communities weighs particularly heavy.  
The incompleteness should have triggered a strong and continuous monitoring process, 
proportionate and adequate to the project’s risks and impacts. Even though the lenders hired 
expert consultants to undertake this task, the involvement of stakeholders could have been 
beneficial in overcoming mutual trust issues and establishing a functioning dialogue.  
Furthermore, it is unfortunate that neither financing institution played a visible role in the UN-
led mediation process taking place in 2012/2013. However, the recognition of legitimate con-
cerns regarding the project’s implementation did eventually result in the establishment of joint 
FMO/DEG complaint mechanism. Whether this will have a lasting impact on the Barro Blan-
co project or the approval of future projects will be telling for the evaluation of the good faith 
commitment of the involved banks. 
2.2.3 Forced displacement from indigenous land 
2.2.3.1  International standards 
Even though so far no immediate displacements have occurred, the impacts of the dam will 
lead to the displacement of several members of the affected indigenous communities. So far 
no resettlement plan has been implemented, and the affected communities have not con-
sented to be relocated.  
Forced displacement/eviction can violate a number of civil and political as well as economic, 
social and cultural rights (e.g. Arts. 6, 7, 9, 17, 25, 26, 27 ICCPR, Arts. 6, 11, 12, 13 
ICESCR). The indivisibility of human rights is particularly evident in this regard. (OHCHR, 
2014, pp. 5–7) In particular the recognition of the right to property is an essential element in 
ensuring protection from displacement. (Basic Principles (Development-based Displace-
34   However, as GENISA withdrew the loan application prior to the scheduled visit, the case with the complaint 
procedure with the EIB was closed. (EIB Barton, 2013; EIB CM, n.d.) 
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ment), 2007, para. 50; Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998, Principle 21) The 
right to property (protected in regional human rights treaties) also includes the recognition 
of traditional land tenure and collective ownership systems. This was also emphasized by the 
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing in 2013 when stating that states ‘have an immedi-
ate obligation to ensure that all persons possess a degree of security of tenure that guaran-
tees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats’ (with reference to 
General Comment No. 4 of the CESCR). (Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, 2013, 
para. 6) 
Hence, every person has the right to be protected against arbitrary displacement/forced 
evictions. (Basic Principles (Development-based Displacement), 2007, para. 11; Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998, Principle 6) The primary duty-bearer is the state 
where the displacement/eviction at risk of occurring. However, as Principle 11 of the Basic 
Principles emphasizes, this ‘does not […] absolve other parties, including project managers 
and personnel, international financial and other institutions or organizations, transnational 
and other corporations, and individual parties, including private landlords and landowners, of 
all responsibility.’ (see also Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7, 
1997, para. 5)  
Moreover, Principle 12 of the Basic Principles stresses that states shall ‘refrain from violating 
human rights domestically and extraterritorially; ensure that other parties within the State’s 
jurisdiction and effective control do not violate the human rights of others; and take preven-
tive and remedial steps to uphold human rights and provide assistance to those whose rights 
have been violated.’  
The use of the qualifier ‘arbitrary’ indicates conduct occurring without a legal basis, in disre-
gard to procedural rules, containing ‘elements of injustice, unpredictability and unreasona-
bleness’. (Nowak, 2005, Article 17, para. 12) This includes displacement inter alia in cases of 
large-scale development projects that are not justified by compelling and overriding 
public interests. Hence, in line with general human rights law (in particular the right to prop-
erty), displacement/evictions are allowed in certain circumstances, but this must be interpret-
ed strictly, leave no other alternatives, and constitute an ultima ratio. (Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement, 1998, Principle 7; Kälin, 2000, p. 15) This process is detailed by the 
UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-based Evictions and Displacement, 
stipulating that ‘any eviction must be (a) authorized by law; (b) carried out in accordance with 
international human rights law; (c) undertaken solely for the purpose of promoting the gen-
eral welfare; (d) reasonable and proportional; (e) regulated so as to ensure full and fair com-
pensation and rehabilitation; and (f) carried out in accordance with the present guidelines.’ 
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(Basic Principles (Development-based Displacement), 2007, para. 21) Where displacement 
is found to be unavoidable, measures must be taken to minimize it and its negative conse-
quences. (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998, Principle 7) 
To determine when there is an overriding public interest, not only must all feasible al-
ternatives have been explored (see inter alia Art. 10, Kampala Convention, 2009, but also 
World Bank OP 4.12, 2013), but a balance of interests between the overall economic inter-
ests in the project and the protected rights of the affected communities must be struck. (Hof-
bauer, 2015, p. 249ff)  
In this regard, the interests of indigenous peoples deserve special attention. The im-
portance of land for indigenous communities has been confirmed already early in by the In-
ter-American Court in Awas Tingni, where it stated that for indigenous peoples ‘relations to 
the land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual 
element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to 
future generations.’ (The Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicara-
gua, 2001, p. 75, para. 149) Both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have deduced special protection rights for indigenous 
peoples inter alia from the provisions regarding the rights to life, liberty and personal security, 
residence and movement, the preservation of health and well-being, culture, judicial well-
being, as well as the Convention’s protection of property.35 
Furthermore, as emphasized by the Inter-American Court in Saramaka, even though Article 
21 of the ACHR (right to property) is not absolute, when concerned with property rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples an additional factor is whether the ‘restriction amounts to a 
denial of their traditions and customs in way that endangers the very survival of the group 
and of its members.’ (Saramaka v. Suriname (Ct), 2007, para. 128)  
In order to safeguard their rights, the whole process, in particular the identification of possible 
alternatives, shall occur in consultation with the affected communities (see, inter alia, 
Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7, 1997, para. 16; Saramaka v. 
Suriname (Ct), 2007, para. 129). In this vein, the special value of lands and territories for 
indigenous peoples has also been recognized in Article 10 of the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
35  Inter alia, Arts. 4, 7, 21, 22, 25, American Convention on Human Rights, 21 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123.  
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Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No re-
location shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of the indige-
nous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, 
where possible, with the option of return. 
Where the public interest overweighs the interests of the affected communities, resettlement 
‘must occur in a just and equitable manner’ and must include ‘the right to alternative land or 
housing which is safe, secure, accessible, affordable and habitable.’ (Commission on Human 
Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7, 1997, paras. 26-27) This shall take place only once a 
resettlement plan has been put in place, and should inter alia ensure that  
‘(c) The actor proposing and/or carrying out the resettlement shall be required by law 
to pay any costs associated therewith, including all resettlement costs;  
[...] 
(e) The affected persons, groups and communities must provide their full and in-
formed consent as regards the relocation site. [...]  
(f) Sufficient information shall be provided to affected persons, groups and communi-
ties concerning all State projects as well as the planning and implementation pro-
cesses relating to the resettlement concerned, including information concerning the 
purpose to which the eviction dwelling or site is to be put and the persons, groups or 
communities who will benefit from the evicted site. Particular attention must be given 
to ensure that indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, the landless, women and chil-
dren are represented and included in this process;  
(g) The entire resettlement process should be carried out in full consultation with and 
participation of the affected persons, groups and communities. States should take in-
to account in particular all alternative plans proposed by the affected persons, groups 
and communities;’ (Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7, 
1997, para. 28) 
Finally, in the context of forced evictions, the right to a remedy and to judicial or other ac-
countability mechanisms is of key importance. (OHCHR, 2014, pp. 2, 31) 
2.2.3.2  Applicable domestic legal framework and institutional policies 
2.2.3.2.1 Domestic legal framework 
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According to Article 19(17) of Law 26 of 29 January 1996, the Autoridad Nacional de los Ser-
vicios Públicos (National Public Services Authority, ASEP) is authorized to recommend ex-
propriations and authorize the establishment of restrictions concerning property and ease-
ments necessary for the provision of public services.36  
Law 18 of 26 March 201337 introduced Art. 138A, creating an extraordinary eviction process 
in addition to the ordinary eviction process. This process can be resorted to if a project is 
considered a matter of urgency to meet the basic needs of the community (‘carácter urgente 
para satisfacer necesidades básicas de la comunidad’). 
2.2.3.2.2 Institutional policies  
With regard to the forced displacement of indigenous peoples, in particular IFC PS 5 (Land 
Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement) and PS 7 (Indigenous Peoples) are relevant. 
PS 5 is applicable to ‘physical displacement (relocation or loss of shelter) and to economic 
displacement (loss of assets or access to assets that leads to loss of income sources or 
means of livelihood) as a result of project-related land acquisition. Resettlement is consid-
ered involuntary when affected individuals or communities do not have the right to refuse 
land acquisition that results in displacement. This occurs in cases of: (i) lawful expropriation 
or restrictions on land use based on eminent domain;2 and ii) negotiated settlements in 
which the buyer can resort to expropriation or impose legal restrictions on land use if negotia-
tions with the seller fail.’ (IFC, 2006, p. 18, para. 1) 
The primary objectives are, inter alia, to avoid or at least minimize involuntary resettlements 
wherever feasible; mitigate adverse social and economic impacts by providing compensation 
and ensure that resettlement is implemented with appropriate disclosure of information, con-
sultation and the informed participation of those affected.  
Whether or not a project will result in resettlement should be discovered already in the 
course of the Social and Environmental Impact Assessment, and the necessary measures 
should be implemented into the Social and Environmental Management system. For the re-
settlement planning, “the client will carry out a census with appropriate socio-economic base-
line data”. (IFC, 2006, p. 20, para. 11) This will include a cut-off date for eligibility.  
36  ‘Recomendar las expropiaciones y autorizar la constitutión de limitaciones de dominio y servidumbres, que 
sean necesarias para la prestación de los servicios públicos’. 
37  http://www.energia.gob.pa/pdf_doc/MarcoLegal/B-Sector-Electrico/Ley18-2013(GO27254).pdf.  
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As emphasized in several passages of PS 5, consultation is a key prerequisite and should 
continue at all stages of implementation. Where indigenous peoples are concerned, PS 7 is 
of particular relevance. Para. 14 of PS 7 states in this regard that 
‘The client will consider feasible alternative project designs to avoid the relocation of 
Indigenous Peoples from their communally held5 traditional or customary lands under 
use. If such relocation is unavoidable, the client will not proceed with the project un-
less it enters into a good faith negotiation with the affected communities of Indigenous 
Peoples, and documents their informed participation and the successful outcome of 
the negotiation. Any relocation of Indigenous Peoples will be consistent with the Re-
settlement Planning and Implementation requirements of Performance Standard 5. 
Where feasible, the relocated Indigenous Peoples should be able to return to their 
traditional or customary lands, should the reason for their relocation cease to exist.’ 
(emphasis added) 
2.2.3.3 Analysis 
GENISA’s Environmental and Social Report came to the conclusion that no people reside in 
the 6,7 ha area which will be inundated on the Barro Blanco project is completed. This has 
since then, however, been disproven by numerous reports, including the UNDP’s verification 
mission, finding that the project would in fact lead to the displacement of families living in six 
houses (Misión de Verificación, 2012, para. 5). 
However, even though this initial assumption has been disproven, there is no resettlement 
plan. There is also no valid agreement with the affected communities to purchase or lease 
their land (owned collectively) against adequate compensation. The lack of a resettlement 
plan also means that no precise data exists on the full range of people affected by the pro-
ject and that therefore no structured planning of compensation measures has occurred. 
With regard to the case at hand, and in light of the spiritual importance of not only the river 
Tabasará for their religion (‘Mama Tata’) but also of the land for the affected indigenous 
communities, a prior agreement between the involved parties can be seen as indispensa-
ble. 
This was not reached, and there are serious doubts whether it was attempted to engage in 
good faith negotiations with the affected communities in a transparent and consistent 
manner. 
Furthermore, even though GENISA argued in their Environmental and Social Report that 
alternative land would be available if requested, potential resettlement sites and alterna-
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tives should have been discussed in respect of the free, prior and informed consent of the 
affected communities prior to authorization of the project.  
There are two expropriation/eviction procedures still pending, taking place under domestic 
law. ASEP Resolution AN No. 6103-Elec of 22 April 2013 declared the Barro Blanco project 
in the ‘public interest’ and ‘urgent’.38 This would have triggered the Art. 138A extraordinary 
eviction procedure under Law 18 of 26 March 201339. Despite the fact that the comarca has 
been recognized as communal property, offers of compensation were only extended to one 
member of the community (valuing the land at approx. 4000 USD). However, an appeal was 
launched against this resolution, whereby the Supreme Court granted provisional measures. 
In the meantime, the ordinary eviction process has been appealed against as well. Final de-
cisions are still pending. 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that to date the process so far has failed to adhere to a 
number of conditions for it to be in full compliance with international human rights standards, 
in particular as it has failed to be regulated so as to ensure full and fair compensation and 
rehabilitation; and has failed to take the special interests of indigenous peoples into account, 
in particular their spiritual attachment to the affected area. 
2.2.4 Conclusions 
The impacts of the Barro Blanco dam on the local indigenous population have been the focus 
of international and national bodies. The historical and societal complexities have contributed 
to a difficult political and legal environment. Against this background, three core issues can 
be identified which have aggravated the human rights situation of the affected communities: 
the project’s authorization without FPIC; a lack of due diligence exercised by involved par-
ties; and the threat of forced displacement from indigenous land.  
Where natural resource development and the rights of indigenous peoples interact, a primary 
objective is to balance these often-times competing interests by reaching a mutually ac-
ceptable agreement on issues of land and resource use and development, land and resource 
ownership, potential resettlement plans, and aspects of compensation and benefit-sharing. 
The current case exemplifies how a lack of due diligence exercised at the initial stages of a 
large-scale development project and a failure to undertake culturally appropriate consulta-
38  http://www.asep.gob.pa/openpdf.php?idresol=AN%20No.6103-Elec.  
39  http://www.energia.gob.pa/pdf_doc/MarcoLegal/B-Sector-Electrico/Ley18-2013(GO27254).pdf.  
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tions can exacerbate existing conflicts and prevent such agreements from being reached at a 
later stage. 
Hence, as stated above, the fact that the project was authorized without FPIC of the affected 
communities weighed particularly heavy in light of the historical struggle over the exploitation 
of natural resources in the comarca. Additionally, the incompleteness of the initial impact 
assessments, both under domestic law as well as under the lenders’ policies, prevented ear-
ly stage planning and led to continuous mistrust by the affected communities. As the project’s 
implementation continues, the failure to regulate resettlement, compensation and rehabilita-
tion within the management plan has cemented the negotiation positions, making a mutual 
agreement seem unreachable. 
In addition, as will be discussed in more detail in Section 2.4, identifying actors accountable 
and obtaining justice is another difficult issue.  
2.3 The legal responsibility and political accountability of European states and their institu-
tions  
The Barro Blanco project has and will continue to have severe impacts on the human rights 
of the local indigenous population. As has been found in numerous international reports by 
independent experts, the project’s implementation falls short of international standards and 
policies applicable. Yet, it is not possible to discern an entity/state/institution which has sin-
gle-handedly caused the identified human rights violations. In addition, it is difficult narrowing 
down an appropriate forum to attain justice for the victims.  
The UNFCCC is an inter-state agreement and currently does not provide individuals with 
human rights protection or direct recourse.40 This is particularly problematic in light of climate 
40   The only potential requirements are that the project must contribute to sustainable development and take 
account the comments made by stakeholders. In this regard, it is noteworthy that there were certain com-
plaints made on this issue in the Barro Blanco project. 
The Barro Blanco project obtained the letter of approval by ANAM for filing for registration under the CDM 
mechanism on 17 November 2009. (AENOR, 2011, p. 9) The Designated Operational Entity (DOE) for the val-
idation report was AENOR, the Spanish Association for Standardisation and Certification. According to their 
validation report, they verified during their visit that the ‘[l]ocal communities (Veladero, Cerro Viejo, Palacios 
and Bellavista) have been consulted and have demonstrated their support for the development of the Barro 
Blanco Hydroelectric power plant Project by signing the corresponding minutes of the meetings.’ (AENOR, 
2011, p. 24) As to comments by stakeholders, the report refers to one comment submitted by Mr. Osvaldo 
Jordan during the first period for commenting, on behalf of ACD, which was received during this period. 
AENOR then stated that after speaking to the DNA of Panama and the ‘main communities involved in the ar-
ea’, these had ‘agreed that the project will bring work and development to the area, and all of them supported 
the development of the project. No negative feedback was received.’ (AENOR, 2011, p. 24) 
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response measures being financed and approved in one state but implemented in another 
state. Thus, individuals negatively affected by such policy measures are often located in the 
territory of a state which has no decisive or singular role to play in the implementation there-
of.  
Applying the regime of extraterritoriality in this context is challenging. As elaborated below, 
the majority of so far existing case law on extraterritorial obligations relates to situations of 
armed conflict or the exercise of some factual control over territory or person. With regard to 
climate policies, victims of the negative effects of climate response measures are however 
generally not in such a control-relationship with the states / organization exercising decisive 
influence. (Humphreys, 2012, p. 44; Pedersen, 2011)  
Yet, as Humphreys argues, ‘[c]limate change may yet open up new spaces for the considera-
tion of this old theme.’ (Humphreys, 2012, p. 44) As the Maastricht Principles emphasize, in 
particular the scope of the ICESCR shall be understood in this context as requiring states to 
refrain from activities which might infringe economic, social and cultural rights in other states. 
(Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, 2011, Principle 9)  
Nevertheless, despite the recognition that climate response measures can result in severe 
human rights violations – both of civil and political rights as well as economic, social and cul-
tural rights – in light of the UNFCCC’s silence on guaranteeing the respect of human rights in 
implementation of adaptation and mitigation projects41 (Roht-Arriaza, 2010), state support for 
recognizing judiciable rights is scarce. (Humphreys, 2012, p. 45) As a preliminary note, it is 
also important to point out that it is commonly recognized that states cannot be held respon-
sible for their votes cast for or against the individual policies of an International Organization 
(Crawford, 2014, p. 412, elaborating on Art. 58 of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of 
Due to a change in methodology, there then was another period for comments regarding a new version of the 
PDD, and during that period, no comments were received. (AENOR, 2011, p. 24) Thus, AENOR concluded 
that it could recommend the Barro Blanco project for registration. A number of NGO reports indicate, however, 
that comments had been sent also during the second period, and their receipt had been confirmed. Yet, no re-
sponse was given on these comments by AENOR and the comments do not appear on the UNFCCC’s web-
site. (Jordan, Sogandares, & Arjona, 2011) 
In June 2011, Barro Blanco was approved as a CDM project by the CDM Executive Board under the Kyoto 
Protocol (CDM EB, 2011). Prior to the approval, supplementary information on the additionality of the project 
was sought by the Executive Board (CDM Barro Blanco, 2010), not however on the stakeholder involvement 
or on any specific measures were taken in response to the information gathered.  
41   The OHCHR Report (OHCHR, 2009), building on the consensus among state submissions, points out that 
‘human rights obligations provide important protection to the individuals whose rights are affected by climate 
change or by measures taken to respond to climate change.’ (para. 71) 
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International Organizations)42. Thus, from a legal perspective, rather than answering the 
question based on a macro analysis of the behavior of states in the UNFCCC frame-
work, a micro approach in assessing the specific context of project financing must be 
resorted to. 
Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, a short overview of extraterritorial obligations in the 
context of climate policies will be provided following a more detailed analysis of the project-
level applicability. Thus, the following Sections (2.3.1-2.3.3) will particularly focus on the hu-
man rights obligations of the European actors directly involved (Germany and the Nether-
lands through their development banks DEG and FMO, respectively). Section 2.3.4 will then 
shortly elaborate on further obligations in the context of the implementation of institutional 
policies as well as in the context of other non-state actors, where European states or only 
indirectly involved. 
2.3.1 Responsibility for conduct of bilateral financial institutions in the context of implement-
ing climate policies 
The UNFCCC is guided by the principle to ‘protect the climate system for the benefit of pre-
sent and future generations of mankind’. (Article 3(1) United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 1992) To reach this goal, state parties ‘should take precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its 
adverse effects.’ (Article 3(3) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
42  Note that where states transfer competences to an IO, the ECtHR has developed the doctrine of ‘equivalent 
human rights protection’ when stating that ‘State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justi-
fied as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the sub-
stantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be con-
sidered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides […] If such equivalent protection is con-
sidered to be provided by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the re-
quirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its mem-
bership of the organization.’ (Bosphorus, 2005, paras. 155-156) This presumption can be rebutted in cases 
where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the protection of Convention rights was ‘manifestly defi-
cient’. (para. 157) Thus, where member states of the EU, e.g., vote in Council decisions on the implementation 
of policies in violation of their human rights obligations, they can incur international responsibility in cases 
where no equivalent human rights protection is offered in the organization. Scholars (Nollkaemper, 2011) and 
the International Law Commission (International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/66/10, 2011, para. 1 to Article 
48) have suggested that in the area of shared competences of the EU – as listed in Article 4 TFEU (including 
the internal market, social policy (for the aspects defined in the TFEU), economic, social and territorial cohe-
sion, agriculture and fisheries (excluding the conservation of marine biological resources), environment, con-
sumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, energy, area of freedom, security and justice and the 
common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in the TFEU. Moreover, in the areas 
of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities, in 
particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in 
Member States being prevented from exercising theirs. And finally, in the areas of development cooperation 
and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; 
however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising 
theirs.) – the concept of joint responsibility should apply to the EU and its member states. However, this has 
so far not been explored in great depth. 
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1992) The Bali Action Plan of 2007 (Decision 1/CP.13) reaffirmed financing as one of the key 
components in the development of low-carbon energy projects and climate adaptation, i.e. 
climate financing. Most often, this is done through a framework of funding offered by bilat-
eral financial institutions (BFIs).43 
Against this background, the financing of Barro Blanco as a CDM project deserves particular 
scrutiny. Thus, in August 2011, two months after the CDM Executive Board approved Barro 
Blanco as a CDM project, FMO (Dutch development bank) and DEG (German development 
bank) approved financing of the project. While the ensuing years have led to a number of 
intense campaigns by civil society against European states involved in Barro Blanco and 
similar projects, the following seeks to analyze whether states – through the conduct of their 
bilateral financial institutions – can be liable for human rights violations that occur as a result 
of the projects financed and approved. 
2.3.2 The attribution of bilateral financial institutions to states 
The position of BFIs versus their state varies on a state by state basis. This is essential in the 
determination to which extent the conduct of BFIs can be attributed to the state. Thus, as 
such institutions are commonly established with their own separate legal identity, the ques-
tion particularly arises whether they operate as state organs (Art. 4, International Law Com-
mission, 200144) or they are authorized to fulfill a public mandate (are “empowered by the law 
of that State to exercise elements of […] governmental authority”, Art. 5, International Law 
Commission, 2001) and operate within that mandate in the financing of the case at hand. 
While the ILC Articles on State Responsibility do not define which entities may be classified 
as state organs, it has been clarified that mere ownership of an entity by the state does not 
convert that entity into an organ of the state. (Crawford, 2014, p. 118; Waste Management v. 
United States of Mexico, 200445) In part, case-law has also further determined when it is 
43   Bilateral financial institutions (BFIs) are institutions primarily funded by or owned by one state. The funds of 
BFIs are usually provided by the state, but can also be supplemented by own funds of the bank and money 
raised on capital markets. 
44  Article 4. Conduct of organs of a State 
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, whether the 
organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organi-
zation of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of 
the State.  
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the 
State. 
45  The case concerned the conduct of Banobras, a development bank partly-owned and substantially controlled 
by Mexian government agencies. The Tribunal stated on the question of attribution that  
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possible to consider an entity not formally a state organ a de facto organ. Thus, as the Inter-
national Court of Justice explained in Bosnian Genocide, the ‘particular great degree of State 
control’ (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007, para. 393) is essential 
in coming to this conclusion. Here, as explained by James Crawford, factors such as whether 
the state involvement exceeded the provision of financial assistance, or whether complete 
control was exercised in fact are decisive. (Crawford, 2014, p. 125)  
As described in Section 1.1.2.6, both DEG and FMO are separate legal entities from their 
respective home states. Since the beginning of the 1980s, DEG has financed projects at its 
own risk (previously operating with funds from the Federal Ministry for Economic Coopera-
tion). Since 2001, it has been a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederauf-
bau (KfW) banking group, a promotional bank of the Federal Republic of Germany. KfW is a 
government-owned public entity, with 4/5th of its capital held by the federal German state and 
1/5th by the Bundesländer. It was founded by the 1948 ‘Gesetz über die Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau’46 (as amended several times since then) and is an ‘Anstalt des öffentlichen 
Rechts’ [public agency]. Its Board Members serve in an independent capacity.  
FMO has a mixed public-private ownership structure. The Dutch state is a shareholder own-
ing 51% of the shares. Decisions are made through a Management Board, which is appoint-
ed by an independent Supervisory Board. The members of the Supervisory Board are elect-
ed at shareholder meetings.  
Both DEG and FMO decided to finance the Barro Blanco project without any direct interfer-
ence by state authorities (Fuchtel, 2015a; Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2014) In light 
of this, it therefore seems more appropriate to assess the question of attribution of 
both institutions under Article 5 of the ILC Articles. 
Article 5 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility deals with the attribution of non-state or-
gans which are empowered to exercise elements of governmental authority. Hereunder, the 
Commentary to said Articles lists exemplary ‘public corporations, semi-public entities, public 
agencies of various kinds and even, in special cases, private companies, provided that in 
‘it is doubtful whether Banobras is an organ of the Mexican State within the meaning of Article 4 of the 
[Articles]. Shares in Banobras were divided between the public and private sector, with the former hold-
ing a minimum of 66%. The mere fact that a separate entity is majority-owned or substantially controlled 
by the state does not make it ipso facto an organ of the state.’ (para. 75) 
46    https://www.kfw.de/Download-Center/KfW-Gesetz-und-Satzung-sowie-
Gesch%C3%A4ftsordnungen/KfW_Gesetz_D.pdf.  
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each case the entity is empowered by the law of the State to exercise functions of a public 
character normally exercised by state organs, and the conduct of the entity relates to the 
exercise of the governmental authority concerned.’ (Commission, 2002, Commentary to Art. 
5, para. 2) 
In order to determine whether DEG and FMO exercise governmental authority, it is helpful to 
take their mandate into consideration. FMO defines as its objective to ‘contribute to the ad-
vancement of productive enterprises in developing countries, to the benefit of economic and 
social advancement of those countries, in accordance with the aims pursued by their gov-
ernments and the policy of the Dutch Government on development cooperation’ (FMO In-
vestment Criteria, n.d.) DEG similarly has as its objective ‘to promote business initiative in 
developing and emerging market countries as a contribution to sustainable growth and im-
proved living conditions of the local population’ (DEG, 2015).  
These mandates are to be considered in light of their contexts, i.e. private sector investments 
in developing states often occur against the background that these entities provide basic 
services such as access to water, sanitation, energy, or transport, and are therefore essential 
in the social advancement of the host state’s population. (Dalberg, 2010) As the positive ef-
fects of sustainable investments often are said to have long-term benefits for the home state 
of the bilateral financing institutions (Dalberg, 2010), they play a decisive role in the fulfilment 
of states’ development policies.  
Additional support of perceiving the mandate of bilateral financial institutions as governmen-
tal can be found in the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Prop-
erty (2004, not in force) which lists under its definition of state: the state and its various or-
gans of government; constituent units of a federal state or political subdivisions of the state, 
which are entitled to perform acts in the exercise of sovereign authority, and are acting in that 
capacity; agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other entities, to the extent that they 
are entitled to perform and are actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority 
of the State; and representatives of the State acting in that capacity. (Art. 2, United Nations 
Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property) It has been discussed 
that ‘agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other entities, to the extent that they are 
entitled to perform and are actually performing acts in the exercise of sovereign authority of 
the State’ is wide enough to include such institutions such as central banks, sovereign wealth 
funds etc. (Grant, 2013)  
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In this vein, it would seem that a bilateral development bank would qualify as an agency or 
instrumentality of the state and its conduct could be attributed to the state if indeed exercis-
ing governmental authority in the pertinent case.47 However, it must be added that even in 
the case of central banks, generally equipped with considerable autonomy from the parent 
state; possessing regulatory powers with regard to monetary policies, distinguishing them 
from commercial banks; and holding significant national reserve deposits, the question 
when they are exercising governmental authority and possessing thus the privileged sta-
tus of enjoying immunity, is difficult to determine (Fox & Webb, 2013, p. 370).  
Despite these difficulties, for the purposes of this analysis it will be assessed which human 
rights obligations the EU member states’ have with regard to the development banks operat-
ing abroad both if their conduct is indeed attributable to them. 
2.3.3 Extraterritorial human rights obligations in the context of project approv-
al/financing/monitoring 
Human rights have traditionally been perceived as a matter owed by states to their nationals 
or residents on their territory. Though the pertinent treaties are entered into at the interna-
tional and regional level, implementation occurs domestically, in a vertical relationship be-
tween state and individual.  
In the past years, there has been increased attention directed at the scope of application of 
human rights treaties. The assessment of extraterritorial human rights obligations has been 
accompanied by corresponding case law, international research projects and output of inter-
national organizations as well as international human rights monitoring mechanisms. At 
times, political difficulties in establishing binding extraterritorial obligations, e.g., with regard 
to corporate conduct, has ‘shifted the emphasis of the debate from states’ extra-territorial 
obligation under human rights law to states’ policy rationales to protect human rights in their 
international relations.’ (Augenstein & Kinley, 2013, p. 273)  
47  Note, however, also the difficulties the tribunal had in Waste Management in this regard:  
‘Nor is it clear that in its dealings with the City and the State in terms of the Line of Credit it was exercis-
ing governmental authority within the meaning of Article 5 of those Articles.
 
The Organic Law of 1986 
regulating Banobras’ activity confers on it a variety of functions, some clearly public, others less so. A 
further possibility is that Banobras, though not an organ of Mexico, was acting “under the direction or 
control of” Guerrero or of the City in refusing to pay Acaverde under the Agreement:
 
again, it is far from 
clear from the evidence that this was so.
 
For the purposes of the present Award, however, it will be as-
sumed that one way or another the conduct of Banobras was attributable to Mexico for NAFTA purpos-
es.’ (Waste Management v. United States of Mexico, 2004, para. 75) 
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Time warrants, however, reconsidering this approach and inquiring whether current case-law 
permits evolvement on the issue. Hence, the answer to the question of whether states incur 
responsibility for human rights violations occurring abroad in the context of the implementa-
tion of climate policies – or more specifically, in the case of climate project financing – de-
pends on two factors:  
- First, whether the relevant human rights treaty is applicable by virtue of a situation 
falling under its jurisdictional scope. 
- Second, whether the situation causing a human rights violation is attributable to a 
state and constitutes a breach of its international obligation. 
In determining to which extent states have extraterritorial human rights obligations in the con-
text of project approval/financing/monitoring case-law by regional human rights bodies and 
international courts analyzing the scope of applicable human rights instruments, in particular 
the ECHR, ICCPR and ICESCR, is decisive. The question whether states further-reaching 
obligation with regard to the climate policies will be answered below in Section 2.3.4. 
2.3.3.1  ETO case-law 
The territorial scope of application of human rights treaties relates to the interpretation of 
their so-called jurisdictional clauses.48 The ICCPR49 and ECHR50 both contain such juris-
dictional clauses, limiting the applicability of the Convention to persons ‘within the jurisdic-
tion’ or ‘within its territory and subject to […] [the] jurisdiction’ of state parties. These clauses 
relate to ‘a particular kind of factual power, authority, or control that a state has over a territo-
ry, and consequently over persons in that territory’ (De Schutter et al., 2012, p. 1102; Mila-
novic, 2011, p. 32). The precise standard of control, power or authority, however, varies, as 
will be explored in the following, in particular by resorting to case law. 
48   M. Gondek calls these ‘umbrella clauses’ as they are applicable to all the rights set out in a given treaty. 
(Gondek, 2009, p. 12) As the use of that term is, however, strongly pre-occupied by international investment 
law, the term jurisdictional clause is to be preferred. 
49  Article 2(1) ICCPR defines the ICCPR’s scope of application in the following manner:  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of 
any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status. 
50  Article 1 ECHR states: 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention. 
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Yet, not all human rights treaties contain such explicit jurisdictional clauses, with the 
ICESCR51 constituting the most notable example. In the absence of a clear treaty norm, in-
ternational treaty law does not provide for a default rule, i.e. ‘there is no presumption against 
extraterritoriality […] [and] there is also no presumption in favour of extraterritoriality.’ (Mila-
novic, 2011, p. 11 [emphasis in original]) However, as will be discussed in more detail below, 
certain jurisdictional links (under general international law) or other effective ties might 
serve as additional indications to evaluate when a person is within the jurisdiction of a state 
for the purpose of applying the human rights treaty.  
In light of abovementioned identified human rights violations relating to civil and political 
rights (e.g., participatory rights of indigenous peoples as contained in Arts. 1 and 27 ICCPR) 
and economic, social and cultural rights (e.g., right to property, right to an adequate standard 
of living), both categories will be discussed in the following. As the focus of this section lies 
on determining the threshold in a situation of project financing, attention will be laid on case-
law concerning situations where a state exercises authority over territory or over persons. 
Arguments that the ICESCR extends further and operates beyond this typical scenario by 
inferring further ‘international obligations’ (‘through international assistance and co-operation) 
will be investigated in Section 2.3.4 on ETOs in the context of the implementation of climate 
policies. 
2.3.3.1.1 Civil and political rights 
The development of extraterritorial obligations in the field of civil and political rights stems 
from a series of cases heard by the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as well as the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The majority of cases originate from situations where 
one state exercises territorial control over parts of another state, e.g., in the context of mili-
tary occupation. The following will provide a brief overview of the evolvement in order to iden-
tify the necessary relationship between the respective state and the individual located out-
side a state’s territory. As will be seen, it can be broadly distinguished into two categories: a 
spatial model of jurisdiction and a personal model of jurisdiction. (This distinction has 
been made by a number of scholars, inter alia, Milanovic, 2011; Wilde, 2005) 
51  Article 2 ICESCR states: 
(1) Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through interna-
tional assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
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One of the first cases and still leading on the issue of extraterritorial application of the ICCPR 
is López Burgos (López Burgos, 1981) which concerned a Uruguayan trade union activist 
who had fled to Argentina following a coup d’état. He was kidnapped there by Uruguayan 
security forces, mistreated for several months and then transferred back to Uruguay where 
he was officially arrested. The HRC, in interpreting the phrase ‘individuals subject to its juris-
diction’ as contained in Article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, found that this re-
ferred not to the place where the violation occurred but  
rather to the relationship between the individual and the state in relation to a vio-
lation of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant, wherever they occurred. (para. 
12.2 [emphasis added]) 
Moreover, the HRC stated that  
it would be unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under article of the Cove-
nant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory 
of another State, which violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory. (para. 
12.3) 
Hence, the Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 31 (HRC, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 2004) interpreted Article 2(1) of the ICCPR (‘within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction’) to entail that state parties ‘must respect and ensure the rights 
laid down in the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, 
even if not situated within the territory of the State Party.’ (para. 10, emphasis added)  
This is also in line with the case law of the International Court of Justice which has had the 
opportunity to address the issue of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties at sev-
eral occasions. Firstly, in its Wall Advisory Opinion (Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of the Wall, 2004), the International Court of Justice was concerned with the question of ap-
plicability of the ICCPR and ICESCR (see also below) in connection with Israel’s occupa-
tion of Palestinian territory and the construction of the wall. It confirmed by referral to prior 
practice of the Human Rights Committee that the ICCPR ‘is applicable in respect of acts 
done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.’ (para. 111; later 
reiterated and generalized52 in the context of military action taken by Uganda in the territory 
52   The Court did not refer to a specific treaty but broadly stated that ‘international human rights instruments are 
applicable “in respect of acts done by a state in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory”’ (para. 
216). 
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of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Con-
go (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, 2005, para. 216).)  
The interpretation of the jurisdictional clause contained in the ECHR has proven particularly 
complex and partly incoherent. As one of the authoritative cases on the extraterritorial appli-
cation of the ECHR, the question of necessary control over territory has most prominently 
been discussed in Loizidou v. Turkey (Loizidou, 1995). The case concerned Mrs. Loizidou, 
a Cypriot Greek who lived in Nikosia. She owned several pieces of land in Northern Cyprus, 
however due to the continued occupation and control of the northern party of Cyprus by 
Turkish armed forces, she had been prevented on several occasions from gaining access to 
her home and other properties there. With regard to the discussion on whether the alleged 
conduct could be capable of falling within the ‘jurisdiction’ of Turkey even though they oc-
curred outside its territory, the Court stated that 
[b]earing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility of a 
Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military action – whether 
lawful or unlawful – it exercises effective control of an area outside its national territo-
ry. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the 
Convention derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised directly, 
through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration. [para. 62, 
emphasis added]  
This standard of effective control of an area has since been confirmed in numerous cases 
(see, inter alia, Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001). In Issa and Others v. Turkey (Issa v. Turkey, 
2004) it was even stated that temporal effective overall control could be sufficient (para. 74).  
Other cases evidence the strictness of the standard of effective control and that this does not 
arise in every situation where a state is in a situation to exert considerable influence over a 
situation (a so-called ‘cause-and-effect’ notion of jurisdiction). For example, in Banković 
(Banković, 2001) the ECtHR declined to find a jurisdictional link between the victims and the 
NATO coalition states with regard to the proceedings brought by six relatives of victims of a 
NATO air strike on a radio station in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999, and 
thus rejected that the concerned act fell ‘within the jurisdiction’ of the members of the re-
spondent states. In its discussion, the ECtHR repeatedly emphasized the exceptional ex-
tension of the scope of the ECHR (paras. 59, 67, 71), referring to four types of situations 
where the extraterritorial application could be applicable, i.e. (effective) control over territo-
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ry53, non-refoulement cases (extradition and expulsion), consular or diplomatic cases/flag 
state jurisdiction cases, and extraterritorial effects (‘acts of authorities […] which produced 
effects or were performed outside their own territory’) (referring to Drozd and Janousek, 
1992, para. 91) (Banković, 2001, paras. 68-73). Moreover, as was later also confirmed in 
Medvedyev, dealing with law-enforcement operations at sea, the Court confirmed that ‘the 
provisions of Article 1 did not admit of a “cause-and-effect” notion of “jurisdiction”.’ 
(Medvedyev and Others v. France - 3394/03 [2010] ECHR 384, 2010, para. 64)  
However, the ECtHR appears to have somewhat departed from the strict spatial application 
and understanding of the jurisdictional clause as held in Banković in its further case law. (Mil-
ler, 2009, p. 1228; Ryngaert, 2012, p. 58) Leading in this regard is Al-Skeini and others v. 
United Kingdom (Al-Skeini, 2011). The case concerned allegations against British armed 
forces operating in southern Iraq (Basrah) which resulted in the deaths of six Iraqi civilians, 
five of which were killed by British troops, one who died after being mistreated whilst in the 
custody of the British Army. The ECtHR began its deliberations by stating that  
‘Jurisdiction’ under Article 1 is a threshold criterion. The exercise of jurisdiction is a 
necessary condition for a Contracting State to be able to be held responsible for acts 
or omissions imputable to it which give rise to an allegation of the infringement of 
rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. (para. 130) 
After referring to its previous case law, it found that  
in certain circumstances, the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its ter-
ritory may bring the individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s authori-
ties into the State’s Article 1 jurisdiction. [referring inter alia to Öcalan v. Turkey54, 
para. 91 and Issa and Others v. Turkey55] […] It is clear that, whenever the State 
53   As further defined in Banković, this effective control is exercised “as a consequence of military occupation or 
through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of 
the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.” (para. 71, emphasis added) 
54   In Öcalan v. Turkey (Öcalan, 2005) the Court found Turkey responsible for acts of Turkish officials exercising 
authority outside its territory. They had arrested the applicant in Kenya, physically forcing him to return to Tur-
key. Consequently, he was ‘subject to their authority and control following his arrest and return to Turkey’ (pa-
ra. 93). 
55   Where the Court inter alia stated that: 
A State may also be held accountable for violation of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons 
who are in the territory of another State but who are found to be under the former State’s authority and 
control through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter State […]. Accountabil-
ity in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot be interpreted so as to 
allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it 
could not perpetrate on its own territory.’ (para. 71). 
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through its agents exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus jurisdic-
tion, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the 
rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the situa-
tion of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be ‘divided 
and tailored’. (paras. 136-137) 
The ECtHR concluded that the United Kingdom had assumed ‘some of the public powers 
normally to be exercised by a sovereign government’ and that, consequently, it ‘exercised 
authority and control over individuals killed in the course of such security operations, so as to 
establish a jurisdictional link between the deceased and the United Kingdom for the purposes 
of Article 1 of the Convention.’  
Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (Ilaşcu, 2004) is a further example which has 
been resorted to when suggesting that the standard has slightly loosened since Banković. 
The Court applied the threshold for falling within Article 1’s jurisdictional clause to impute 
responsibility to the Russian Federation in a surprisingly wide manner. In particular, it found 
that the authorities of the ‘Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria’ remained under ‘the effec-
tive authority, or at the very least under the decisive influence of the Russian Federation, and 
in any event that it survives by virtue of the military, economic, financial and political support 
given to it by the Russian Federation.’ (para. 392) [emphasis added] (confirmed in Catan and 
Others, 2012, paras. 103ff). 
In conclusion, the threshold of jurisdiction to extend civil and political human rights obliga-
tions beyond a state’s territory remains a strict one. Most prominently, the standard can be 
described as one of ‘exercise of effective control of an area’ through the ‘exercise of 
public powers’ (spatial model). There are limited indications that the scope of jurisdiction is 
widening throughout the Court’s case law, in particular to situations where an individual is 
brought under the effective control and authority of state agents operating abroad (personal 
model). 
2.3.3.1.2 Economic, social and cultural rights 
In theory, the lack of a jurisdictional clause in the ICESCR bears greater potential for extend-
ing its scope of application to extraterritorial situations. Nevertheless, difficulties arise in par-
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ticular in light of lacking case-law, as the ICESCR has only recently established a complaint 
mechanism and has so far not issued any decisions.56 
Thus, scholarly opinion and the output of the CESCR have particular relevance in this con-
text. Moreover, in 2011, the well-known Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations 
in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial 
Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 2011) were adopted by a 
group of international legal experts. They are based on case law, opinions by international 
institutions as well as scholarly literature, but are non-binding principles and are not open for 
signature by states. As pointed out by one of their authors (Vandenhole, 2013, p. 817), the 
Principles themselves avoid assigning a legal status to the content of the principles, instead 
referring vaguely to the fact that they are ‘[d]rawn from international law.’ (preambular para. 
8) In any event, in an attempt to combine two diametrical positions, i.e. the wide application 
of economic and social rights in an extraterritorial context and the narrow consensus on nor-
mative content, the Maastricht Principles serve as an important starting point. 
A number of scholars see the existence of firm extraterritorial obligations with regard to eco-
nomic and social rights at best still under development. (Coomans, 2004; Sepúlveda, 2003, 
pp. 374–378) The programmatic formulation to achieve the protection of this category of 
rights through ‘progressive realization’, difficulties in identifying direct links between policies 
and violations, and scarce state practice and case law are just some of the issues men-
tioned. (Gondek, 2009, p. 291 ff)  
Nevertheless, in an attempt to clarify the matter, Michał Gondek suggests four typical scenar-
ios where the conduct of a state can affect the economic and social rights of persons situated 
outside its territory: through acts of state agents (also see above’s analysis on ‘effective con-
trol of an area’); through omissions (e.g., failure to regulate the conduct of corporations regis-
tered in its territory); through domestic economic policies (e.g., by a state subsidizing its do-
mestic agriculture); and indirectly through activities of international organizations in whose 
decision-making states participate (e.g., international financial institutions deciding on devel-
opment projects the implementation of which may lead to deprivation of economic and social 
rights). (Gondek, 2009, p. 291 ff)  
56  The Optional Protocol to the ICESCR foreseeing an individual complaints procedure only came into force on 5 
May 2013. As of August 2015, six cases are pending, see 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/PendingCases.aspx.  
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The following highlights the little case-law available on the scope of application of the 
ICESCR and investigates to which extent these scenarios are covered thereby. 
With regard to the ICESCR, the most authoritative statement can be found in abovemen-
tioned Wall Advisory Opinion (Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall, 2004). 
But even the few passages in this Opinion remain vague. After pointing out that the ICESCR 
does not contain any provision on its scope of application, the Court elaborates that this 
might be because the rights contained in the Convention are ‘essentially territorial.’ (para. 
112) However, at the same time it emphasized with regard to the applicability of the ICESCR 
that ‘it is not to be excluded that it applies both to territories over which a State party has 
sovereignty and to those over which that State exercises territorial jurisdiction‘. (para. 112) 
Hence, it came to the conclusion that in light of the fact that the concerned (occupied) territo-
ries had been subject to Israel’s territorial jurisdiction for over 37 years, it was both bound by 
the provisions of the ICESCR and under the obligation ‘not to raise any obstacle to the exer-
cise of such rights in those fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian au-
thorities.’ (para. 112) 
Similarly, the Maastricht Commentary cites General Comment No. 8 by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which confirms that: 
When an external party takes upon itself even partial responsibility for the situation 
within a country (whether under Chapter VII of the Charter or otherwise), it also una-
voidably assumes a responsibility to do all within its power to protect the economic, 
social, and cultural rights of the affected population. (CESCR, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1997/8, 1997, para. 13)  
Hence, in situations where a state is in a position to exercise effective control over territories 
and populations (cf. CESCR, UN Doc. E/C12/1/Add.90, 2003, para. 31), it is bound by the 
provisions contained in the ICESCR in relation thereto.  
While it is difficult to measure the normative value thereof in practice, the output of interna-
tional institutions with regard to other human rights treaties provides some guidance in the 
determination of the scope of jurisdiction. Hence, as also stipulated in Principle 9 of the 
Maastricht Principles, states have the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil economic, 
social and cultural rights where they a) exercise authority or effective control (whether in ac-
cordance with international law or not)57; b) where their acts and omissions bring about fore-
57  See the discussion above on civil and political rights. 
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seeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights (whether within or 
outside its territory)58; and c) where the state, acting separately or jointly, is in a position to 
exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize economic, social and cultural rights 
extraterritorially, in accordance with international law.59  
In conclusion, while the ICESCR is conceptualized in a broader sense and is thus more sus-
ceptible to extraterritorial application than the ICCPR, the weak normative content of many of 
its aspirational provisions make enforcement difficult.  
2.3.3.2  ETOs in the context of financed climate projects 
As can be deduced from the above, the traditional scenario of extending the scope of appli-
cation of human rights treaties to territories/persons outside a state’s territory relates to situa-
tions where a state exercises territorial control over parts of another state by virtue of an ex-
ercise of public powers, e.g., through military presence or through acts of a state’s security 
forces. To date, there is no jurisprudence on human rights violations occurring in the course 
of a single project, such as a development project, despite numerous instances having raised 
international concern, accompanied with calls for action to hold the responsible actors re-
sponsible. Nevertheless, it is argued that the spatial model of jurisdiction bears potential 
with regard to financed projects. 
2.3.3.2.1 Understanding effective control  
While the ECtHR and HRC have extended the jurisdictional reach of the respective treaties 
to cases where states exercise ‘effective control’ over an area, the case law so far does not 
substantiate in great detail what ‘effective control’ looks like. (See also Milanovic’s attempt to 
define 'effective' as meaning that 'the state needs to have enough power over the territory 
and inhabitants to broadly do as it pleases', Milanovic, 2011, pp. 137–138) Also, as Judge 
Bonello put it in his concurring opinion in Al-Skeini, “[t]he Court’s case-law on Article 1 of the 
Convention (the jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties) has, so far, been bedevilled by an 
58  Both examples given in subpara. b) relate to situations where an individual under a state’s authority is re-
moved from a state’s jurisdiction, i.e. through extradition to a non-contracting state which has ‘sufficiently prox-
imate repercussions on rights guaranteed by the Convention’ (Ilaşcu, 2004, para. 317) or the handing over to 
another state’s authorities (Mohammed Munaf, 2009). As the Human Rights Committee has explained, in such 
circumstances, a causal chain measured by factors of foreseeability is required (‘the risk of an extra-territorial 
violation must be necessary and foreseeable consequence and must be judged on the knowledge the State 
party had at the time’, para. 14.2.). Moreover, as the Commentary emphasizes, this relates to the respective 
treaties and does not express the scope of obligations under general international law. (De Schutter et al., 
2012, p. 1108)  
59   Subpara. c) refers to the obligation of international cooperation. On this see below on XXXX. 
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inability or an unwillingness to establish a coherent and axiomatic regime, grounded in es-
sential basics and even-handedly applicable across the widest spectrum of jurisdictional con-
troversies.” (Al-Skeini, 2011, Concurring Opinion, para. 4) This varying and at times incoher-
ent approach to the matter has made it difficult to discern clear guidance on the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of Art. 1. 
The facts of the so far adjudicated cases relate to situations of military control, influence or 
authority, thus pointing towards a particularly high threshold as the authority exercised is 
closely aligned with core sovereign functions. Thus, extraterritorial state activities which incur 
the application of human rights treaties are related to the exercise of sovereign, or rather 
public, powers on a foreign territory. 
From the case law of the ECtHR, it is clear that the Court understands effective control to be 
narrower than ‘effective overall control’. In Cyprus v. Turkey, it found that as Turkey exer-
cised ‘effective overall control’ over Northern Cyprus, it was not necessary to hold in the spe-
cific case at hand that the exercise of control was detailed. (Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001, para. 
77; Wilde, 2005) Thus, while there might be situations where a state exercises such influ-
ence over another state or area (see also the abovementioned Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova 
and Russia (Ilaşcu, 2004)) that it can be said to have overall responsibility to ensure compli-
ance with its human rights obligations, the general approach will be to determine a more lim-
ited but at the same time more detailed standard of control. 
A similar discussion can be followed on the control standard in the sense of Article 8 ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility.60 Thus, the discussion on the necessary control has shifted 
from effective control (Nicaragua), to overall control (Tadic), back to effective control (Appli-
cation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bos-
nia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007). Though relating to attribution and 
not to the question of jurisdictional scope of human rights treaties, the ICJ’s understanding of 
‘effective control’ demonstrates the high level of involvement necessary to reach the stand-
ard of ‘effectiveness’:  
‘United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, organiz-
ing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or 
60  Art. 8 ILC Articles on State Responsiblity: 
“The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under international 
law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or con-
trol of, that State in carrying out the conduct. The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be con-
sidered an act of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the 
instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.” 
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paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in 
itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of attrib-
uting to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their military or 
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States participation mentioned 
above, and even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a high degree 
of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the 
United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and 
humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts could well be committed by mem-
bers of the contras without the control of the United States. For this conduct to give rise to le-
gal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State 
had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the al-
leged violations were committed.’ (para. 115, emphasis added) 
 
Hence, it is clear from this evolvement that in order for a situation to fall under the effective 
control of a state, more than mere financing, organizing, training, supplying and equip-
ping is required. Rather, there must be directions or enforcement of the perpetration 
of acts contrary to human rights. 
2.3.3.2.2 Extent of control in the context of project financing and the exercise of public pow-
ers 
Applying above-elaborated standard in the context of climate project financing entails adopt-
ing the criteria to the given context. Two primary aspects must be considered: firstly, whether 
a state has ‘effective control’ over the project’s implementation by virtue of its approval, 
financing, and monitoring functions; and secondly, whether in the course thereof it is exercis-
ing ‘public powers’. 
In the sense of the Nicaragua standard, it is clear that the mere financing or approval of a 
project does not suffice to establish effective control over a spatially-delimited project. In 
most circumstances, a project will be authorized, mostly even commissioned, by local host 
governments. The specific requirements which must be met (environmental impact assess-
ment, acquisition of property, obtaining the necessary concessions), all fall within the compe-
tence of local authorities.  
For example, in the case of Barro Blanco, the bid was awarded by ASEP to GENISA in 2006, 
and an EIA was conducted and approved by Panama’s environmental authority ANAM in 
May 2008. By June 2011, the construction had begun, the project was registered as a CDM 
project and the government was confronted with a series of protests and lawsuits. Only in 
August 2011, however, was financing through FMO and DEG secured. A series of alleged 
human rights violations, dealt with in more detail above, had already been committed at this 
point in time. Thus, even though the argument might be made that these banks – and as a 
consequence their respective home state – should have been aware of significant human 
rights deficiencies occurring in the context of the project’s implementation before they ap-
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proved financing, it cannot be said that the approval and financing of the project led to the 
effective control of FMO or DEG over the project. 
A limited amount of control resulted from the monitoring activities of the financing institutions. 
That is, in the financial loan agreements, there were additional requirements which the pro-
ject operator was to fulfill by the time of the first disbursement of funds (FMO/DEG IEP, 2015; 
see also Fuchtel, 2015b) Nevertheless, as also pointed out by the report issued by the com-
plaint mechanism, certain issues such as the cultural value of the land, were hard for the 
lenders to influence. (FMO/DEG IEP, 2015, para. 167) The lack of extensive influence is also 
evident in light of the lack of participation in continuing negotiations and mediation attempts 
between the government and the affected communities, under guidance of the UN and other 
third parties. 
Finally, even if it is determined that a state’s development bank exercises sufficient control 
and authority of a spatially-delimited project in order for it to fall within the jurisdictional scope 
of the ECHR or ICCPR, this still does not mean that “anything that occurs within a state’s 
jurisdiction is attributable to it. It would still be necessary to establish that the particular act 
that is alleged to be a human rights violations is attributable to the state.” (Milanovic, 2011, p. 
52)  
Hence, in this context it is particularly important to correlate the authority exercised by the 
project financers to a type of public powers. As stated previously, this relates to those pow-
ers “normally to be exercised by a sovereign government” (Al-Skeini, 2011, para. 149). In Al-
Skeini, the ECtHR referred to the fact that the United Kingdom had “assumed authority and 
responsibility for the maintenance of security” (ibid.), i.e. it exercised military authority 
through its soldiers engaged in security operations. This had been transferred on the UK on 
the basis of an official letter which the UK and US had sent to the President of the Security 
Council, announcing that they had formed a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA 
also conferred the additional powers on the CPA members, i.e. the exercise of legislative and 
executive authority as well as the administration of justice.61  
While this was based on an officially declared assumption of sovereign powers, the ECtHR 
already emphasized in Loizidou v. Turkey that the lawfulness of the exercise of public pow-
ers is not a decisive determining factor (Loizidou, 1995, para. 62) Thus, similar to the func-
tional test suggested by Judge Bonello in his concurring opinion in Al-Skeini (Al-Skeini, 
61  Such powers also have been transferred in other transitional administrative arrangements by the United Na-
tions (e.g. UNTAET, UNMIK) (Larsen, 2012, p. 190). 
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2011), a focus must be on determining when a state is in a position to ensure the observance 
of human rights. It does so in five ways: “firstly, by not violating (through their agents) human 
rights; secondly, by having in place systems which prevent breaches of human rights; thirdly, 
by investigating complaints of human rights abuses; fourthly, by scourging those of their 
agents who infringe human rights; and, finally, by compensating the victims of breaches of 
human rights.” (para. 10) Hence, the issue to decide is whether a state exercises such sov-
ereign functions that it can prevent human rights violations from occurring, punish perpetra-
tors and offer justice to victims of human rights abuses. 
In the context of project financing, there might be situations where a power vacuum in a state 
or the clear absence of legislation adhering to international standards shifts the burden of 
responsibility on the financing entity. In such a scenario, a project operator will still have to 
comply with the financial partner’s policies to, e.g., conduct an environmental impact as-
sessment, negotiate to obtain the consent of the affected communication through adequate 
procedures etc.  
Where the financing partner – and thereby its state through means of attribution – thus fulfils 
a public power function or exercises de facto regulatory/governmental powers, it can be ar-
gued that the state would assume due diligence obligations under the respective human 
rights treaties with regard to individuals and communities affected in the context of the im-
plementation of a project. Hence, these would by virtue of the ‘most’ effective control exer-
cised over the spatially-delimited project’s area fall “within the jurisdiction” of the state financ-
ing, approving and monitoring the project in the sense of the ECHR’s or ICCPR’s jurisdic-
tional clauses.  
In light of the case-law issued by the ECtHR and the HRC, the threshold is necessarily a high 
one. 
2.3.3.3  Analysis and conclusion 
Extending the scope of the jurisdictional clause contained in Art. 1 ECHR or Art. 2 of the 
ICCPR to include situations where a state through its agents exercises effective control over 
a spatially-limited project fosters the universal protection of human rights. It realizes that 
states should ensure the protection of human rights of those persons which are within the 
scope of conduct over which it can exercise considerable influence/effective control and 
where they assume a public purpose function. This extension should, however, only be ap-
plied under strict circumstances. Hence, while it is important to emphasize that the host state 
where the project is implemented is never absolved from its human rights obligations, in situ-
ations where the financial partner exercises substantial functional control over the project’s 
implementation and operation, especially through the exercise of de facto legislative or exec-
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utive authority, as well as through the administration of justice, the extension of the scope of 
the ECtHR’s or ICCPR’s application would be justified. Still lacking any clear case law on the 
issue, however, at present this is still to be viewed with adequate caution. 
2.3.4 Extraterritorial obligations in the context of policies – obligation to regulate 
Despite the lack of binding case law, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights has been forthcoming in recognizing and proclaiming extraterritorial obligations in its 
General Comments. It has repeatedly emphasized the ‘international obligations’ of state 
parties. For example, General Comment 12 on the Right to Food (CESCR, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/5, 1999) calls on states to  
‘take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, to protect that right, 
to facilitate access to food and to provide the necessary aid when required. States parties 
should, in international agreements whenever relevant, ensure that the right to adequate food 
is given due attention and consider the development of further international legal instruments 
to that end. States parties should refrain at all times from food embargoes or similar measures 
which endanger conditions for food production and access to food in other countries. Food 
should never be used as an instrument of political and economic pressure.’ (paras. 36-37) 
Similar passages can be found also in General Comments relating to the Right to Water62 
and the Right to Health63. Such international obligations are complemented and partly effec-
tuated by obligations of international cooperation (Art. 2(1) ICESCR).  
With regard to obligations of member states arising under the ICESCR – where control is 
absent –, general agreement on its applicability is limited to the obligation to respect, i.e. the 
obligation to refrain from conduct which impairs the enjoyment of economic, social and cul-
62   To comply with their international obligations in relation to the right to water, States parties have to respect the 
enjoyment of the right in other countries. International cooperation requires States parties to refrain from ac-
tions that interfere, directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of the right to water in other countries. Any activi-
ties undertaken within the State party’s jurisdiction should not deprive another country of the ability to realize 
the right to water for persons in its jurisdiction. States parties should refrain at all times from imposing embar-
goes or similar measures, that prevent the supply of water, as well as goods and services essential for secur-
ing the right to water. Water should never be used as an instrument of political and economic pressure. [...] 
Steps should be taken by States parties to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the right to 
water of individuals and communities in other countries. Where States parties can take steps to influence oth-
er third parties to respect the right, through legal or political means, such steps should be taken in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations Charter and applicable international law. (CESCR, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11, 2003 paras. 31ff) 
63   To comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties have to respect the enjoy-
ment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from violating the right in other coun-
tries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law. Depending on the availability of resources, 
States should facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other countries, wherever 
possible and provide the necessary aid when required. […]Accordingly, States parties which are members of 
international financial institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional de-
velopment banks, should pay greater attention to the protection of the right to health in influencing the lending 
policies, credit agreements and international measures of these institutions. (CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, 
2000, para. 39) 
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tural rights outside of a state’s territory. Additionally, there is some consensus that aspects of 
the obligation to protect through regulating those (non)-state actors which a state is in a po-
sition to regulate are accepted, including the investigation of alleged breaches, providing 
redress, as well as ensuring that international organizations they participate in (or to which 
they have transferred competences) likewise do not interfere with economic, social and cul-
tural rights, as far as they are in a position to control this. This consensus is generally lacking 
with regard to the obligation to fulfil (Gondek, 2009, p. 360). 
The most readily available obligation to identify in this regard in therefore the obligation to 
regulate. That is, if in fact a certain proximate relationship between a state and a particular 
measure can be established, the state’s due diligence obligation inter alia in environmental 
matters provides certain safeguards for the affected population (realizing the difficulties aris-
ing in this context, Humphreys, 2012). As is also elaborated in the ECtHR’s case law, states 
are under an obligation to protect those within their jurisdiction from the ‘immediate and 
known risks’ (Öneryildiz, 2004, para. 109) to which they are exposed. In Öneryildiz v. Tur-
key, the ECtHR found that the state officials and authorities had not done everything within 
their power to avert risks brought to their attention, and that they therefore ‘know or ought to 
have known that there was a real and immediate risk to a number of persons living near the 
[…] municipal rubbish tip.’ (para. 101). Similar was also found in Budayeva v. Russia (Buda-
yeva, 2008), concerning a series of mudslides, where the ECtHR reiterated that Article 2 
ECHR lays down a positive obligation on states to take appropriate steps to safeguard the 
lives of those within their jurisdiction. This entails inter alia the obligation to install a ‘legisla-
tive and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to 
the right to life’, whether the threat stems from public activities or not (paras. 129-130).64 
Russia was found responsible for the  
64  The ECtHR continued detailing this obligation:  
132. [S]pecial emphasis must be placed on regulations geared to the special features of the activity in 
question, particularly with regard to the level of the potential risk to human lives. They must govern the li-
censing, setting up, operation, security and supervision of the activity and must make it compulsory for 
all those concerned to take practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens whose lives 
might be endangered by the inherent risks. Among these preventive measures, particular emphasis 
should be placed on the public's right to information, as established in the case-law of the Convention in-
stitutions. The relevant regulations must also provide for appropriate procedures, taking into account the 
technical aspects of the activity in question, for identifying shortcomings in the processes concerned and 
any errors committed by those responsible at different levels (see Öneryıldız, cited above, §§ 89-90).  
133. It has been recognised that in the context of dangerous activities the scope of the positive obliga-
tions under Article 2 of the Convention largely overlap with those under Article 8 (see Öneryıldız, cited 
above, §§ 90 and 160). Consequently, the principles developed in the Court's case-law relating to plan-
ning and environmental matters affecting private life and home may also be relied on for the protection of 
the right to life. 
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authorities’ omissions in implementation of the land-planning and emergency relief policies in 
the hazardous area of Tyrnauz regarding the foreseeable exposure of residents, including all 
applicants, to mortal risk. (para. 158)  
Moreover, this obligation also can be identified with regard to the conduct of corporations 
headquartered in a state. The question when states are in a position to regulate the conduct 
of TNCs or non-state actors has been subject to much debate. The obligation to protect 
against human rights abuses is a due diligence standard, i.e. an obligation of conduct and 
not result. (McCorquodale & Simons, 2007, p. 615) The Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (Report of the Special Representative of the SG on the Issue of Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 2011) 
find that a state might be in such a position if some sort of jurisdictional basis exists. At the 
same time they stipulate that while there is no prohibition to regulate the extraterritorial 
activities of businesses domiciled in a state’s territory/jurisdiction, there is also no 
obligation to do so. 
In practice, states have approached this by sometimes drafting extraterritorial legislation, 
sometimes merely requiring parent companies to report on their global operations. (Report of 
the Special Representative of the SG on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, 2011, p. 4) However, corporate 
structures (e.g., the separate legal personality of foreign subsidiaries) further complicate the 
matter, and hardly lend themselves to more than cases of indirect regulatory obligations, i.e. 
by requiring the parent to impose certain requirements/conditions on its subsidiaries. 
(McCorquodale & Simons, 2007, p. 616)  
Applied in the context of climate measures, this would mean that states are expected to have 
an appropriate legislative and administrative framework in place to ensure that, e.g., the cli-
mate change mitigation projects they or their corporations are involved in abroad do not en-
danger the protection of the rights guaranteed under the ECHR. Within the field of project 
finance often-times competing policies intersect, carrying on the one hand potential to en-
sure international standards by adding institutional layers which assess social and environ-
mental risk additional to the assessments carried out by host states, but on the other hand 
also the risk for affected communities to be victim of human rights violations which have sub-
stantially been contributed to by entities located abroad and often not subject to domestic 
jurisdiction. (Leader & Ong, 2013, pp. 3–4)  
The obligation to regulate in the context of project finance refers to ‘the exercise of control of 
one actors (the regulator) over other actors through (1) the setting of standards, (2) the moni-
toring of actors’ conduct, both to assess compliance and to determine whether changes to 
existing standards are necessary, and (3) enforcement of these standards where compliance 
is adequate.’ (Sarro, 2012, p. 1532)  
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Hence, in concreto, states involved in the approval and financing of projects should ensure 
that their institutions have according policies and due diligence standards in place.  
Moreover, a second subject-level of the obligation to regulate can be observed. Id est, these 
institutions must ensure that the project operators act in compliance with these standards. 
Where there is a failure to respect these standards, there must be some sort of conse-
quence, be it a refusal of approval, a cancellation of the loan, and – as discussed in Section 
2.4 – access to justice for affected communities. (Leader & Ong, 2013, p. 114)  
Through their supervisory and administrative boards, government officials exercise indirect 
influence over then respective bank policies. Both FMO and DEG apply inter alia the IFC 
Performance Standards (in the current project study, the 2006 versions are pertinent). In the 
course of the project’s implementation, a number of conditions and milestones were set by 
them, and an international technical advisor team was employed to monitor compliance with 
the standards as well as the imposed conditions. (DEG and FMO Management Response, 
2015) However, in terms of measurable output, the identified failure to negotiate with the 
legitimate indigenous authorities was not met with any significant response. As a core issue 
of the concerns of the affected communities, this constitutes a clear and discernible short-
coming. 
2.3.5 Analysis and conclusion 
In conclusion, identifying extraterritorial human rights obligations in the context of climate 
policies, and in particular in the context of climate project finance, is set within the traditional 
debate of interpreting the jurisdictional scope of human rights treaties. Thus, as already con-
cluded above, only in limited circumstances these policies which have an external effect re-
sult in the sufficient control-relationship between state and affected communities.  
However, there are certain aspects which still play an important role, in particular the obliga-
tion to refrain from conduct which impairs the enjoyment of human rights outside if their terri-
tory and the obligation to ensure appropriate legislative and administrative regulatory frame-
works. This is not only expected under the ECHR/ICCPR, but also receives additional di-
mensions under the ICESCR. Hence, the scope of the ICESCR is said to be broader and 
lays a particular focus on the ‘international obligations’ of state parties.  
2.4 Access to justice 
A further essential aspect in the course of the investigation relates to access to justice and 
the determination through which means a breach of obligations can be invoked. In the follow-
ing, a focus will be laid both on judicial and non-judicial means of access to justice. 
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As the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement 
emphasize, ‘[a]ll persons threatened with or subject to forced evictions have the right of ac-
cess to timely remedy. Appropriate remedies include a fair hearing, access to legal counsel, 
legal aid, return, restitution, resettlement, rehabilitation and compensation, and should com-
ply, as applicable, with the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law.’ (Basic Principles (Development-based Dis-
placement), 2007, Principle 59)  
Where financing institutions are concerned, this entails them establishing or acceding certain 
complaint mechanisms for such cases. (Basic Principles (Development-based Displace-
ment), 2007, Principle 72) 
So far, a number of non-judicial and judicial mechanisms have been resorted to by the af-
fected communities. As explored in more detail in Section 1.4, the United Nations has taken 
up the case through a variety of bodies (UNDP, Special Rapporteur on the Right of Indige-
nous Peoples), as have reports been issued by further human rights monitoring bodies (in 
particular CERD).  
A number of legal proceedings have been dealt with by Panama’s Supreme Court. While the 
proceeding against the EIA was ultimately rejected (in October 2014), a second case against 
ASEP’s resolution permitting the taking of the land was won. The Supreme Court also sus-
pended the construction of the project for a period of time. While it lifted the suspension after 
a few months, the political dialogue on the issue has resulted in an agreement to install an-
other technical commission to evaluate the effects of the project. In the meantime, the con-
struction remains on hold.  
With regard to the lenders, FMO and DEG established a complaint mechanism in 2014 (see 
Section 1.4.3 for details). Even though the Independent Expert Panel found that a number of 
issues remained open at the time of project approval, the Management Response of the 
banks has remained meagre. 
Overall, the events in the case evidence how judicial and non-judicial means reinforce one 
another. There remain some avenues to explore for the affected communities, e.g., in partic-
ular a filing of a complaint with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. However, 
in light of the usual length of proceedings (sometimes decades), this is not particularly prom-
ising. 
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3 Preliminary conclusions 
The study of the Barro Blanco case has revealed a number of issues which are exemplary to 
the overall research question of the human rights impact of climate policies. The climate pro-
ject financed concerns the development of natural resources through the construction of a 
hydroelectric power plant on the river Tabasará by a local corporation, financed by two Euro-
pean development banks and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). 
The project, once completed, will have impacts on an indigenous area (parts of the comarca 
Ngäbe-Buglé), and force members of the indigenous community to relocate as their houses 
will be flooded.  
Even though the international community has been aware of the ongoing protests and the 
concerns of the affected indigenous community for their livelihood, their response have not 
had a meaningful impact for the resolution of the dispute. 
The present study identified three main aspects where the project’s impacts on human rights 
were particularly evident:  
- The authorization of the project occurred without the free, prior and informed con-
sent (FPIC) of the affected communities.  
- The process of implementation occurred without adequate due diligence assess-
ments/monitoring.  
- And thirdly, there is a threat of forced displacement from indigenous land. 
On this basis, a number of issues can be identified where recommendations can made: 1) 
financing of projects with a long-lasting political conflict; 2) explicit human rights mandate; 3) 
access to justice. 
Financing of projects with a long-lasting political conflict 
Overall, the current case exemplifies how a lack of due diligence exercised at the initial stag-
es of a development project and a failure to undertake culturally appropriate consultations 
can exacerbate existing conflicts and prevent mutually beneficial agreements from being 
reached at a later stage. 
The duty to exercise due diligence applies in particular to financing institutions involved in the 
approval of the project. Here, it is necessary for them to apply an increased due diligence 
standard in situations where tensions and resistance by local affected communities is 
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brought to their attention in advance. Where the affected communities are indigenous peo-
ples, cultural appropriateness of the overall procedure of the consultation process is a key 
element for a sustainable outcome.  
In addition, it is imperative to base the project’s implementation on a comprehensive envi-
ronmental and social impact assessment. Hence, where gaps in the assessment are found to 
exist, the process must remain at that stage and not proceed in hope for a beneficial resolu-
tion of the issues. 
Also, in situations where tensions are identified at an early stage, it would be advisable to 
include the affected communities in the monitoring process, which would be beneficial in 
overcoming mutual trust issues and establishing a functioning dialogue.  
Explicit human rights mandate and access to justice 
The answer to the question which actors carry which human rights obligations in the context 
of the project’s implementation is particularly complex. While European actors have un-
doubtedly a political responsibility to ensure that their conduct does not infringe the human 
rights of persons affected thereby, the determination of justiciable rights which can be 
claimed in a judicial forum is harder to make. 
To date, the UNFCCC fails to provide individuals with human rights protection or direct re-
course. Also, the CDM Executive Board is not equipped with a human rights mandate. This is 
particularly problematic in light of greenhouse gas mitigation measures being financed and 
approved in one state but implemented in another state. Thus, individuals negatively affected 
by such policy measures are often located in the territory of a state which has no decisive or 
singular role to play in the implementation thereof.  
The inclusion of human rights safeguards at the institutional level would therefore be a signif-
icant improvement. At the same time, this is closely related to the access to justice which 
constitutes a fundamental aspect in ensuring the effective protection of human rights.  
Access to justice entails inter alia to have an effective forum for victims of human rights viola-
tion to obtain justice. In the context of climate project finance, this is an issue of concern at 
the national, project-level as well as international level.  
In this regard, also the jurisdictional hurdle of human rights treaties plays an indirect role. 
Applying the regime of extraterritoriality in this context is challenging. Thus, the threshold of 
jurisdiction to apply civil and political human rights obligations contained in the ICCPR and 
ECHR beyond a state’s territory remains a strict one. Most prominently, the standard can be 
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described as one of ‘exercise of effective control of an area’ through the ‘exercise of public 
powers’ (spatial model). There are limited indications that the scope of jurisdiction is widen-
ing throughout the Court’s case law, in particular to situations where an individual is brought 
under the effective control and authority of state agents operating abroad (personal model). 
In theory, the lack of a jurisdictional clause in the ICESCR bears greater potential for extend-
ing its scope of application to extraterritorial situations. Nevertheless, difficulties arise in par-
ticular in light of lacking case-law, as the ICESCR has only recently established a complaint 
mechanism and has so far not issued any decisions65. In any event, even though the 
ICESCR is conceptualized in a broader sense and is thus more susceptible to extraterritorial 
application than the ICCPR, the weak normative content of many of its aspirational provi-
sions make enforcement difficult.  
However, extending the scope of the jurisdictional clause contained in Art. 1 ECHR or Art. 2 
of the ICCPR to include situations where a state through its agents exercises effective con-
trol over a spatially-limited project would foster the universal protection of human rights and 
is thus highly recommendable. It would also be a response to the realization that states 
should ensure the protection of human rights of those persons which are within the scope of 
conduct over which it can exercise considerable influence/effective control and where they 
assume a public purpose function.  
Overall, the events in the case evidence how judical and non-judicial means may reinforce 
one another. Nevertheless, effectiveness of the remedy has been an issue of concern. This 
is also an aspect to which continued attention should be paid with regard to the complaint 
mechanism established by FMO/DEG. In particular, the question may be asked what the 
impact of the outcome of the complaint will be on the further implementation of the project.  
 
 
65 Parties… Austria not ratified…. 
 108 
                                               
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
References  
ACD. (2009) Commentaries on the Validation of the Hydroelectric Project Barro Blanco, 
Republic of Panama. Retrieved from http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/Comments_Osvaldo-Jordan_July-2009.pdf  
ACS. (2015, July 13) ACS applies SHOCS therapy to Caribbean nations. Retrieved from 
http://www.acs-aec.org/index.php?q=disaster-risk-reduction/acs-applies-shocs-
therapy-to-caribbean-nations 
AENOR. (2011) CDM validation report. 
AIDA. (2015) AIDA: Protecting communities and the environment in the Americas. Retrieved 
from http://www.aida-americas.org/about 
AIDA, CIEL, Earthjustice Amicus Curiae. (2013) Amicus Curiae dentro del proceso que 
contiene la Demanda Contencioso Administrativa de Nulidad, interpuesta por Félix 
Wing Solís en nombre y representación de Adelaida Miranda, Ítalo Jiménez, Eugenio 
Carpintero y Manolo Miranda, contra la Resolución DIEORA IA-332-2008 de 9 de 
mayo de 2008, de la Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente. 
Aizprúa, J. C. (2015, June 22) Cacica Carrera y M-10 aceptan volver al diálogo. Retrieved 
July 1, 2015, from http://impresa.prensa.com/nacionales/Cacica-Carrera-M-10-
aceptan-dialogo_0_4237826230.html 
Al-Skeini. Al-Skeini and others v. United Kingdom, Judgment, ECtHR, App. No. 55721/07, 7 
July 2011 (ECtHR 2011). 
ANAM. (2015, February 9) ANAM ordena paralización de obras del Proyecto Hidroeléctrico 
Barro Blanco por incumplimientos de EIA. Retrieved June 23, 2015, from 
http://miambiente.gob.pa/index.php/homepage/ultimas-noticias/otras-noticias/959-
anam-ordena-paralizacion-de-obras-del-proyecto-hidroelectrico-barro-blanco-por-
incumplimientos-de-eia  
ANAM PDD. (2015, July 1) MDL. Retrieved July 1, 2015, from 
http://miambiente.gob.pa/index.php/mitigacion/que-es-el-mdl 
Andritz. (2013) Panama - Barro Blanco. Hydronews, 23(06-2013), 30. 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 2007 ICJ 43 (Judgment, 26 February) (ICJ 
2007). 
Arghiris, R. (2011, June 15) In Defence of the Rio Tabasara. Retrieved June 30, 2015, from 
https://intercontinentalcry.org/in-defence-of-the-rio-tabasara/ 
Arghiris, R., & Kennedy, J. (2015, June 14) Indigenous activists block entry to the Barro 
Blanco hydro dam. Retrieved July 1, 2015, from https://intercontinentalcry.org/ngabe-
block-entry-to-barro-blanco-hydro-dam-panama-28186/ 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 2005 ICJ 168 (Judgment, 19 
December) (ICJ 2005). 
Augenstein, D., & Kinley, D. H. (2013) When Human Rights “Responsibilities” become 
“Duties”: the Extra-Territorial Obligations of States that Bind Corporations, 271–294. 
 109 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
Banković. Banković et al. v. Belgium et al., Admissibility, ECtHR, App. No. 52207/99, 12 
December 2001 (ECtHR 2001). 
Banktrack. (n.d.) Barro Blanco dam project. Retrieved from 
http://www.banktrack.org/show/dodgydeals/barro_blanco_dam_project#tab_dodgyde
als_update 
Barro Blanco PDD. (2010) CDM PDD Barro Blanco Version 03. 
Basic Principles (Development-based Displacement). Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
Development-based Evictions and Displacement, Pub. L. No. A/HRC/4/18 (2007). 
Bocharel, F. (2015) Barro Blanco project to move forwards. La Prensa, (4 May 2015). 
Retrieved from http://www.prensa.com/in_english/Barro_Blanco-silvia-carrera-
comarca-ngabe-bugle-rodolfo-aguilera_21_4201289835.html 
Bosphorus. Bosphorus v. Ireland, ECtHR, Judgment, App. No. 45036/98, 30 June 2005 
(ECtHR 2005). 
Both ENDS. (2015, May 6) Both ENDS: Construction of Barro Blanco dam will be resumed. 
Retrieved June 23, 2015, from http://www.bothends.org/en/News/Laatste-
nieuws/newsitem/411/Construction-of-Barro-Blanco-dam-will-be-resumed 
Both ENDS. (n.d.) Both ENDS: Barro Blanco. Retrieved July 13, 2015, from 
http://www.bothends.org/en/News/Our-stories/Barro-Blanco/ 
Budayeva. Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Judgment ECtHR, App. Nos. 15339/02, 
21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02, 20 March 2008 (ECtHR 2008). 
CABEI Constitutive Agreement. Constitutive Agreement of the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration (1960). 
Cansari, R., & Gausset, Q. (2013) Along the Road: The Ngäbe-Buglé Struggle to Protect 
Environmental Resources in Panama. The International Indigenous Policy Journal, 
4(3), 15. 
Castro de la Mata, G. (2013a, August 29) Peritaje al Proyecto Hidroelectrico Barro Blanco 
Resultados del Diagnostico Rural Participativo. 
Castro de la Mata, G. (2013b, September 2) Peritaje al Proyecto Hidroelectrico Barro Blanco 
- Analisis de Los Aspectos Ecologicos y Economicos. 
Catan and Others. Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Judgment, EctHR, App. Nos. 
43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06, 19 October 2012 (ECtHR 2012). 
CBD Guidelines. (n.d.) Guidelines for Incorporating Biodiversity-Related Issues Into 
Environmental Impact Assessment Legislation and/or Process and in Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (endorsed by COP 6 Decision VI/7. 
CCAD/SICA. (2010) Regional Strategy on Climate Change. 
CDM Barro Blanco. (2010, December 14) Project: 3237 Barro Blanco Hydroelectric Power 
Plant Project - History. Retrieved from 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/AENOR1261468057.59/history 
CDM EB. (2011) CDM EB Meeting 61. 
Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of 
Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya. (2009, November 25). Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare 
Council) v. Kenya, Comm. No. 276/03. 
CERD UN Doc. A/52/18, Annex V. (1997, August 18). General Recommendation No. 23, 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
 110 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
CERD, UN Doc. CERD/C/PAN/CO/15-20. (2010, May 19). Concluding Observations 
Panama. 
CESCR, UN Doc. E/1991/23. (1991) General Comment No. 3: The Nature of State Parties’ 
Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant. 
CESCR, UN Doc. E/C12/1/Add.90. (2003, June 26) Concluding observations of the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights -  Israel. 
CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8. (1997) General Comment No. 8: The relationship between 
economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights. 
CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/5. (1999) General Comment 12: Right to adequate food. 
CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4. (2000) General Comment 14: Right to Health. 
CESCR, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11. (2003, January 20) General Comment No. 15: The Right 
to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant). E/C.12/2002/11. 
chiriquinatural. (n.d.) chiriquinatural.com: La Verdad sobre el fallido foro público de BARRO 
BLANCO en Tolé (febrero 8, 2008). Retrieved from 
http://chiriquinatural.blogspot.co.at/2012/09/la-verdad-sobre-el-fallido-foro-
publico.html 
CIAM et al. (2013a, June 14) Request to James Anaya to meet about the Barro Blanco 
project during July 2013 visit to Panama. 
CIAM et al. (2013b, June 24) Letter to Mr. John Knox by 14 NGOs. Retrieved from 
http://carbonmarketwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Letter-to-John-Knox-
Barro-Blanco-24-June-2013.pdf 
CIEL Press release. (2013, August 29) Groups Support Challenge to Dam Project in Panama 
for Violating Indigenous Rights - Amicus brief highlights unlawful consultation 
process. Retrieved from 
http://www.ciel.org/Law_Communities/BarroBlanco_29Aug2013.html 
CIEL Press release. (2014, February 20). Groups Appeal to UN to Halt Imminent Forced 
Evictions of Indigenous Ngöbe Community. Retrieved from 
http://www.ciel.org/Law_Communities/Panama_20Feb2014.html 
CMW. (2011) Massive Protests against Barro Blanco Hydropower Project in Panama - 
Carbon Market Watch. Retrieved May 19, 2015, from 
http://carbonmarketwatch.org/massive-protests-against-barro-blanco-hydropower-
project-in-panama/ 
Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/79. (2006, March 22) Indigenous 
Issues – Human Rights and Indigenous Issues, Report of the Working Group 
Established in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32 of 
3 March 1995 on its eleventh session. 
Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/7. (1997, July 2) Annex: The 
Practice of Forced Evictions: Comprehensive Human Rights Guidelines on 
Development-Based Displacement. 
Commission, U. N. I. L. (2002) The International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries. Cambridge University Press. 
Coomans, F. (2004) Some Remarks on the Extraterritorial Application of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In F. Coomans & M. T. 
Kamminga (Eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (pp. 183–
200). Antwerp, Oxford: Intersentia. 
Counter Balance. (2011, November) Dire Straits - EIB Investments in Panama and Their 
Impacts on Indigenous Communities Worker and the Environment. 
 111 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
Crawford, J. (2014) State Responsibility. Retrieved August 24, 2015, from 
http://www.cambridge.org/at/academic/subjects/law/public-international-law/state-
responsibility-general-part 
Cyprus v. Turkey. Cyprus v. Turkey, Merits, ECtHR, App. No. 25781/94, 10 May 2001 
(ECtHR 2001). 
Dalberg. (2010, July 7) The Growing Role of the Development Finance Institutions in 
International Development Policy. Retrieved from https://www.deginvest.de/DEG-
Documents-in-English/Download-Center/EDFI_The-growing-role-of-DFIs-in-
International-Development-Policy_2010.pdf 
DEG. (2015, June 23) Financing opportunities - shaping development. Retrieved from 
https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/DEG/Die-DEG/Was-wir-tun/ 
DEG. (n.d.) Complaint Mechanism. Retrieved May 19, 2015, from 
https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/DEG/Die-
DEG/Verantwortung/Beschwerdemanagement/ 
DEG and FMO Management Response. (2015, May 29) DEG and FMO Management 
Response to the Independent Expert Panel’s Compliance Review Report regarding 
the Barro Blanco complaint. 
DEG Guideline for sustainability. (n.d.) DEG Guideline for environmental and social 
sustainability. 
DEG response. (2015, June 24) Stellungnahme Berichterstattung „Report Mainz“ am 
23.06.2015. Retrieved from https://www.deginvest.de/DEG-Dokumente/Die-
DEG/Verantwortung/20150624_Stellungnahme_DEG_ReportMainz.pdf 
De Schutter, O., Eide, A., Khalfan, A., Orellana, M., Salomon, M., & Seiderman, I. (2012) 
Commentary to the Maastricht  Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations  of States in 
the Area of Economic,  Social and Cultural Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 34, 
1084–1169. 
Drozd and Janousek. Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, Judgment, ECtHR, App. No. 
12747/87, 26 June 1992 (ECtHR 1992). 
EIA. (2015, July 13) US Energy Information Administration - Panama. Retrieved from 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/?fips=pm 
EIB Barton. (2013) Written Questions to EIB Director Tamsyn Barton - Hearing on 21 
January 2013. 
EIB CM. (n.d.) Barro Blanco Hydroelectric , Panama. Retrieved May 19, 2015, from 
http://www.eib.org/about/accountability/complaints/cases/barro-blanco-hydroelectric-
panama.htm 
EIB SG/E/2009/11. (2009) Barro Blanco Hydroelectric , Panama. Retrieved June 30, 2015, 
from http://www.eib.org/about/accountability/complaints/cases/barro-blanco-
hydroelectric-panama.htm 
Espoo Convention. (1997, September 10) Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 
in a Transboundary Context,1989 UNTS 309. 
eurodad. (2012) DEG factsheet. Retrieved from 
http://www.eurodad.org/files/pdf/53be75764add2.pdf 
European Commission, E/2007/482. (2007, March 29) Panama Country Strategy Paper 
2007-2013. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/panama/csp/07_13_en.pdf 
FAO. (2015, July 13) FAO Country Profiles. Retrieved July 13, 2015, from 
http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/index/en/?iso3=PAN 
 112 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
FMO. (2013) Independent Complaints Mechanism FMO. 
FMO. (2015a) FMO About FMO. Retrieved from https://www.fmo.nl/about-us/profile/history 
FMO. (2015b, May 18) FMO’s Reaction to Article in De Volksgrant. Retrieved from 
https://www.fmo.nl/k/n1771/news/view/19660/20819/fmo-s-reaction-to-article-in-de-
volkskrant.html 
FMO. (2015c, May 29) Independent Expert Panel Publishes Report on Barro Blanco. 
Retrieved from https://www.fmo.nl/k/n1771/news/view/20692/179/independent-
expert-panel-publishes-report-on-barro-blanco.html 
FMO/DEG Barro Blanco Complaint. (2014, May 5) Barro Blanco Complaint - Annex 1: 
Analysis of Policies and Procedures. 
FMO/DEG IEP. (2015, May 29) Barro Blanco Hydroelectric Project Panama - Panel Report 
No. 1. 
FMO Investment Criteria. (n.d.) FMO General Investment Critera. Retrieved from 
https://www.fmo.nl/general-investment-criteria 
FMO Investment Policies. (2015) Investment Policies. Retrieved from http://www.fmo-
im.nl/investment-policies 
FMO Position Statement. (n.d.) FMO Position Statement - Hydropower. Retrieved from 
https://www.fmo.nl/position-statements 
Forum of Ministers of Latin America and the Caribbean. (2014, March 14) Declaration of Los 
Cabos - XIX Meeting of the Forum of Ministers of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Retrieved from http://www.pnuma.org/forodeministros/19-
mexico/documentos/Declaracion/MINISTERIAL_DECLARATION_VERSION_FINAL.
pdf 
Fox, H., & Webb, P. (2013) The Law of State Immunity. OUP Oxford. 
Fuchtel, H.-J. (2015a, März) Antwort des Parlamentarischen Staatssekretärs Hans-Joachim 
Fuchtel vom 5. März 2015 auf die kleine Anfrage des Abgeordneten Niema Novassat 
im Deutschen Bundestag. 
Fuchtel, H.-J. (2015b, July 6) Antwort des Parlamentarischen Staatssekretärs Hans-Joachim 
Fuchtel vom 6. Juli 2015 auf die Anfrage des Abgeordneten Uwe Kekeritz im 
Deutschen Bundestag. 
GENISA. (2011) GENISA Project Management Report, Environmental and Social Summary 
Report. 
GENISA. (n.d.) Barro Blanco FAQs. Retrieved from http://www.genisa.com.pa/en/faqs/ 
Giardinella, A. S., Baumeister, B. A., & Da Silva, C. Y. (2011) Status of the Development of 
Renewable Energy Projects in the Republic of Panama. 
Gondek, M. (2009) The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties. Antwerp, Oxford, Portland: Intersentia. 
Gordon, R. (2009) Panama and the Specter of Climate Change. University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review, 41, 129. 
Grant, T. (2013) Article 2(1)(a) and (b). In R. O’Keefe & C. J. Tams (Eds.), The United 
Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property – A 
Commentary (pp. 40–53). 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, 
submitted pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39, Pub. L. No. 
E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (1998). 
 113 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
Hofbauer, J. (2015) A Legal Guide to the Rights of Peoples: The Determination of Elements 
of Sovereignty Through the Exercise of the Right to Self-Determination. 
HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/12/34. (2009, July 15) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, James 
Anaya. 
HRC, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13. (2004) General Comment 31, Nature of the 
General Legal Obligations on States Parties to the Covenant. 
HRC, UN Doc. CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3. (2008, April 17) Concluding Observations Panama. 
Human Rights Council, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/15/14. (2010, October 6) Resolution 15/14: 
Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
Humphreys, S. (2012) Climate Change and International Human Rights Law. In R. Rayfuse 
& S. Scott (Eds.), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (pp. 29–57). 
Cheltenham and Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
IFC. (2006, April 30) IFC Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustainability. 
IFC. (2012, January 1) IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability. Retrieved from 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/c8f524004a73daeca09afdf998895a12/IFC_Perfo
rmance_Standards.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
Ilaşcu. Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, Judgment, ECtHR, App. No. 48787/99, 8 
July 2004 (ECtHR 2004). 
ILC Articles on Prevention (with Commentaries). (2001) Draft articles on Prevention of 
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, with commentaries. 
ILO Convention No. 107. (1957) Indigenous and Tribunal Peoples Convention. 
ILO Convention No. 169. ILO Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries, Pub. L. No. 1650 UNTS 383 (1989). 
Intercontinental Cry. (2011) In Defence of the Rio Tabasara. Retrieved May 11, 2015, from 
https://intercontinentalcry.org/in-defence-of-the-rio-tabasara/ 
International Law Commission. (2001) Report of the Commission to the General Assembly – 
Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
commentaries. 
International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/66/10. (2011) Draft articles on the responsibility of 
international organizations. 
International Rivers. (2013) Chronology of Events for Barro Blanco Dam (Panama). 
Retrieved May 11, 2015, from http://www.internationalrivers.org/chronology-of-
events-for-barro-blanco-dam-panama 
Issa v. Turkey. Issa and Others v. Turkey, Judgment, ECtHR, App. No. 31821/96, 16 
November 2004 (ECtHR 2004). 
Jordan, O., Sogandares, O., & Arjona, M. (2011, February 15) Barro Blanco Hydropower 
Project in Panama violates CDM Rules (Newsletter #12) - Carbon Market Watch. 
Retrieved July 1, 2015, from http://carbonmarketwatch.org/barro-blanco-hydropower-
project-in-panama-violates-cdm-rules-newsletter-12/ 
Jung, M. (2005) Host Country Attractiveness for CDM Non-sink Projects (SSRN Scholarly 
Paper No. ID 704265). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network. Retrieved 
from http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=704265 
 114 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
Kälin, W. (2000) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement - Annotations. Washington 
D.C.: The American Society of International Law and the Brookings Institution. 
Kampala Convention. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (2009). 
Kearns, R. (2012) Massive Indigenous Protest in Panama Spurs Accord With Government. 
Retrieved from http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/02/10/massive-
indigenous-protest-panama-spurs-accord-government-96996 
KfW DEG. (2014, February) Independent Complaints Mechanism DEG. Retrieved from 
https://www.deginvest.de/DEG-Documents-in-English/About-
DEG/Responsibility/DEG_Complaints-Mechanism_2014_05.pdf 
KfW DEG. (2015) Environmental and social standards as the primary basis. Retrieved from 
https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/DEG/Die-DEG/Was-wir-tun/#3 
KfW DEG. (n.d.) Complaint Mechanism. Retrieved July 13, 2015, from 
https://www.deginvest.de/International-financing/DEG/Die-
DEG/Verantwortung/Beschwerdemanagement/ 
KfW Environmental & Social Impact Assessments. (2015) Environmental & Social Impact 
Assessments. Retrieved June 30, 2015, from https://www.kfw.de/nachhaltigkeit/KfW-
Group/Sustainability/Sustainability-Management/Guidelines/Environmental-and-
social-impact-assessments/ 
Kopp, U. (2013, May 10) Antwort der Parlamentarischen Staatssekretärin Gudrun Kopp vom 
10. Mai auf die kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Ute Koczy im Deutschen 
Bundestag. 
Larsen, K. M. (2012) The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Leader, S., & Ong, D. (Eds.). (2013) Global Project Finance, Human Rights and Sustainable 
Development (Reprint edition). Cambridge University Press. 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of the Wall. Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 ICJ 136 (Advisory 
Opinion, 9 July) (ICJ 2004). 
Letter to FMO complaints office. (2014, April 28) Autoridad tradicional y Movimiento 10 de 
Ab¡il (M-I0)“Por la conservación y defensa de los recursos hldricos y ambientales del 
poeblo Ngábe-Buglé y Campesion.” 
Letter to the CDM Executive Board. (2011, February 9) Letter to the CDM Executive Board 
Regarding the Barro Blanco Hydroelectric Project. Retrieved June 30, 2015, from 
http://www.internationalrivers.org/resources/letter-to-the-cdm-executive-board-
regarding-the-barro-blanco-hydroelectric-project-3078 
Loizidou. Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections and Merits, ECtHR, App. No. 15318/89, 
23 March 1995 (ECtHR 1995). 
López Burgos. López Burgos v. Uruguay, Human Rights Committee, Case No. 52/79, 29 
July 1981, UN Doc. A/36/40 (Human Rights Committee 1981). 
López García, L. (2013, September 5) Peritaje independiente de la presa de Barro Blanco, 
Panamá: informe final de la componente de ingeniería hidráulica. 
M10 et al. (2015, June 4) Movimiento 10 de Abril presents letter of concern to Dutch and 
German embassies in Panama. Retrieved from 
http://grievancemechanisms.org/news/movimiento-10-de-abril-presents-letter-of-
concern-to-dutch-and-german-embassies-in-panama 
 115 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. (2011, September 28). Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial 
Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
McCorquodale, R., & Simons, P. (2007) Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility 
for ExtraterritorialViolations by Corporations of International Human Rights Law. 
Modern Law Review, 70(4), 598–625. 
Medvedyev and Others v. France - 3394/03 [2010] ECHR 384 (ECHR (2010) March 29, 
2010). Retrieved from http://www.bailii.org/cgi-
bin/markup.cgi?doc=/eu/cases/ECHR/2010/384.html&query=Medvedyev&method=bo
olean 
Milanovic, M. (2011) Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, 
and Policy. Oxford & New York: OUP. 
Miller, S. (2009) Revisiting Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Territorial Justification for 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction under the European Convention. European Journal of 
International Law, 20(4), 1223–1246. 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, M.-2014. 14200. (2014, April 3) Barro Blanco -  
Beantwoording vragen van het lid Jasper van Dijk over de gedwongen verhuizing van 
de Ngöbe-stam vanwege de bouw van de Barro Blanco dam in Panama. 
Minority Rights Group International. (2010) Climate change forcing relocation of Panama’s 
indigenous Kuna. 
Misión de Verificación. (2012, December) Informe de la Misión de Verificación - Realizada 
del 23 al 28 de septiembre de 2012. 
Mohammed Munaf. Mohammed Munaf v. Romania, Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 
1539/2006, 21 August 2009, UN Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 (HRC 2009). 
Nollkaemper, A. (2011) Joint Responsibility Between the EU and Member States for Non-
Perfornance of Obligations Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements. ACIL 
Research Paper No. 2011-14. Retrieved from http://www.sharesproject.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2011/12/Nollkaemper-Joint-responsibility-EU-and-MS-for-
Multilateral-Environment-Agreements.pdf 
Nowak, M. (2005) U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary. N.P. 
Engel. 
O’Boyle, M. (2004) The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: A Comment on “Life After Banković.” In F. Coomans & M. T. Kamminga 
(Eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (pp. 125–139). 
Öcalan. Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment, ECtHR, App. No. 46221/99, 12 May 2005 (ECtHR 
2005). 
OeEB projects. (n.d.) Langfristige Kreditlinie an Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration. Retrieved from http://www.oe-eb.at/de/projekte/Seiten/central-american-
bank-for-economic-integration.aspx 
OeEB Standards. (2015) Environmental and Social Standards. Retrieved from http://www.oe-
eb.at/en/about-oeeb/pages/environmental-social-standards.aspx 
OHCHR. (2009, January 15) Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner  
for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change   and human rights - 
UN Doc. A/HRC/10/61. 
OHCHR. (2012) The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights - An Interpretative 
Guide. 
 116 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
OHCHR. (2014). Forced Evictions - Fact Sheet No. 15 Rev. 1. Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS25.Rev.1.pdf 
OHCHR. (2015, July 13). OHCHR Panama. Retrieved from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/LACRegion/Pages/PAIndex.aspx 
Öneryildiz. Case of Öneryildiz v. Turkey, Judgment, ECtHR, App. No. 48939/99, 30 
November 2004 (ECtHR 2004). 
Panama Supreme Court. (2000, December). Demanda Contencioso Administrativa de 
Nulidad interpuesta por el Lic. Jacinto Cárdenas (Expediente 665-00). 
Pedersen, O. W. (2011). Janus-Head of Human Rights and Climate Change: Adaptation and 
Mitigation, The. Nordic Journal of International Law, 80, 403. 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, UN Doc. E/C/19/2005/3. (2005, February 17). 
Report of the International Workshop on Methodologies Regarding Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent and Indigenous Peoples. 
Pulp Mills (ICJ). (2010). Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, 2010 ICJ 14. 
Purdy, B. (2013). Ignoring FPIC Leads to 30 Years of Protest, Violence, and Profit-Loss in 
Panama. Retrieved from http://firstpeoples.org/wp/ignoring-fpic-leads-to-30-years-of-
protest-violence-and-profit-loss-in-panama/ 
Report of the Special Representative of the SG on the Issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie. (2011, 
March 21). Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31). 
Human Rights Council. 
Rodríguerz-Pinero Royo, L. (2010). Political Participation Systems Applicable to Indigenous 
Peoples. In M. Weller & K. Nobbs (Eds.), Political Participation of Minorities: A 
Commentary on International Standards and Practice (pp. 308–342). OUP. 
Roht-Arriaza, N. (2010). “First, do no Harm”: Human Rights and Efforts to Combat Climate 
Change. Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 38(3), 593. 
Ryngaert, C. (2012). Clarifying the Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 28(74), 57–60. 
Sands, P., & Peel, J. (2012). Principles of International Environmental Law. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Saramaka v. Suriname. (2006, June 23). Application to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights in the Case of Twelve Saramaka Clans against the Republic of Suriname, 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case No. 12.338. 
Saramaka v. Suriname (Ct). (2007, November 28). Case of the Saramaka People v. 
Suriname (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. 
Sarayaku v. Ecuador. (2012, June 27). Case of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku 
v. Ecuador (Merits and Reparations). Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
Sarro, D. (2012). Do Lenders Make Effective Regulators? An Assessment of the Equator 
Principles on Project Finance, German Law Journal, 13(12), 1500-1555. 
Schertow, & Arghiris. (2011). Panama: Indigenous movement deeply concerned about the 
Barro Blanco Dam. Retrieved May 19, 2015, from 
https://intercontinentalcry.org/panama-indigenous-movement-deeply-concerned-
about-the-barro-blanco-dam/ 
Sepúlveda, M. M. (2003). The Nature of the Obligations Under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Utrecht: Intersentia. 
 117 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
Social and Economic Rights Action Centre & the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria. (2001, October 27). Social and Economic Rights Action Centre & the Centre 
for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96 (SERAC), 
ACHPR/COMM/A044/1. 
Sogandares, O. (2012, June 4). Massive Protests against Barro Blanco Hydropower Project 
in Panama - Carbon Market Watch. Retrieved July 13, 2015, from 
http://carbonmarketwatch.org/massive-protests-against-barro-blanco-hydropower-
project-in-panama-2/ 
Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing. (2013, December). Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate 
standard of living, and on the right to non-discrimination in this context, Raquel 
Rolnik. 
Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/52/Add.1_en. (2014). Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya. 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Discrimination 
Against Indigenous Populations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/25. (1988, June 21). 
Working Paper by Ms. Erica-Irene A. Daes Containing a Set of Draft Preambular 
Paragraphs and Principles for Insertion Into a Universal Declaration on Indigenous 
Rights. 
Sullivan, M. P. (2012). Panama: Political and Economic Conditions and U.S. Relations. 
Congressional Research Service. 
Swyter, N. (2013, August 15). Panama: Dam Promises or Dam Lies? Retrieved July 1, 2015, 
from http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/central-america-panama-ng%C3%A4be-
bugl%C3%A9-indigenous-tribe-hydroelectric-dam-tabasar%C3%A1-river-company-
genisa-barro-blanco 
The Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua. (2001, August 
31). Awas Tingni (Merits) (The Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of Awas 
Tingni v. Nicaragua), 2001 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Judgment, 31 August). 
Turner, A. (2011). El derecho a la consulta de los pueblos indígenas de Panamá. In Derecho 
Indígena en Panamá (pp. 77–97). Panama: FLACSO. 
Tzevelekos, V. P. (2014). Reconstructing the Effective Control Criterion in Extraterritorial 
Human Rights Breaches: Direct Attribution of Wrongfulness, Due Diligence, and 
Concurrent Responsibility. Michigan Journal of International Law, 36(1), 129–178. 
UNDP. (2013, February). Reflections - Insights from Resident Coordinators on generating 
entry points for UN engagement. Retrieved from https://undg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/Reflections-Publications.pdf 
UNDRIP. (2007, September 13). UNGA Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 61 UN GAOR (vol. III), Supp. No. 49, p. 15, UN Doc. 
A/61/49. 
UNFCCC. (2015, June 23). UNFCCC - Full list of DNAs. Retrieved from 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/DNA/bak/index.html#P 
UNFCCC CDM. (2015, July 1). UNFCCC project search. Retrieved from 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html 
UNGA, UN Doc. A/61/PV.107. (2007, September 13). 107th plenary meeting. 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). 
UN-REDD Programme. (2013). Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent. 
 118 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
Urgent Appeal. (2014, February 18). Imminent Forced Evictions of Indigenous Ngöbe 
Families due to Barro Blanco Dam in Panama. 
Vandenhole, W. (2013). Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations: Taking Stock, looking 
Forward. European Journal of Human Rights, 2013/5, 804–835. 
Velásquez Runk, J. (2012). Indigenous Land and Environmental Conflicts in Panama: 
Neoliberal Multiculturalism, Changing Legislation, and Human Rights. Journal of Latin 
American Geography, 11(2), 21–47. 
Waste Management v. United States of Mexico. (2004, April 30). ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/3. 
Wiessner, S. (2008). Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law, 41. 
Wilde, R. (2005). Legal “Black Hole”?: Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty 
Law on Civil and Political Riights. Michigan Journal of International Law, 26(3), 739–
806. 
World Bank. (2011, April). Panama Dashboard - Climate Risk and Adaptation Country 
Profile. Retrieved from 
http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportalb/home.cfm?page=country_profile&CCode=
PAN&ThisTab=Overview 
World Bank Data. (2015, July 13). Panama. Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/panama 
World Bank OD 4.20. (1991, September). World Bank Operational Manual, Operational 
Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples (replaced in 2005 with Operational Policy 4.10). 
Retrieved from 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/835cc50048855270ab94fb6a6515bb18/OD420_I
ndigenousPeoples.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
 
 119 
